Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Security Bargaining in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–23
13 Jan 2009-International Security (MIT Press 238 Main St., Suite 500, Cambridge, MA 02142-1046 USA journals-info@mit.edu)-Vol. 33, Iss: 3, pp 143-179
TL;DR: In international bargaining, governments can provide economic benefits as a side payment to reinforce security cooperation and use close security ties a... as discussed by the authors, where states use economic-security linkages in international bargaining.
Abstract: How do states use economic-security linkages in international bargaining? Governments can provide economic benefits as a side payment to reinforce security cooperation and use close security ties a...
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01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: The seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather, one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and deformation as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and de‹ciency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself the enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency. (Ibn al-Haytham)1
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that state-owned multinational corporations may counter the monopoly power of the host state by leveraging the political influence of their home government, depending on the strength of political relations between the home and host state, and the level of economic dependence on the host country on the home market.
Abstract: Expropriation risk has a binding effect on foreign direct investment (FDI). However, state-owned multinational corporations may counter the monopoly power of the host state by leveraging the political influence of their home government. The magnitude of this counter force, we argue, may vary, depending on the strength of political relations between the home and host state, and the level of economic dependence of the host country on the home market. We find supporting evidence of our hypotheses using Chinese firm-level FDI information between 2003 and 2010.
210 citations
Cites background from "Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Sec..."
...The negative externality for domestic actors may therefore raise the challenge for and limit the deployment of economic gunboat diplomacy (Skalnes, 2000; Davis, 2008/09)....
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01 Jan 2015
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows are analyzed and the authors argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce, and that parties to a common preferential trading arrangement and a common alliance engage in markedly greater trade than do members of either type of institution but not both.
Abstract: We analyze the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows. Both factors are likely to promote trade among members, but we argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce. The combination of an alliance, which creates political incentives for participants to engage in trade, and a commercial institution, which liberalizes trade among members, is expected to provide a considerable impetus to commerce among parties to both. The results of our quantitative analyses support these arguments. Both alliances and preferential trading arrangements strongly affected trade from 1960 to 1990, and allies that included a major power conducted considerably more trade than their nonmajor-power counterparts. Moreover, the interaction between alliances and preferential trading arrangements is fundamental to explaining patterns of bilateral commerce: Parties to a common preferential trading arrangement and a common alliance engage in markedly greater trade than do members of either type of institution but not both…
187 citations
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: In this paper, a racial theory of international politics and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1923, and the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty are discussed.
Abstract: ......................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................... iv Vita ............................................................................................................................... vi List of Tables............................................................................................................... viii List of Figures ............................................................................................................... ix Chapter One: Introduction ..............................................................................................1 Chapter Two: A Racial Theory of International Politics ................................................. 31 Chapter Three: Race and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1923 ......... 91 Chapter Four: Race and the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty ......................................... 165 Chapter Five: Race and the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment ......................................... 233 Chapter Six: Conclusion ............................................................................................. 295 References ................................................................................................................... 322 Appendix A: List of Texts Used in Chapter Three Content Analysis ............................ 357 Appendix B: List of Texts Used in Chapter Four Content Analysis .............................. 363
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used matching techniques to find that trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement in failed alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945 and showed that the benefits of trade linkage can explain the high compliance rate of alliance compliance.
Abstract: Abstract Though scholars widely claim that issue linkage—the simultaneous negotiation of multiple issues for joint settlement—can help states conclude international agreements, there exist some notable skeptics. Resolving this debate requires empirical evidence. However, beyond a few case studies, there exists no direct and systematic evidence that issue linkages actually increase the probability of agreement. I address this lack of direct and systematic evidence by combing original data on failed alliance negotiations with data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) database. Using matching techniques, I find that, for alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945, offers of trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement. Besides confirming issue linkage's ability to help clinch an agreement, this article's research design and evidence have far-reaching implications for the study of negotiations and alliances. The research design illustrates the value of considering the “dogs that didn't bark” as it identifies both successful and failed negotiations. The article's evidence explains the high rate of alliance compliance identified by previous scholars and highlights a need to rethink the alliance formation process.
