Dozens of states have long been capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, yet only a few have actually done so. Jacques E. C. Hymans finds that the key to this surprising historical pattern lies not in externally imposed constraints, but rather in state leaders' conceptions of the national identity. Synthesizing a wide range of scholarship from the humanities and social sciences to experimental psychology and neuroscience, Hymans builds a rigorous model of decisionmaking that links identity to emotions and ultimately to nuclear policy choices. Exhaustively researched case studies of France, India, Argentina, and Australia - two that got the bomb and two that abstained - demonstrate the value of this model while debunking common myths. This book will be invaluable to policymakers and concerned citizens who are frustrated with the frequent misjudgments of states' nuclear ambitions, and to scholars who seek a better understanding of how leaders make big foreign policy decisions.

https://assets.cambridge.org/97805216/16256/copyright/9780521616256_copyright.pdf

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The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy

This paper aims to redress the asymmetry in the standard economic treatment of the shortcomings of markets and governments by developing and applying a theory of ‘nonmarket’ failure– that is, of government failure – so that the comparison between markets and governments can be made more systematically, and choices between them arrived at more intelligently. Several conclusions are drawn. First, the choice between markets and governments is not a pure one, actual systems inevitably involve combinations between markets and governments. Second, with respect to both static and dynamic efficiency criteria, markets generally do better than governments. Third, there are various ways in which government can contribute to improving the functioning of markets. Fourth, market forces can play a useful role in improving the functioning of government and reducing the incidence of nonmarket failures.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0143814X00004347

Market and Non-Market Failures: Comparison and Assessment

This article examines the classification of regime types. It shows that most writers classify regime types with reference to both their dispositional properties (whether there is a president and/or a prime minister, whether or not they are popularly elected and whether or not they serve for a fixed term) and their relational properties (the actual patterns of executive politics in the political system). It is argued that this juxtaposition of dispositional and relational properties creates a conceptual ambiguity. As a result, it is concluded that classifications of regime types should be made on the basis of either dispositional or relational properties but not both together. It then shows that writers who classify regime types with reference to relational properties are likely to make highly contestable assumptions about how power is actually exercised. This is because the question of where executive power lies in a particular country is often subject to not just one incontestable interpretation but to a number of contestable and mutually exclusive interpretations. This point is illustrated by examining the case of the Fifth French Republic. Therefore, it is concluded that the classification of regime types should be made with reference to dispositional properties alone.

The classification of democratic regime types: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions

Raymond Aron is widely regarded as the most important figure in the history of twentieth-century French liberalism. Yet his status within the history of liberal thought has been more often proclaimed than explained. Though he is frequently lauded as the inheritor of France's liberal tradition, Aron's formative influences were mostly non-French and often radically anti-liberal thinkers. This book explains how, why, and with what consequences he belatedly defined and aligned himself with a French liberal tradition. It also situates Aron within the larger histories of Cold War liberalism and decolonization, re-evaluating his contribution to debates over totalitarianism, the end of ideology, and the Algerian War. By exposing the enduring importance of Aron's student political engagements for the development of his thought, Iain Stewart challenges the prevailing view of Aron's early intellectual trajectory as a journey from naive socialist idealism to mature liberal realism, offering a new critical perspective on one of the twentieth century's most influential intellectuals.

Raymond Aron and Liberal Thought in the Twentieth Century

The thousands of books and articles on President Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration all accord primary explanatory importance to his distinctive geopolitical ideology. These analyses place secondary significance, if any at all, on commercial considerations. This two-part article seeks to revise that historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration taken by France during de Gaulle's presidency: to remain in the Common Market and promote the Common Agricultural Policy, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the European Economic Community, and to provoke the “empty chair” crisis in 1965–1966. The first two decisions are discussed here, and the other two are covered in Part 2. For each case, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence confirms that the interests pursued by de Gaulle were more commercial than geopolitical.

/pdf/de-gaulle-between-grain-and-grandeur-the-political-economy-487sp43ar8.pdf

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Citations

The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy

Market and Non-Market Failures: Comparison and Assessment

The classification of democratic regime types: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions

Raymond Aron and Liberal Thought in the Twentieth Century

De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958–1970 (Part 1)