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Book ChapterDOI

Linguistic form and relevance

01 Jan 2012-pp 149-168
TL;DR: Wilson and Sperber as mentioned in this paper treat utterance interpretation as a two-phase process: a modular decoding phase is seen as providing input to a central inferential phase in which a linguistically encoded logical form is contextually enriched and used to construct a hypothesis about the speaker's informative intention.
Abstract: © Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber 2012. Introduction Our book Relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986a) treats utterance interpretation as a two-phase process: a modular decoding phase is seen as providing input to a central inferential phase in which a linguistically encoded logical form is contextually enriched and used to construct a hypothesis about the speaker’s informative intention. Relevance was mainly concerned with the inferential phase of comprehension: we had to answer Fodor’s challenge that while decoding processes are quite well understood, inferential processes are not only not understood, but perhaps not even understandable (see Fodor 1983). Here we will look more closely at the decoding phase and consider what types of information may be linguistically encoded, and how the borderline between decoding and inference can be drawn. It might be that all linguistically encoded information is cut to a single pattern: all truth conditions, say, or all instructions for use. However, there is a robust intuition that two basic types of meaning can be found. This intuition surfaces in a variety of distinctions: between describing and indicating, stating and showing, saying and conventionally implicating, or between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional, conceptual and procedural, or representational and computational meaning. In the literature, justifications for these distinctions have been developed in both strictly linguistic and more broadly cognitive terms.

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1
LINGUISTIC FORM AND RELEVANCE
Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber
[Published in Lingua 90 (1993): 1-25]
1. Introduction
Our book Relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986) treats utterance interpretation as a two-phase
process: a modular decoding phase is seen as providing input to a central inferential phase in
which a linguistically encoded logical form is contextually enriched and used to construct a
hypothesis about the speaker's informative intention. Relevance was mainly concerned with the
inferential phase of comprehension: we had to answer Fodor's challenge that while decoding
processes are quite well understood, inferential processes are not only not understood, but
perhaps not even understandable (see Fodor 1983). Here we will look more closely at the
decoding phase and consider what types of information may be linguistically encoded, and how
the borderline between decoding and inference can be drawn.
It might be that all linguistically encoded information is cut to a single pattern: all truth
conditions, say, or all instructions for use. However, there is a robust intuition that two basic
types of meaning can be found. This intuition surfaces in a variety of distinctions: between
describing and indicating, stating and showing, saying and conventionally implicating, or
between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional, conceptual and procedural, or
representational and computational meaning. In the literature, justifications for these distinctions
have been developed in both strictly linguistic and more broadly cognitive terms.
The linguistic justification goes as follows (see for example Recanati 1987). Utterances
express propositions; propositions have truth conditions; but the meaning of an utterance is not
exhausted by its truth conditions, i.e. the truth conditions of the proposition expressed. An
utterance not only expresses a proposition but is used to perform a variety of speech acts. It can

2
thus be expected to encode two basic types of information: truth-conditional and non-truth-
conditional, or propositional and illocutionary - that is, information about the state of affairs it
describes, and information indicating the various speech acts it is intended to perform.
The cognitive justification goes as follows (see for example Sperber & Wilson 1986,
Blakemore 1987, 1992). Linguistic decoding provides input to the inferential phase of
comprehension; inferential comprehension involves the construction and manipulation of
conceptual representations. An utterance can thus be expected to encode two basic types of
information: representational and computational, or conceptual and procedural - that is,
information about the representations to be manipulated, and information about how to
manipulate them.
It is tempting to assume that these two approaches are equivalent, and classify the data in
identical ways. This would be so, for example, if any construction which contributed to the truth
conditions of an utterance did so by encoding concepts, while all non-truth-conditional
constructions encoded procedural information. We want to argue that this assumption is false.
The two distinctions cross-cut each other: some truth-conditional constructions encode concepts,
others encode procedures; some non-truth-conditional constructions encode procedures, others
encode concepts. This raises a more general question. What is the relation between the two
approaches? Is the set of distinctions drawn by one approach somehow more basic than the
other? This would be so if it was possible to predict whether a given construction was truth-
conditional or non-truth-conditional, say, on the basis of some systematic interaction between
the type of information it encoded and other linguistic or cognitive factors. We will touch briefly
on these issues towards the end.
These internal questions about the decoding phase of comprehension are mainly of
interest to linguistic semantics. Pragmatic theorists are more interested in an external question:
how is the borderline between decoding and inference to be drawn? Linguistic decoding is not

