Lies in disguise—an experimental study on cheating
01 Jun 2013-Journal of the European Economic Association (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd)-Vol. 11, Iss: 3, pp 525-547
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors presented a novel experimental design to measure honesty and lying, where participants receive a die which they roll privately, and their payoff depends on the reported roll of the die, the subjects have an incentive to be dishonest and report higher numbers to get a higher payoff.
Abstract: We present a novel experimental design to measure honesty and lying. Participants receive a die which they roll privately. Since their payoff depends on the reported roll of the die, the subjects have an incentive to be dishonest and report higher numbers to get a higher payoff. This design has three advantages. First, cheating cannot be detected on the individual level, which reduces potential demand effects. Second, the method is very easy to implement. Third, the underlying true distribution of the outcome under full honesty is known, and hence it is possible to test different theoretical predictions. We find that about 20% of inexperienced subjects lie to the fullest extent possible while 39% of subjects are fully honest. In addition, a high share of subjects consists of partial liars; these subjects lie, but do not report the payoff-maximizing draw. We discuss different motives that explain the observed behavioral pattern.
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: This article presents www.prolific.ac and lays out its suitability for recruiting subjects for social and economic science experiments, and traces the platform’s historical development, present its features, and contrast them with requirements for different types of social andEconomic experiments.
1,357 citations
TL;DR: It is shown that employees of a large, international bank behave, on average, honestly in a control condition, but when their professional identity as bank employees is rendered salient, a significant proportion of them become dishonest.
Abstract: Trust in others' honesty is a key component of the long-term performance of firms, industries, and even whole countries. However, in recent years, numerous scandals involving fraud have undermined confidence in the financial industry. Contemporary commentators have attributed these scandals to the financial sector's business culture, but no scientific evidence supports this claim. Here we show that employees of a large, international bank behave, on average, honestly in a control condition. However, when their professional identity as bank employees is rendered salient, a significant proportion of them become dishonest. This effect is specific to bank employees because control experiments with employees from other industries and with students show that they do not become more dishonest when their professional identity or bank-related items are rendered salient. Our results thus suggest that the prevailing business culture in the banking industry weakens and undermines the honesty norm, implying that measures to re-establish an honest culture are very important.
437 citations
TL;DR: An index of the ‘prevalence of rule violations’ (PRV) based on country-level data from the year 2003 of corruption, tax evasion and fraudulent politics is developed and individual intrinsic honesty is found to be stronger in the subject pools of low PRV countries than those of highPRV countries.
Abstract: Deception is common in nature and humans are no exception. Modern societies have created institutions to control cheating, but many situations remain where only intrinsic honesty keeps people from cheating and violating rules. Psychological, sociological and economic theories suggest causal pathways to explain how the prevalence of rule violations in people's social environment, such as corruption, tax evasion or political fraud, can compromise individual intrinsic honesty. Here we present cross-societal experiments from 23 countries around the world that demonstrate a robust link between the prevalence of rule violations and intrinsic honesty. We developed an index of the 'prevalence of rule violations' (PRV) based on country-level data from the year 2003 of corruption, tax evasion and fraudulent politics. We measured intrinsic honesty in an anonymous die-rolling experiment. We conducted the experiments with 2,568 young participants (students) who, due to their young age in 2003, could not have influenced PRV in 2003. We find individual intrinsic honesty is stronger in the subject pools of low PRV countries than those of high PRV countries. The details of lying patterns support psychological theories of honesty. The results are consistent with theories of the cultural co-evolution of institutions and values, and show that weak institutions and cultural legacies that generate rule violations not only have direct adverse economic consequences, but might also impair individual intrinsic honesty that is crucial for the smooth functioning of society.
358 citations
Cites background from "Lies in disguise—an experimental st..."
...Comparing the distributions of claims pooled for all low and high PRV countries, respectively, reveals a highly significant difference (nlow = 1,211, nhigh = 1,357; χ2(5) = 40....
[...]
