Liquidity and Leverage
TL;DR: In a financial system in which balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes appear immediately as changes in net worth, eliciting responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In a financial system in which balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes appear immediately as changes in net worth, eliciting responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets. We document evidence that marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical. Such behavior has aggregate consequences. Changes in dealer repos—the primary margin of adjustment for the aggregate balance sheets of intermediaries—forecast changes in financial market risk as measured by the innovations in the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). Aggregate liquidity can be seen as the rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the financial intermediaries.
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TL;DR: The authors summarizes and explains the main events of the liquidity and credit crunch in 2007-08, starting with the trends leading up to the crisis and explaining how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets.
Abstract: This paper summarizes and explains the main events of the liquidity and credit crunch in 2007-08. Starting with the trends leading up to the crisis, I explain how these events unfolded and how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets.
3,033 citations
Cites background from "Liquidity and Leverage"
...Adrian and Shin (2009) confirm this spiral empirically for investment banks....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relationship between credit spreads and economic activity, by constructing a credit spread index based on an extensive data set of prices of outstanding corporate bonds trading in the secondary market and found that the predictive content of credit spreads for economic activity is due primarily to movements in the excess bond premium.
Abstract: We re-examine the evidence on the relationship between credit spreads and economic activity, by constructing a credit spread index based on an extensive data set of prices of outstanding corporate bonds trading in the secondary market. Compared with the standard default-risk indicators, our credit spread index is a robust predictor of economic activity at both the short- and longer-term horizons. Using an empirical framework, we decompose the index into a predictable component that captures the available firm-specific information on expected defaults and a residual component—the excess bond premium—which we argue likely reflects variation in the price of default risk rather than variation in the risk of default. Our results indicate that the predictive content of credit spreads for economic activity is due primarily to movements in the excess bond premium. Innovations in the excess bond premium that are orthogonal to the current state of the economy are shown to lead to significant declines in economic activity and equity prices. We also show that a deterioration in the creditworthiness of broker-dealers—key financial intermediaries in the corporate cash market—causes an increase in the excess bond premium. These findings support the notion that a rise in the excess bond premium represents a reduction in the e!ective risk-bearing capacity of the financial sector and, as a result, a contraction in the supply of credit with significant adverse consequences for the macroeconomy.
1,585 citations
Cites background from "Liquidity and Leverage"
...As documented by Adrian and Shin [2010], broker-dealers differ from other types of institutional investors by their active pro-cyclical management of leverage: Expansions in broker-dealer assets are associated with increases in leverage as broker-dealers take advantage of greater balance sheet capacity; conversely, contractions in their assets are associated with the de-leveraging of their balance sheets....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the global financial cycle is not aligned with countries' specific macroeconomic conditions and propose a convex combination of targeted capital control, macroprudential control, and stricter limit on leverage for all financial intermediaries.
Abstract: There is a global financial cycle in capital flows, asset prices and in credit growth. This cycle co‐moves with the VIX, a measure of uncertainty and risk aversion of the markets. Asset markets in countries with more credit inflows are more sensitive to the global cycle. The global financial cycle is not aligned with countries’ specific macroeconomic conditions. Symp toms can go from benign to large asset price bubbles and excess credit creation, which are among the best predictors of financial crises. A VAR analysis suggests that one of the determinants of the global financial cycle is monetary policy in the centre country , which affects leverage of global banks, capital flows and credit growth in the international financial system. Whenever capital is freely mobile, the global financial cycle constrains national monetary policies regardless of the exchange rate regime. For the past few decades, international macroeconomics has postulated the “trilemma”: with free capital mobility, inde pendent monetary policies are feasible if and only if exchange rates are floating. The global financial cycle transforms the trilemma into a “dilemma” or an “irreconcilable duo”: independent monetary policies are possible if and only if the capital account is managed. So should policy restrict capital mobility? Gains to international capital flows have proved elusive whether in calibrated models or in the data. Large gross flows disrupt asset markets and financial intermediation, so the costs may be very large. To deal with the global financial cycle and the “dilemma”, we have the following policy options: ( a) targeted capital controls; (b) acting on one of the sources of the financial cyc le itself, the monetary policy of the Fed and other main central banks; (c) acting on the transmission channel cyclically by limiting credit growth and leverage during the upturn of the cycle, using national macroprudential policies; (d) acting on the transmission channel structurally by imposing stricter limit s on leverage for all financial intermediaries. We argue for a convex combination of (a), (c) and (d).
1,428 citations
1,407 citations
TL;DR: The authors review the main elements of the pre-crisis consensus, identify where we were wrong and what tenets of the framework still hold, and take a tentative first pass at the contours of a new macroeconomic policy framework.
Abstract: The great moderation lulled macro-economists and policymakers alike in the belief that we knew how to conduct macroeconomic policy. The crisis clearly forces to question that assessment. This paper reviews the main elements of the pre-crisis consensus, identify where we were wrong and what tenets of the pre-crisis framework still hold, and take a tentative first pass at the contours of a new macroeconomic policy framework.