3
the only source of input to inferential comprehension. When Peter notices Mary's accent and
decides that she is Scottish, this information is not encoded in her utterance, any more than it is
encoded by the fact that she is drinking malt whisky or wearing a Black Watch tartan kilt. These
are facts about her which Peter may notice, and from which he may draw inferences. How do
these inferences interact with linguistically encoded information? How do we decide, as
theorists, which information was decoded and which was inferred?
In Relevance we tried to answer some of these questions; answers to others will be
attempted here. In Figure 1, we have tried to draw the threads together and give a general picture
of the various types of information, decoded and inferred, that an utterance can convey.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
This paper is organised around the distinctions drawn in the diagram. We will start at the top,
with the inferential phase of comprehension, and work down through external questions about
the borderline between decoding and inference, to end with internal questions about the
decoding phase.
2. Conveying and ostensively communicating
An utterance makes manifest a variety of assumptions: the hearer attends to as many of these as
seem relevant to him. All these assumptions are conveyed by the utterance. Not all of them are
ostensively communicated, as the following examples will show:
(a) Mary speaks to Peter: something in her voice or manner makes him think that she is sad. As
she speaks, he is wondering about the reasons for her sadness. This is not what Mary wanted:
she was trying to hide her feelings from him. In the terms of Relevance, Mary had neither an
informative nor a communicative intention. The case is one of accidental information-
transmission.

4
(b) Mary speaks sadly to Peter. She intends him to notice her sadness, but to think she is
bravely hiding her pain. In the terms of Relevance, she intends to inform Peter of her sadness,
but she wants her informative intention to be fulfilled without being recognised. Some form of
covert (and hence non-ostensive) communication is taking place.
(c) Mary speaks sadly to Peter. She intends him to notice her sadness, and to realise that she
intended him to notice it, but to think she wanted this higher-order intention to remain hidden
from him. In the terms of Relevance, Mary intends to inform Peter of her sadness, and she wants
her informative intention to be recognised but not to become mutually manifest. Again, some
form of covert communication is taking place.
(d) Mary speaks sadly to Peter. She intends to inform him of her sadness, and she wants her
informative intention to be not merely recognised, but to become mutually manifest. In the terms
of Relevance, Mary has both an informative and a communicative intention. Ostensive
communication is taking place.
In Relevance, we showed how examples (a)-(d) all fall within the scope of a relevance-
based theory of cognition. As Mary speaks, Peter will pay attention to any aspect of her
behaviour that seems relevant to him. Sometimes, to explain her behaviour, he will be led to
attribute to her an informative intention. What distinguishes ostensive communication from
other forms of intentional or unintentional information transmission is that the hearer has special
help in recognising the speaker's informative intention. Ostensive communication creates a
presumption of relevance and falls under the principle of relevance. Of all accessible hypotheses
about the speaker's informative intention, the hearer should accept the first one tested and found
consistent with the principle of relevance. Having recognised the speaker's informative intention
by use of this criterion, he is entitled to treat it as not only manifest but mutually manifest.
3. Linguistic and non-linguistic communication