TL;DR: It is found that the effect of power on moral hypocrisy depends on the legitimacy of the power: When power was illegitimate, the moral-hypocrisy effect was reversed, with the illegitimately powerful becoming stricter in judging their own behavior than in judging other people’s behavior.
Abstract: In five studies, we explored whether power increases moral hypocrisy (i.e., imposing strict moral standards on other people but practicing less strict moral behavior oneself). In Experiment 1, compared with the powerless, the powerful condemned other people's cheating more, but also cheated more themselves. In Experiments 2 through 4, the powerful were more strict in judging other people's moral transgressions than in judging their own transgressions. A final study found that the effect of power on moral hypocrisy depends on the legitimacy of the power: When power was illegitimate, the moral-hypocrisy effect was reversed, with the illegitimately powerful becoming stricter in judging their own behavior than in judging other people's behavior. This pattern, which might be dubbed hypercrisy, was also found among low-power participants in Experiments 3 and 4. We discuss how patterns of hypocrisy and hypercrisy among the powerful and powerless can help perpetuate social inequality.
311 citations
Cites methods from "Lies in disguise—an experimental st..."
...For half of the participants, we measured cheating behavior, using a paradigm adapted from Fischbacher and Heusi (2008)....
[...]
TL;DR: This article measured the extent of lying costs among a representative sample of the German population by calling them at home and found that participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport, misreporting cannot be detected, reputational concerns are negligible and altruism, efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation cannot play a role.
302 citations
References
More filters
TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
Abstract: z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments) is a software for developing and conducting economic experiments. The software is stable and allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time. In this article, I present the guiding principles behind the software design, its features, and its limitations.
9,760 citations
"Lies in disguise—an experimental st..." refers methods in this paper
...In this way, we were able to restrict our analysis to the inexperienced subjects and look at the results of those taking part a second time separately....
[...]
TL;DR: The authors show that performance incentives offered by an informed principal can adversely affect an agent's perception of the task, or of his own abilities, and also study the effects of empowerment, help and excuses on motivation, as well as situations of ego bashing reflecting a battle for dominance within a relationship.
Abstract: A central tenet of economics is that individuals respond to incentives. For psychologists and sociologists, in contrast, rewards and punishments are often counterproductive, because they undermine "intrinsic motivation". We reconcile these two views, showing how performance incentives offered by an informed principal (manager, teacher, parent) can adversely impact an agent's (worker, child) perception of the task, or of his own abilities. Incentives are then only weak reinforcers in the short run, and negative reinforcers in the long run. We also study the effects of empowerment, help and excuses on motivation, as well as situations of ego bashing reflecting a battle for dominance within a relationship.
3,060 citations
TL;DR: A survey technique for improving the reliability of responses to sensitive interview questions is described, which permits the respondent to answer "yes" or "no" to a question without the interviewer knowing what information is being conveyed by the respondent.
Abstract: For various reasons individuals in a sample survey may prefer not to confide to the interviewer the correct answers to certain questions. In such cases the individuals may elect not to reply at all or to reply with incorrect answers. The resulting evasive answer bias is ordinarily difficult to assess. In this paper it is argued that such bias is potentially removable through allowing the interviewee to maintain privacy through the device of randomizing his response. A randomized response method for estimating a population proportion is presented as an example. Unbiased maximum likelihood estimates are obtained and their mean square errors are compared with the mean square errors of conventional estimates under various assumptions about the underlying population.
2,929 citations
"Lies in disguise—an experimental st..." refers methods in this paper
...Methodologically, our design is related to the procedure of Batson et al. (1997) where subjects were asked to assign a good and a bad task to themselves and another subject by reporting the result of a coin flip and to the random response method used in social psychology (Warner 1965)....
[...]
TL;DR: The authors show that people behave dishonestly enough to profit but honestly enough to delude themselves of their own integrity, and that a little bit of dishonesty gives a taste of profit without spoiling a positive self-view.