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01 Jan 1977TL;DR: The Politics of Oceans and money: Historical Overview as mentioned in this paper is an overview of international rule-making in oceans and money, with a focus on the United States and its relationship with Canada and Australia.
Abstract: I. UNDERSTANDING INTERDEPENDENCE. Interdependence in World Politics. Realism and Complex Interdependence. Explaining International Regime Change. II. REGIME CHANGE IN OCEANS AND MONEY. The Politics of Oceans and Money: Historical Overview. Complex Interdependence in Oceans and Money. The Politics Of Rule-Making in Oceans and Money. III. REGIMES AND TWO BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS. United States Relations With Canada And Australia. IV. THE UNITED STATES AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE. Coping With Interdependence. V. SECOND THOUGHTS ON THEORY AND POLICY. Afterword. "Two Cheers for Multilateralism."
2,262 citations
Book•
18 Dec 2000
TL;DR: Triangulating Peace as mentioned in this paper argues that democracy, economic interdependence, and international mediation can successfully cooperate to significantly reduce the chances of war in the field of international relations, and it is based on ideas originally put forth by Immanuel Kant.
Abstract: Triangulating Peace tackles today's most provocative hypothesis in the field of international relations: the democratic peace proposition. Drawing on ideas originally put forth by Immanuel Kant, the authors argue that democracy, economic interdependence, and international mediation can successfully cooperate to significantly reduce the chances of war.
1,477 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1969
TL;DR: In this paper, Bcnda et al. discuss the problem of how to find the best solution to a given problem in the context of international trade and present a solution to the problem by using a set of techniques based on Enciclopedia.
Abstract: " Hauser. op. cit. p. iv. " Times (I.ondrmV June 23, 1916, editorial. " Julieii Bcnda, La trahison des clercs (Paris, 1927), p. 72. 6o National Power and Foreign Trade T h u s , P r e z i o s i w a n t e d t o b u i l d u p s t r o n g I t a l i a n i n d u s t r i e s s o t h a t t h e y m a y " i n t h e i r o w n t i m e p r a c t i c e d u m p i n g , t u r n i n g a g a i n s t the G e r m a n s t h e i r o w n f a v o r i t e w e a p o n s . " " S i m i l a r l y , h e w i s h e d t o f r e e t h e B a n c a C o m m e r c i a l e f r o m G e r m a n i n f l u e n c e b e c a u s e " t h e b a n k i n g s y s t e m h a s to b e o n e of t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l i n s t r u m e n t s w h i c h t h e s t a t e h a s a t i t s d i s p o s a l i n o r d e r t o d i r e c t i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y a c c o r d i n g t o i t s o w n a i m s . " " T h u s , i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t o b e i n f o r m e d b y t h e Enciclopedia Italiana t h a t P r e z i o s i e a r l y j o i n e d t h e F a s c i s t p a r t y a n d h a d a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n t h e e l a b o r a t i o n of i ts e c o n o m i c p r o g r a m b e f o r e t h e m a r c h o n R o m e . I n a m o r e b a l a n c e d f a s h i o n , H a u s e r m a d e a d i s t i n c t i o n i n h i s final c h a p t e r b e t w e e n " w h a t w e s h a l l n o t i m i t a t e f r o m G e r m a n y " a n d " w h a t w e s h a l l h a v e t o i m i t a t e . " T h i s s h o w s r a t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h e w a y i n w h i c h t h e w h o l e p r o b l e m w a s r a i s e d . B u t i n s p i t e o f h i s m o d e r a t e p o s i t i o n — h e r e j e c t e d t h e m o r e a g g r e s s i v e G e r m a n m e t h o d s , s u c h a s d u m p i n g , a n d d i d n o t f a v o r a c o m p l e t e b o y c o t t o f G e r m a n y a f t e r t h e w a r ' s e n d — h e a d v o c a t e d a n " e c o n o m i c o f f e n s i v e " e v e n a f t e r t h e w a r a s t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e a n s w e r t o G e r m a n m e t h o d s . ^ T h e s e i n