Journal ArticleDOI
Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment
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Abstract:
Most social scientists take for granted that law is defined by the presence of a centralized authority capable of exacting coercive penalties for violations of legal rules. Moreover, the existing approach to analyzing law in economics and positive political theory works with a very thin concept of law that does not account for the distinctive attributes of legal order as compared with other forms of social order. Drawing on a model developed elsewhere, we reinterpret key case studies to demonstrate how a theoretically informed approach illuminates questions about the emergence, stability, and function of law in supporting economic and democratic growth.read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
Group size effect and over-punishment in the case of third party enforcement of social norms
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the effect of the number of third party punishers in a group on the average punishment intensity of a player in a prisoner's dilemma, and find that when there are too many third-party punishers, a defector's expected payoff is far lower than that of a cooperator due to strong aggregate punishment.
Journal ArticleDOI
Building Legal Order in Ancient Athens
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test the robustness of modern assumptions by turning to the case of ancient Athens and show that Athens' legal order relied on institutions that achieved common knowledge and incentive compatibility for enforcers in a largely decentralized system of coercion.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Problem of Social Order: What Should We Count as Law?
TL;DR: Schauer and McAdams as mentioned in this paper argue that coercive penalties are delivered only if the decentralized application of punishment by ordinary individuals is successfully coordinated and incentivized, and that coercive force is needed to deter conduct when coordination incentives are absent or insufficient.
Journal ArticleDOI
Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature
TL;DR: The authors analyse both accounts of the state of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games, and suggest that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality.
Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal Relations in Support of Innovation
Iva Bozovic,Gillian K. Hadfield +1 more
TL;DR: This paper found that companies that described innovation-oriented external relationships reported making extensive use of formal contracts to plan and manage these relationships, however, they did not generate these formal contracts in order to secure the benefits of a credible threat of formal contract enforcement; instead, like Macaulay's original respondents, they largely relied on relational tools.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
Economy and society : an outline of interpretive sociology
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers in the context of social norms and economic action in the social sciences, and propose several categories of economic action.
Journal ArticleDOI
Altruistic punishment in humans.
Ernst Fehr,Simon Gächter +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment and that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishments are possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out.
Book
The Concept of Law
TL;DR: The Foundations of a Legal System as mentioned in this paper is an example of a legal system based on formalism and rule-scepticism, and it can be seen as a union of primary and secondary rules.
Posted Content
Altruistic Punishment in Humans
Ernst Fehr,Simon Gaechter +1 more
TL;DR: It is shown experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation, and that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punished.