Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment
11 Feb 2013-Journal of Law and Courts (University of Chicago PressChicago, IL)-Vol. 1, Iss: 1, pp 3-34
Abstract: Most social scientists take for granted that law is defined by the presence of a centralized authority capable of exacting coercive penalties for violations of legal rules. Moreover, the existing approach to analyzing law in economics and positive political theory works with a very thin concept of law that does not account for the distinctive attributes of legal order as compared with other forms of social order. Drawing on a model developed elsewhere, we reinterpret key case studies to demonstrate how a theoretically informed approach illuminates questions about the emergence, stability, and function of law in supporting economic and democratic growth.
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TL;DR: In this article , the authors distinguish legal markets from the market for lawyers and show how excessive regulation of our legal markets, by lawyers themselves, distorts economic activity and growth, and does so primarily by inhibiting investment in the legal and regulatory technologies needed to respond to the transformation of the economy wrought by globalization, digitization, aspirations for inclusion, and the coming of artificial intelligence.
Abstract: The existence of an effective legal system is assumed throughout economic analysis, and yet there has been little study of the economics of legal markets themselves. Research to date has focused narrowly on the economics of markets for lawyers. In this review, I distinguish legal markets from the market for lawyers and show how excessive regulation of our legal markets—by lawyers themselves—distorts economic activity and growth. It does so primarily by inhibiting investment in the legal and regulatory technologies needed to respond to the transformation of the economy wrought by globalization, digitization, aspirations for inclusion, and the coming of artificial intelligence. (JEL J44, K00, K40, L84)
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TL;DR: In this paper, Miller's readings of ancient Iceland's sagas and extensive legal code aim to reconstruct and illuminate the society that produced them, revealing a complex interplay of ordering and disordering impulses.
Abstract: This work seeks to delve beneath the chaos and brutality of the Norse world to discover a complex interplay of ordering and disordering impulses. William Miller's readings of ancient Iceland's sagas and extensive legal code aim to reconstruct and illuminate the society that produced them.
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TL;DR: It is found that, in the first situation, the announcement of CP never decreases the level of resistance, and in the second situation, CP can be successful.
Abstract: The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future “wrong-doing” by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking enthusiasm, or soldiers showing cowardice to the enemy. CP could consist of the lockout of workers, additional training units for football teams, increased control of athletes and firms, up to the shooting of fellow villagers of assassins. I investigate two classes of problems. In one class, resistance against an authority is individually costly, but enough resistance can be successful (the production of a public good, for example, higher wages after a strike). In the other case, “resistance” is individually profitable (a criminal activity as pollution) and enough “resistance” produces a public bad. We find that, in the first situation, the announcement of CP never decreases the level of resistance. In the second situation, CP can be successful.
2 citations
Cites background from "Law without the State: Legal Attrib..."
...Even the “Zero-Tolerance Policy” may be regarded as a form of CP [1]....
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12 May 2021
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined strategies of human resource management in the absence of institutional hedging by norm-enforcing institutions such as a state monopoly of violence by using case studies of criminal organizations.
Abstract: The article examines strategies of human resource management in the absence of institutional hedging by norm-enforcing institutions such as a state monopoly of violence by using case studies of criminal organizations. This condition provides a test-bed for studying the effects of human relations management strategies on organizational performance.,For this purpose, a case study methodology is applied. Three cases are selected to build a scale from complete plasticity of an undifferentiated network via a status differentiated gang to a hierarchical organization that provides social positions. The case studies are analysed by qualitative content analysis, network analysis and agent-based simulation.,An undifferentiated network based on informal trust lacks mechanisms for conflict resolution. This is a highly vulnerable organizational structure. While a status differentiated gang is more resilient towards internal conflicts, its activities remain dependent on individually accumulated social capital. This organizational structure is not resilient over generations of actors. A hierarchical organization provides highest degree of structural resilience up to a level of a system of self-organized criticality.,The study of human relations management outside the legal world provides insights into the basic mechanisms and functional effects of organizational activity.
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01 Jan 2018TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the sagas of Icelanders depict a violent society in which even the slightest transgression could result in a prolonged feud that could last for generations, and they stress that the conflicts described in sagas mostly involve the social elites, the wealthy free farmers and chieftains, who were the only members of society vested with the social and material capital necessary for sustaining prolonged feuds.
Abstract: The sagas of Icelanders depict a violent society in which even the slightest transgression could result in a prolonged feud that could last for generations. The aim of this study is to ascertain how closely this description of medieval Iceland resembles social reality. Using both narrative and legal sources, as well as the anthropological research of other authors, I argue that the saga age of Iceland was not as violent as the sogumenn (storytellers) imply. I stress that the conflicts described in the sagas mostly involve the social elites, the wealthy free farmers and chieftains, who were the only members of society vested with the social and material capital necessary for sustaining prolonged feuds. Disputes between members of the lower classes, and across the social strata were less violent than those depicted in sagas. Moreover, there were several social factors in operation which limited the scale of interpersonal violence, including cultural and legal norms promoting moderation.
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References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers in the context of social norms and economic action in the social sciences, and propose several categories of economic action.
Abstract: List of Abbreviations Volume 1 Preface to the 1978 Re-issue Preface Introduction Part One: Conceptual Exposition I. Basic Sociological Terms II. Sociological Categories of Economic Action III. The Types of Legitimate Domination IV. Status Groups and Classes Part Two: The Economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers I. The Economy and Social Norms II. The Economic Relationships of Organized Groups III. Household, Neighborhood and Kin Group IV. Household, Enterprise and Oikos V. Ethnic Groups VI. Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion) VII. The Market: Its Impersonality and Ethic (Fragment) Volume 2 VII. Economy and Law (The Sociology of Law) IX. Political Communities X. Domination and Legitimacy XI. Bureaucracy XII. Patriarchalism and Patrimonialism XIII. Feudalism, Standestaat and Patrimonialism XIV. Charisma and Its Transformation XV. Political and Hierocratic Domination XVI. The City (Non-Legitimate Domination) Appendices Index
6,034 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment and that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishments are possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out.
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
4,353 citations
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01 Jan 1961
TL;DR: The Foundations of a Legal System as mentioned in this paper is an example of a legal system based on formalism and rule-scepticism, and it can be seen as a union of primary and secondary rules.
Abstract: Introduction 1. Persistent Questions 2. Laws, Commands, and Orders 3. The Variety of Laws 4. Sovereign and Subject 5. Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules 6. The Foundations of a Legal System 7. Formalism and Rule-Scepticism 8. Justice and Morality 9. Laws and Morals 10. International Law Postscript
3,929 citations
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TL;DR: It is shown experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation, and that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punished.
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the sel®sh motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation ¯ourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
3,813 citations
"Law without the State: Legal Attrib..." refers background in this paper
...Fehr and Gachter ð2002Þ show that people in laboratory settings are frequently willing to engage in such conduct; Henrich et al. ð2006Þ demonstrate this for several populations around the world....
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