s t a n c e s suffice t o s h o w t h e g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s o f a c u r r e n t o f t h o u g h t w h i c h r e c e i v e d i t s p r a c t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n a n d off icial c o n s e c r a t i o n a t t h e P a r i s E c o n o m i c C o n f e r e n c e . T h i s w a s , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e o n l y A l l i e d c o n f e r e n c e d u r i n g t h e w a r a t w h i c h p r o b l e m s of p o s t w a r e c o n o m i c r e c o n s t r u c t i o n w e r e u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . A s h o r t s u r v e y o f i t s r e s o l u t i o n s a n d i t s i n f l u e n c e u p o n l a t e r e v e n t s s e e m s t h e r e f o r e t o b e w a r r a n t e d . ^ T h e r e s o l u t i o n s a d o p t e d b y s i x A l l i e d n a t i o n s — E n g l a n d , F r a n c e , I t a l y , R u s s i a , B e l g i u m , J a p a n — f e l l i n t o t h r e e p a r t s : m e a s u r e s fo r t h e w a r p e r i o d ; m e a s u r e s fo r t h e t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d a f t e r t h e w a r ; a n d p e r m a n e n t m e a s u r e s . T h e a i m o f t h e c o n f e r e n c e i s c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n t h e p r e a m b l e t o t h e r e s o l u t i o n s : T h e representa t ives of the A l l i e d g o v e r n m e n t s . . . dec l a re that , after forc ing u p o n t h e m the m i l i t a r y contest in sp i te of al l the efforts to a v o i d the conflict, the E m p i r e s of C e n t r a l E u r o p e are today p r e p a r i n g , in concert wi th their a l l ies , for a contest on the e c o n o m i c p l a n e , which will no t 1' Preziosi, op. cit., p. 43. 5" Preziosi, op. cit., p, 58, Hauser, op. cit., p. ix. ^For a history of the genesis of the conference, see Etienne CliJmentel, La France et la Politique Economique Interalliee (Paris-New Haven, 1931), pp. 74-78. Theoretical and Historical Aspects 6 1 onJy survive the reestabljshment of peace, but will at that moment attain its full scope and intensity. T h e y cannot therefore conceal from themselves that the agreements which are being prepared for this purpose between their enemies have the obvious object of establishing the domination of the latter over the produclion and the markets of the whole world and of imposing on other countries an intolerable yoke. In the face of so great a peril, the representatives of the All ied governments consider that it has become their duty, on grounds of necessary and legitimate defense, to adopt and realize from now onward all the measures requisite on the one hand to secure for themselves and for the whole of the markets of neutral couniries full economic independence and respect for sound commercial practice and, on the other hand, to facilitate the organization on a permanent basis of their economic alliance.^ I n this p r e a m b l e t!ie spirit w h i c h d o m i n a t e d the conference becomes c lear . T h e e c o n o m i c sovere ignty , e v e n of the defeated e n e m y , is not quest ioned, and it is supposed that e c o n o m i c war wi l l c o n t i n u e after the e n d of mil i tary war , U n d e r this assumption the m a i n preoccupat ion of the Al l ies b e c a m e " e c o n o m i c defense ," w h i c h is very often indist inguishable from e c o n o m i c warfaie.'^ W e are interested here i n the resolutions of the conference only so far as they deal w i t h the transit ion p e r i o d o r wi th the p e r m a n e n t arrangements after the war. T h e s e sections, r e p r o d u c e d in A p p e n d i x B, should be read in their entirety. I n d e e d , they m a k e famil iar reading. O n e after a n o t h e r ^ve find e n u m e r a t e d all the f u n d a m e n t a l policies of refined e c o n o m i c nat ional ism w i t h w h i c h w e have b e c o m e so ivell a c q u a i n t e d in the per iod b e t w e e n the t w o wars—restricted access to raw materials a n d resources, preferent ia l treatments a n d discr iminat ions, restrictions on the activit ies of aliens, a n t i d u m p i n g legislation, differential transport rates, autarky, not only w i t h respect to key industries, b u t on a practical ly universal scale by means ' ^ Q u o t e d f rom H . W. V. T e m p c r l e y , A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol, V { L o n d o n , 1921), p . 