Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment
11 Feb 2013-Journal of Law and Courts (University of Chicago PressChicago, IL)-Vol. 1, Iss: 1, pp 3-34
Abstract: Most social scientists take for granted that law is defined by the presence of a centralized authority capable of exacting coercive penalties for violations of legal rules. Moreover, the existing approach to analyzing law in economics and positive political theory works with a very thin concept of law that does not account for the distinctive attributes of legal order as compared with other forms of social order. Drawing on a model developed elsewhere, we reinterpret key case studies to demonstrate how a theoretically informed approach illuminates questions about the emergence, stability, and function of law in supporting economic and democratic growth.
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TL;DR: In the subsequent century Germanic governance institutions changed in a number of ways as discussed by the authors, such as temporary military commanders elected from the nobility gave way to standing retinues under the leadership of professional commanders and public assemblies met more frequently and regularly.
Abstract: Julius Caesar and Cornelius Tacitus provide characterizations of early Germanic (barbarian) society around, respectively, 50 BC and 50 AD. The earlier date corresponds to expansion of Rome to the Rhine and Danube. During the subsequent century Germanic governance institutions changed in a number of ways. In particular, (1) temporary military commanders elected from the nobility gave way to standing retinues under the leadership of professional commanders, (2) public assemblies met more frequently and regularly, (3) councils made up of nobility gained agenda control in the assemblies, and (4) these councils relinquished their control over the allocations of land. I account for these constitutional exchanges in light of Rome’s encroachment. This encroachment brought new sources of wealth as well as constraints on the expansion of Germans into new lands. Incentives favored a reallocation of resources away from pastoralism and towards both sedentary farming and raids across the frontier.
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TL;DR: In this paper, a unified theoretical model that can simultaneously analyze: the three main types of political risk (war, expropriation, and transfer restrictions); the universe of private foreign investors (direct investors, portfolio equity investors and portfolio debt investors); heterogeneity in government constraints; and the three most relevant strategic capabilities (information, exit, and resistance).
Abstract: Political risk is a complex phenomenon. This complexity has incentivized scholars to take a piecemeal approach to understanding it. Nearly all scholarship has targeted a single type of political risk (expropriation) and, within this risk, a single type of firm (MNCs) and a single type of strategic mechanism through which that risk may be mitigated (entry mode). Yet "political risk" is actually a collection of multiple distinct risks that affect the full spectrum of foreign firms, and these firms vary widely in their capabilities for resisting and evading these risks. We offer a unified theoretical model that can simultaneously analyze: the three main types of political risk (war, expropriation, and transfer restrictions); the universe of private foreign investors (direct investors, portfolio equity investors, portfolio debt investors, and commercial banks); heterogeneity in government constraints; and the three most relevant strategic capabilities (information, exit, and resistance). We leverage the variance among foreign investors to identify effective firm strategies to manage political risk. By employing a simultaneous and unified model of political risk, we also find counterintuitive insights on the way governments trade off between risks and how investors use other investors as risk shields.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the formation of Vigilance Committees was studied and it was found that these committees were more likely to form in contexts where levels of ethno-nationalist heterogeneity were high and where political institutions had recently changed.
Abstract: What explains the emergence of organized private enforcement in the United States? We study the formation of vigilance committees—that is, coercive groups organized in a manner not officially sanctioned by state law and with the purpose of establishing legal and moral claims. We argue that these committees were primarily intended to help create civic political identities in contexts of social ambiguity and institutional instability, what we call social frontiers. Relying on quantitative and qualitative analysis, we find that these committees were more likely to form in contexts where levels of ethno-nationalist heterogeneity were high and where political institutions had recently changed. Contrary to common wisdom, vigilance committees were much more than functionalist alternatives to an absent state, or local orders established by bargaining, or responses to social or economic conflict. They constituted flexible instruments to counteract environments characterized by social and political uncertainty.
13 citations
Cites background from "Law without the State: Legal Attrib..."
...5 Ellickson 1991; Leeson 2014; Hadfield and Weingast 2013....
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...34 Hadfield and Weingast 2013....
