Lessons from Russia's Protracted Transition from Communist Rule
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a comprehensive theory of transition from dictatorship to democracy and found that some transitions from authoritarian rule lead to the creation of liberal democracies, while others descend into civil war or end with the recreation of an authoritarian regime.
Abstract: Despite the recent explosion of regime transitions throughout the world, social scientists have yet to develop a comprehensive theory of transition. Some transitions from authoritarian rule lead to the creation of liberal democracies. Others descend into civil war or end with the recreation of an authoritarian regime. Even within the set of successful transitions to democracy, some succeed in consolidating liberal democracies while others settle into patterns of democracy that are not fully liberal. How can we explain this variation? Russia's protracted transition from communist rule to democracy is especially puzzling, for this case over time is both an instance of a failed transition and a successful transition. The first two attempts at creating new democratic institutions failed. The third attempt appears to be succeeding. Why? A failed transition occurs when a change in the political rules of the game precipitates abnormal politics or what Charles Tilly has called "revolutionary" politics.1 Such moments occur when one or more significant actors opt to pursue political objectives outside of the normal rules of the game. These situations become revolutionary when two opposing groups claim sovereignty over the same territory and only end "when a single sovereign polity regains control over the government."2 Russia's protracted transition from communist rule produced two such revolutionary situations. Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the first attempt to democratize the institutions of national government in the Soviet Union in 1987. This attempt ended in failure in August 1991, because the design resulted in violent confrontation between multiple sovereigns. The sec-
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15 Jun 2017TL;DR: In this article, Repnikova reveals the webs of an uneasy partnership between critical journalists and the state in China, highlighting the distinctiveness of Chinese journalist-state relations, as well as the renewed pressures facing them in the Xi era.
Abstract: Who watches over the party-state? In this engaging analysis, Maria Repnikova reveals the webs of an uneasy partnership between critical journalists and the state in China. More than merely a passive mouthpiece or a dissident voice, the media in China also plays a critical oversight role, one more frequently associated with liberal democracies than with authoritarian systems. Chinese central officials cautiously endorse media supervision as a feedback mechanism, as journalists carve out space for critical reporting by positioning themselves as aiding the agenda of the central state. Drawing on rare access in the field, Media Politics in China examines the process of guarded improvisation that has defined this volatile partnership over the past decade on a routine basis and in the aftermath of major crisis events. Combined with a comparative analysis of media politics in the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia, the book highlights the distinctiveness of Chinese journalist-state relations, as well as the renewed pressures facing them in the Xi era.
96 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest some of the main lessons about democratization that may be derived from the study of the experience of post-communist Russia, seen in a comparative perspective.
42 citations
Cites background from "Lessons from Russia's Protracted Tr..."
...…of thought in the USA during the 1990s (and to a lesser extent inWestern Europe) believed that Russia had gone through a breakthrough toward democratization during the early 1990s, and that Russia subsequently faced the task of consolidating the features of its infant democracy (McFaul,1999,117)....
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TL;DR: The failure of economic reform between 1992 and 1998 is explained as a policy response by state officials unable to manage tendencies towards fiscal crisis because of the state's general helplessness in managing the Russian economy, rather than as a surrender of sovereignty to economic interests as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: It has become common to describe Russia as a state that has only achieved partial reform due to the influence of powerful economic forces, the ‘winners’ of economic reform, and to assume that the Russian state lacks autonomy This paper questions how far reform in Russia has been compromised by the power of winners The failure of economic reform between 1992 and 1998 is explained as a policy response by state officials unable to manage tendencies towards fiscal crisis because of the state's general helplessness in managing the Russian economy, rather than as a surrender of sovereignty to economic interests
30 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an analysis of legislators' attitudes towards the separation of powers in Ukraine is presented, focusing on the elite's attitude towards the country's political stability and democratic stability.
Abstract: (2002). Elite Attitudes and Democratic Stability: Analysing Legislators' Attitudes towards the Separation of Powers in Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 87-107.
22 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that transitional violence can be a byproduct of competition between, or within, a state's security services for power and resources in an emerging regime, where there is intense uncertainty about the form that the new regime might take and associated uncertainty about distribution of power and state funds among state security services within that regime.
Abstract: When collective violence breaks out during periods of regime change, the root cause of that violence is ordinarily assumed to be a failure of state and/or governmental organizations, alongside transition. However, there are limits to the applicability of this understanding, since violence sometimes erupts during regime change, even when state and executive organs remain intact. This paper addresses those puzzling cases, by arguing that transitional violence can be a by-product of competition between, or within, a state's security services—for power and resources in an emerging regime. Competition develops where there is intense uncertainty about the form that the new regime might take and associated uncertainty about the distribution of power and state funds among state security services within that regime. The dynamics of transitional violence through intrastate competition are illustrated in the paper through treatment of two “most different” cases: Indonesia (1998) and Romania (1990).
16 citations