5
When Mary speaks sadly to Peter, intending to communicate that she is sad, his knowledge of
language does not help him to recognise her informative intention. Mary communicates her
sadness to Peter, but she does not linguistically communicate it. For an assumption to be
linguistically communicated, the linguistic properties of the utterance must help with its
recovery. In this example, they do not.
This is not to say that paralinguistic clues such as tone of voice or manner play no role at
all in linguistic communication. Consider the exchange in (1):
(1) a. Peter: Can you help?
b. Mary (sadly): I can't.
Suppose that in saying (lb), Mary expected Peter not only to notice that she is sad, but to ask
himself why she is sad, and to come to the conclusion in (2):
(2) Mary is sad that she can't help Peter.
Suppose, moreover, that Mary intended not merely to inform Peter of (2) but to communicate it
ostensively. Then in the terms of Relevance, (2) would be an explicature of (lb).
An utterance typically has several explicatures. Mary's utterance in (lb) might include
those in (3):
(3) a. Mary can't help Peter to find a job.
b. Mary says she can't help Peter to find a job.
c. Mary believes she can't help Peter to find a job.
d. Mary regrets that she can't help Peter to find a job.
The explicatures of an utterance are constructed by enriching a linguistically encoded
logical form to a point where it expresses a determinate proposition, such as (3a), and optionally
embedding it under a higher-level description: for example, a speech-act description such as
(3b), or a propositional attitude description such as (3c) or (3d). Let us call (3a) the proposition
expressed by the utterance and (3b-d) its higher-level explicatures. Then not only the proposition

Citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the distinction between le dit and limplicature is made, and it is shown that the implicatures conventionnelle pose problems, derivant plutot du sens d'expressions particulieres que des circonstances conversationnelles.
Abstract: Depuis la distinction que fit Grice entre le dit et l'implicature, on considere generalement que le premier est du ressort de la semantique, tandis que le second appartient au domaine de la pragmatique. Cependant, dans cette distinction, l'implicature conventionnelle pose probleme, derivant plutot du sens d'expressions particulieres que des circonstances conversationnelles. L'A. veut demontrer la non-existence des implicatures conventionnelles

473 citations

Book Chapter
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: Wilson and Sperber as mentioned in this paper argue that language use is not governed by any convention or maxim of truthfulness in what is said, and they take a different line and argue that they are strictly speaking false.
Abstract: © Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber 2012. Introduction Here are a couple of apparent platitudes. As speakers, we expect what we say to be accepted as true. As hearers, we expect what is said to us to be true. If it were not for these expectations, if they were not often enough satisfied, there would be little point in communicating at all. David Lewis (who has proposed a convention of truthfulness) and Paul Grice (who has argued for maxims of truthfulness), among others, have explored some of the consequences of these apparent platitudes. We want to take a different line and argue that they are strictly speaking false. Of course hearers expect to be informed and not misled by what is communicated; but what is communicated is not the same as what is said. We will argue that language use is not governed by any convention or maxim of truthfulness in what is said. Whatever genuine facts such a convention or maxim was supposed to explain are better explained by assuming that communication is governed by a principle of relevance. According to David Lewis (1975), there is a regularity (and a moral obligation) of truthfulness in linguistic behaviour. This is not a convention in Lewis’s sense, since there is no alternative regularity which would be preferable as long as everyone conformed to it. However, for any language £ of a population P, Lewis argues that there is a convention of truthfulness and trust in £ (an alternative being a convention of truthfulness and trust in some other language £´): My proposal is that the convention whereby a population P uses a language £ is a convention of truthfulness and trust in £. To be truthful in £ is to act in a certain way: to try never to utter any sentences of £ that are not true in £. Thus it is to avoid uttering any sentence of £ unless one believes it to be true in £. To be trusting in £ is to form beliefs in a certain way: to impute truthfulness in £ to others, and thus to tend to respond to another’s utterance of any sentence of £ by coming to believe that the uttered sentence is true in £. (Lewis 1975/1983: 167)

335 citations


Cites background from "Linguistic form and relevance"

  • ...We have argued (Wilson and Sperber 1981; 1993; forthcoming; Sperber and Wilson 1986a; 1998a) that relevance-oriented inferential processes are efficient enough to allow for a much greater slack between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning than is generally assumed....

    [...]

  • ...We also claim that there are higher-level explicatures which do not normally contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance (Wilson and Sperber 1993; Carston 2000; Ifantidou 2001)....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore how the wealth of insights provided by the literature on the interpretation of prosody might be integrated into the relevance-theoretic framework (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995; Blakemore, 2002; Carston, 2002).