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03 May 2016
TL;DR: In this paper, a unified theoretical model that can simultaneously analyze: the three main types of political risk (war, expropriation, and transfer restrictions); the universe of private foreign investors (direct investors, portfolio equity investors and portfolio debt investors); heterogeneity in government constraints; and the three most relevant strategic capabilities (information, exit, and resistance).
Abstract: Political risk is a complex phenomenon. This complexity has incentivized scholars to take a piecemeal approach to understanding it. Nearly all scholarship has targeted a single type of political risk (expropriation) and, within this risk, a single type of firm (MNCs) and a single type of strategic mechanism through which that risk may be mitigated (entry mode). Yet "political risk" is actually a collection of multiple distinct risks that affect the full spectrum of foreign firms, and these firms vary widely in their capabilities for resisting and evading these risks. We offer a unified theoretical model that can simultaneously analyze: the three main types of political risk (war, expropriation, and transfer restrictions); the universe of private foreign investors (direct investors, portfolio equity investors, portfolio debt investors, and commercial banks); heterogeneity in government constraints; and the three most relevant strategic capabilities (information, exit, and resistance). We leverage the variance among foreign investors to identify effective firm strategies to manage political risk. By employing a simultaneous and unified model of political risk, we also find counterintuitive insights on the way governments trade off between risks and how investors use other investors as risk shields.
12 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the north-east Brazilian state of Pernambuco primarily between 2007 and 2013, proposing that patterns of declining lethal violence can be explained by changes in both the accountability and effectiveness of formal state institutions and informal social norms.
Abstract: If institutions are important for regulating violence, can institutional reforms make societies less violent? This article examines the north-east Brazilian state of Pernambuco primarily between 2007 and 2013, proposing that patterns of declining lethal violence can be explained by changes in both the accountability and effectiveness of formal state institutions and informal social norms. Drawing on two months of qualitative fieldwork, findings suggest that social and political mobilisation enabled a political coalition to initiate substantial changes under the Pacto pela Vida (Pact for Life) public-security programme, which improved the legitimacy and operational effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and coincided with a marked reduction in homicide rates. While showing that these reforms were central in reducing lethal violence in Pernambuco between 2007 and 2013, the article concludes by discussing the challenges of policy continuity in light of increasing rates of lethal violence since 2014.
11 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers in the context of social norms and economic action in the social sciences, and propose several categories of economic action.
Abstract: List of Abbreviations Volume 1 Preface to the 1978 Re-issue Preface Introduction Part One: Conceptual Exposition I. Basic Sociological Terms II. Sociological Categories of Economic Action III. The Types of Legitimate Domination IV. Status Groups and Classes Part Two: The Economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers I. The Economy and Social Norms II. The Economic Relationships of Organized Groups III. Household, Neighborhood and Kin Group IV. Household, Enterprise and Oikos V. Ethnic Groups VI. Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion) VII. The Market: Its Impersonality and Ethic (Fragment) Volume 2 VII. Economy and Law (The Sociology of Law) IX. Political Communities X. Domination and Legitimacy XI. Bureaucracy XII. Patriarchalism and Patrimonialism XIII. Feudalism, Standestaat and Patrimonialism XIV. Charisma and Its Transformation XV. Political and Hierocratic Domination XVI. The City (Non-Legitimate Domination) Appendices Index
6,034 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment and that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishments are possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out.
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
4,353 citations
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01 Jan 1961
TL;DR: The Foundations of a Legal System as mentioned in this paper is an example of a legal system based on formalism and rule-scepticism, and it can be seen as a union of primary and secondary rules.
Abstract: Introduction 1. Persistent Questions 2. Laws, Commands, and Orders 3. The Variety of Laws 4. Sovereign and Subject 5. Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules 6. The Foundations of a Legal System 7. Formalism and Rule-Scepticism 8. Justice and Morality 9. Laws and Morals 10. International Law Postscript
3,929 citations
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TL;DR: It is shown experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation, and that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punished.
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the sel®sh motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation ¯ourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
3,813 citations
"Law without the State: Legal Attrib..." refers background in this paper
...Fehr and Gachter ð2002Þ show that people in laboratory settings are frequently willing to engage in such conduct; Henrich et al. ð2006Þ demonstrate this for several populations around the world....
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