Abstract: People like to think of themselves as honest. However, dishonesty pays—and it often pays well. How do people resolve this tension? This research shows that people behave dishonestly enough to profit but honestly enough to delude themselves of their own integrity. A little bit of dishonesty gives a taste of profit without spoiling a positive self-view. Two mechanisms allow for such self-concept maintenance: inattention to moral standards and categorization malleability. Six experiments support the authors' theory of self-concept maintenance and offer practical applications for curbing dishonesty in everyday life.
1,756 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Neely et al. show that deception is part of many economic interactions and that people who make use of private information do not always do so honestly, regardless of their effect on the other party.
Abstract: Deception is part of many economic interactions. Business people, politicians, diplomats, lawyers, and students in the experimental laboratory who make use of private information do not always do so honestly. This observation indicates that behavior often rejects the moral approach to deception. As St. Augustine wrote, “To me, however, it seems certain that every lie is a sin. . . ” (St. Augustine, 421). Later, philosophers like Immanuel Kant (1787) again adopted this uncompromising moral stance when arguing against lying. At the other extreme, economic theory is built on the assumption of “homo economicus,” a figure who acts selfishly and is unconcerned about the well-being of others. An implication of this assumption is that lies will be told whenever it is beneficial for the liar, regardless of their effect on the other party. Another implication is that there is no negative outcome associated with lying per se. This assumption is very useful in many economic models. Consider contract theory, where it is assumed that without an explicit contract, neither side will fulfill its respective obligations. For example, George Akerlof’s (1970) paper on asymmetric information and the market for lemons assumes that sellers of used cars will always lie if it is in their benefit to do so. In the mechanism design literature (e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, 1979), the standard assumption is that people will tell the truth only if this is incentive-compatible given material outcomes. In the literature on tax evasion, the choice of whether to avoid paying taxes is considered a decision under uncertainty; cost is treated as a product of the probability of being caught and the cost of punishment, whereas benefit is simply the money saved by avoiding payment. However, there is no cost associated with the very act of lying (Michael Alingham and Agnar Sandmo, 1972). Another example is the game theoretic treatment of “cheap talk” (Crawford and Joel Sobel, 1982). An intermediate approach is taken by utilitarian philosophers (e.g., Jeremy Bentham, 1789). Utilitarianism prescribes that, when choosing whether to lie, one should weigh benefits against harm, and happiness against unhappiness. As Martin Luther stated, “What harm would it do, if a man told a good strong lie for the sake of the good and for the Christian church. . . a lie out of necessity, a useful lie, a helpful lie, such lies would not be against God, he would accept them.” Similarly to the economic theory approach, this type of calculation implies that lies, apart from their resultant harm and benefit, are in themselves neutral. A lie and a truthful statement that achieve the same monetary payoffs (for both sides) are considered * Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: uri.gneezy.gsb.uchicago.edu). I thank Douglas Bernheim and two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments that considerably improved the paper. I also thank Andreas Blume, Gary Charness, Rachel Croson, Martin Dufwenberg, Georg Kirchsteiger, David Levine, Muriel Niederle, Yuval Rottenstreich, Maurice Schweitzer, Richard Thaler, George Wu, and seminar participants at numerous universities for their comments and suggestions. Ira Leybman provided valuable help in running the experiment. I became interested in deception when my father was terminally ill and his physicians created in him a belief that they considered to be untrue. I dedicate this paper to his memory. 1 Important deviations from this assumption in economic modeling are found in Kenneth Arrow’s (1972) discussion of trust, Gary Becker’s (1976) modeling of altruistic preferences, and Akerlof’s (1982) study of the fair-wage hypothesis. For a general discussion, see Becker (1993): “The economic approach I refer to does not assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or material gain. It is a method of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations. Along with others, I have tried to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest. Behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences” (p. 385). 2 Note that this does not mean that a completely selfish person will always lie. There may be strategic reasons not to lie. For example, see the David Kreps and Robert Wilson (1982) discussion of reputation and imperfect information; see also Vincent P. Crawford (2003). 3 Cited by his secretary, in a letter in Max Lenz, ed., Briefwechsel Landgraf Phillips des Grossmuthigen von Hessen mit Bucer, Vol. 1.
1,604 citations