293 citations


Cites background from "Linguistic form and relevance"

  • ...Properly linguistic expressions which have been analysed in procedural terms include discourse connectives, pronouns, mood indicators and discourse particles (cf. Blakemore 1987, 2002; König 1991; Wilson and Sperber 1993; Hall 2004)....

    [...]

References
More filters
Book
01 Jan 1983

7,781 citations

Book
06 Mar 1986
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a list of symbols for verb-verb communication in the context of Verbal Communication, including the following: preface to second edition, preface and postface to first edition.
Abstract: Preface to Second Edition. List of symbols. 1. Communication. 2. Inference. 3. Relevance. 4. Aspects of Verbal Communication. Postface. Notes to First Edition. Notes to Second Edition. Notes to Postface. Bibliography. Index.

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Book
26 Apr 1989
TL;DR: This volume, Grice's first hook, includes the long-delayed publication of his enormously influential 1967 William James Lectures as mentioned in this paper, which is a vital book for all who are interested in Anglo-American philosophy.
Abstract: This volume, Grice's first hook, includes the long-delayed publication of his enormously influential 1967 William James Lectures. But there is much, much more in this work. Paul Grice himself has carefully arranged and framed the sequence of essays to emphasize not a certain set of ideas but a habit of mind, a style of philosophizing. Grice has, to be sure, provided philosophy with crucial ideas. His account of speaker-meaning is the standard that others use to define their own minor divergences or future elaborations. His discussion of conversational implicatures has given philosophers an important tool for the investigation of all sorts of problems; it has also laid the foundation for a great deal of work by other philosophers and linguists about presupposition. His metaphysical defense of absolute values is starting to be considered the beginning of a new phase in philosophy. This is a vital book for all who are interested in Anglo-American philosophy.

3,874 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

2,336 citations


"Linguistic form and relevance" refers background or methods in this paper

  • ...The fact that these utterances are perfectly acceptable creates a serious problem for Grice's account. In recent work, Robyn Carston (1988) has shown how to solve the problem and save the pragmatic approach....

    [...]

  • ...To illustrate his approach, we will look at his treatment of 'on the other hand' in the 'Retrospective Epilogue' (Grice 1989: 362)....

    [...]

  • ...Since Grice's William James Lectures (reprinted in Grice 1989), a sustained and largely successful attack on unreflective appeals to encoding, the borderline between linguistic communication and linguistic encoding has been a major focus of pragmatic research....

    [...]

Frequently Asked Questions (5)
Q1. What contributions have the authors mentioned in the paper "Linguistic form and relevance" ?

In this paper, Sperber et al. show that a modular decoding phase is seen as providing input to a central inferential phase in which a linguistically encoded logical form is contextually enriched and used to construct a hypothesis about the speaker 's informative intention. 

In utterances with illocutionary adverbials, or parentheticals of the type discussed by Ifantidou ( forthcoming ), Itani ( l990 ) and Blakemore ( 1991 ), it might be argued, a la Grice, that the speaker is simultaneously making two assertions, each with its own truth conditions ; one might then investigate the possibility that intuitions about the truth conditions of the utterance as a whole are based on the assertion which makes the major contribution to overall relevance. In H. Parret, M. Sbisa and J. Verschueren ( eds ) Possibilities and limitations of pragmatics. What the authors hope to have shown is that such research can be usefully conducted within the broader cognitive and communicative framework outlined here. For further discussion and a range of additional examples, see Carston 1988. 

Various types of sentence adverbial, including the illocutionary adverbials 'seriously', 'frankly', etc., are conceptual and non-truth-conditional: they encode concepts which are constituents not of the proposition expressed but of higher-level explicatures..(c) Discourse connectives such as 'so' and 'after all' are procedural and non-truth-conditional: they encode procedural constraints on implicatures. 

Blakemore's work on discourse connectives amounts to a reanalysis in procedural terms of Grice's notion of conventional implicature. 

It seems, then, that there is good reason to treat illocutionary adverbials as both non-truth-conditional and conceptual, thus abandoning the idea that all non-truth-conditional meaning is necessarily procedural and cut to a single pattern.