3G7. »• Le Teji\f)s h a d a s o m e w h a t Iv ikcwa im a t t i t u d e t o w a r d t h e conference a n d s h o w e d the a b s u r d i t y of this pos i t ion even f rom a n a t i o n a l i s t i c po int of view, " W e think that the m a i n e c o n o m i c task of the C o n f e r e n c e is not to e l a b o r a t e this m o d e s t r^ply to a pro jec t which is a s s u m e d to be a l r eady rea l ized , b u t on the contrary by all m e a n s to prevent the rea l i za t ion of this pro jec t a n d Ihe f o r m a t i o n of this M i t t e l e u r o p a , a l t h o u g h s o m e per sons a p j i a r e n t l v w o u l d l ike to confine themse lves l o p r e p a r i n g a sh ie ld a g a i n s t its b lows . "—/.e Temps, Jime 15, 191C. 62 National Power and Foreign Trade o f s u b s i d i e s , tar i f fs , p r o h i b i t i o n s , e tc . E v e n a c u r s o r y v i e w of t h i s a m a z i n g P a n d o r a ' s b o x r a i s e s d o u b t s w h e t h e r t h e s e m e a s u r e s w e r e d e v i s e d for d e f e n s e o n l y . T h e P a r i s R e s o l u t i o n s w e r e t o b e c o n s i d e r e d a s a b a s i c p r o g r a m . E a c h of t h e A l l i e s p r o m i s e d t o w o r k o u t i ts o w n p r o g r a m i n t e r m s of n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s . E a c h , f u r t h e r m o r e , w a s t o b e i n f o r m e d o f the p r o g r a m d e c i s i o n s o f t h e o t h e r . T h e a g r e e m e n t h a d n o t b e e n r e a c h e d ea s i ly . T h e F r e n c h a n d E n g l i s h d e l e g a t i o n s m e t w i t h s o m e res i s ta n c e f r o m the R u s s i a n a n d I t a h a n d e l e g a t i o n s . B e f o r e t h e w a r t h e t w o l a t t e r c o u n t r i e s h a d r e l i e d h e a v i l y o n t h e G e r m a n m a r k e t a n d v i e w e d w i t h s o m e a p p r e h e n s i o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of G e r m a n re p r i s a l s . T h e R u s s i a n d e l e g a t e s o p p o s e d t h e p e r i o d o f five y e a r s w h i c h h a d b e e n p r o p o s e d b y t h e E n g l i s h d e l e g a t i o n a s t h e m i n i m u m p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h G e r m a n y w a s t o b e e x c l u d e d f r o m m o s t f a v o r e d n a t i o n t r e a t m e n t ; R u s s i a o b t a i n e d t h e m u c h v a g u e r w o r d i n g " f o r a n u m b e r o f y e a r s t o b e fixed by m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t . " ^ T h e R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t , h o w e v e r , w a s m a i n l y f e a r f u l les t t o o i n t i m a t e a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h t h e A l l i e s o n p o s t w a r e c o n o m i c p o l i c y m i g h t , b y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f c o n v e n t i o n a l tar i f fs , r e s t r i c t R u s s i a ' s c o n t e m p l a t e d fu l l u s e o f e c o n o m i c s o v e r e i g n t y . T h i s is evid e n t f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t a l i n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e d e l e g a t e s , w h i c h u n d e r l i n e d " t h e n e c e s s i t y o f a t h o r o u g h g o i n g , u n h i n d e r e d d e v e l o p m e n t o f o u r p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n o n a s l a r g e a s c a l e a s w i l l b e p r a c t i c a b l e of o u r v a s t n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s . . . . I n o r d e r t o a v o i d t h e e n s l a v e m e n t o f o u r i n d u s t r y b y f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e s a n d t o m a k e it a b s o l u t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t w e m u s t , a s a j u s t m e a s u r e , c r e a t e a u t o n o m o u s tar i f fs , w h e r e t h e tarif f o n g o o d s is n o t fixed b y a g r e e m e n t w i t h i n d i v i d u a l c
1,041 citations
738 citations