1,212 citations
Cites background from "Liquidity and Leverage"
...Mark-to-market rules, when coupled with constant regulatory capital ratios, forced financial institutions to take dramatic measures to reduce their balance sheets, exacerbating fire sales, and deleveraging (Adrian and Shin 2008)....
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...(This is hard to prove empirically, as the output gap is not directly observable....
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References
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Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors constructs a simple neoclassical model of intrinsic business cycle dynamics in which borrowers' balance sheet positions play an important role and shows that the agency costs of undertaking physical investments are inversely related to the entrepreneur's/borrower's net worth.
Abstract: This paper constructs a simple neoclassical model of intrinsic business cycle dynamics in which borrowers' balance sheet positions play an important role. The critical insight is that the agency costs of undertaking physical investments are inversely related to the entrepreneur's/borrower's net worth. As a result, accelerator effects on investment emerge: Strengthened borrower balance sheets resulting from good times expand investment demand, which in turn tends to amplify the upturn; weakened balance sheets in bad times do just the opposite. Further, redistributions or other shocks that affect borrowers' balance sheets (as in a debt-deflation} may have aggregate real effects.
4,286 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that arbitrage is performed by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors who take large positions using other people's money, which has a number of interesting implications for security pricing.
Abstract: In traditional models, arbitrage in a given security is performed by a large number of diversified investors taking small positions against its mispricing. In reality, however, arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors who take large positions using other people's money. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them.
3,997 citations
"Liquidity and Leverage" refers background in this paper
...Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139857...
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...Gromb and Vayanos (2002) draw on the theme in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) on the importance of collateral constraints for leveraged traders....
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TL;DR: The authors developed a simple neoclassical model of the business cycle in which the condition of borrowers' balance sheets is a source of output dynamics, and the mechanism is that higher borrower net worth reduces the agency costs of financing real capital investments.
Abstract: This paper develops a simple neoclassical model of the business cycle in which the condition of borrowers' balance sheets is a source of output dynamics. The mechanism is that higher borrower net worth reduces the agency costs of financing real capital investments. Business upturns improve net worth, lower agency costs, and increase investment, which amplifies the upturn; vice versa, for downturns. Shocks that affect net worth (as in a debt-deflation) can initiate fluctuations. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.
3,795 citations
"Liquidity and Leverage" refers background in this paper
...The first is the increased credit that operates through the borrower’s balance sheet, where increased lending comes from the greater creditworthiness of the borrower (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 2005))....
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Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity and traders' funding liquidity, i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding, to explain the empirically documented features that market liquidity can suddenly dry up, has commonality across securities, is related to volatility, is subject to flight to quality, and comoves with the market.
Abstract: We provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity - i.e., the ease with which it is traded - and traders' funding liquidity - i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding. Traders provide market liquidity, and their ability to do so depends on their availability of funding. Conversely, traders' funding, i.e., their capital and the margins they are charged, depend on the assets' market liquidity. We show that, under certain conditions, margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. The model explains the empirically documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up, (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) is subject to “flight to quality¶, and (v) comoves with the market, and it provides new testable predictions. Keywords: Liquidity Risk Management, Liquidity, Liquidation, Systemic Risk, Leverage, Margins, Haircuts, Value-at-Risk, Counterparty Credit Risk
3,638 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the textbook description of arbitrage does not describe realistic arbitrage trades, and moreover the discrepancies become particularly important when arbitrageurs manage other people's money.
Abstract: Textbook arbitrage in financial markets requires no capital and entails no risk. In reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital, and is typically risky. Moreover, professional arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors using other people's capital. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them. ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL concepts in finance is arbitrage, defined as "the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets for advantageously different prices" (Sharpe and Alexander (1990)). Theoretically speaking, such arbitrage requires no capital and entails no risk. When an arbitrageur buys a cheaper security and sells a more expensive one, his net future cash flows are zero for sure, and he gets his profits up front. Arbitrage plays a critical role in the analysis of securities markets, because its effect is to bring prices to fundamental values and to keep markets efficient. For this reason, it is extremely important to understand how well this textbook description of arbitrage approximates reality. This article argues that the textbook description does not describe realistic arbitrage trades, and, moreover, the discrepancies become particularly important when arbitrageurs manage other people's money. Even the simplest realistic arbitrages are more complex than the textbook definition suggests. Consider the simple case of two Bund futures contracts to deliver DM250,000 in face value of German bonds at time T, one traded in London on LIFFE and the other in Frankfurt on DTB. Suppose for the moment, counter factually, that these contracts are exactly the same. Suppose finally that at some point in time t the first contract sells for DM240,000 and the second for DM245,000. An arbitrageur in this situation would sell a futures contract in Frankfurt and buy one in London, recognizing that at time T he is perfectly hedged. To do so, at time t, he would have to put up some good faith money, namely DM3,000 in London and DM3,500 in Frankfurt, leading to a
3,358 citations