Making Inference across Mobilisation and Influence Research: Comparing Top-Down and Bottom-Up Mapping of Interest Systems.
TL;DR: The findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up mapping strategies lead to profoundly different maps of interest group communities.
Abstract: Scholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a bottom-up mapping strategy in order to characterise the total size and composition of interest group communities. Researchers with an interest in policy influence usually rely on a top-down strategy in which the mapping of politically active organisations depends on samples of specific policies. But some scholars also use top-down data gathered for other research questions on mobilisation (and vice versa). However, it is currently unclear how valid such large-N data for different types of research questions are. We illustrate our argument by addressing these questions using unique data sets drawn from the INTEREURO project on lobbying in the European Union and the European Union’s Transparency Register. Our findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up mapping strategies lead to profoundly different maps of interest group communities.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the European Union interest group population with those in four member states: France, Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, and show that the EU interest system is not more biased towards the representation of business interests than the other systems.
Abstract: The European Union interest group population is often characterised as being biased towards business and detached from its constituency base. Many scholars attribute this to institutional factors unique to the EU. Yet, assessing whether or not the EU is indeed unique in this regard requires a comparative research design. We compare the EU interest group population with those in four member states: France, Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. We differentiate system, policy domain and organisational factors and examine their effects on interest group diversity. Our results show that the EU interest system is not more biased towards the representation of business interests than the other systems. Moreover, EU interest organisations are not more detached from their constituents than those in the studied countries. Everywhere, business interest associations seem to be better capable of representing their members’ interests than civil society groups. These findings suggest that the EU is less of a sui generis system than commonly assumed and imply the need for more fine-grained analyses of interest group diversity.
55 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the salience and scope of issues seem more important denominators for variation in business lobby activity than the importance of conflict and containment or expansion of conflict on concrete policy issues.
Abstract: Business interest groups numerically dominate the European Union (EU) interest group communities. However, scholars note that the relative proportion of business interests varies by either the institutional venue or the policy issue. Exchange-theoretical approaches emphasize the distinct informational needs of policy-makers at different venues, hereby favoring business actors to a varying degree. Other scholars emphasize the importance of conflict and argue that containment or expansion of conflict on concrete policy issues shapes the relative presence of business interest representatives. We simultaneously test both hypotheses comparing interest group activities on seventy issues observed in the European Parliament, the European Commission and in the EU media. We find little differences between the EU venues in terms of the interests represented. Rather, the salience and scope of issues seem more important denominators for variation in business lobby activity.
33 citations
Cites background from "Making Inference across Mobilisatio..."
...Recent research shows that the aggregate sum of issue-level interest group communities hardly differs from the full interest group population assessed independently from the policy process (Berkhout et al. 2018)....
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...It may alternatively be labeled actor expansion (Grande and Hutter, 2016: 8) or issue crowdedness or density (Berkhout et al. 2017)....
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TL;DR: The Comparative Interest Group-survey project (CIGsurvey) as mentioned in this paper is a large scale survey of interest groups in 9 European countries and at the European Union level.
Abstract: This article discusses the methodology and practice behind planning and executing the Comparative Interest Group-survey project (CIG-survey). The CIG-survey includes surveys among national populations of organized interests in 9 European countries and at the European Union level. Although surveys are a useful and reliable way to collect data on a variety of topics, there are also numerous pitfalls and challenges in surveying interest groups, especially across multiple countries. Despite the prominent use of surveys in interest group research, systematic reflections on this method are scarce and data sets are not always properly archived or openly accessible. This article elaborates upon the practical implications and reflects on the lessons learnt during from the implementation of the CIG-survey. Moreover, we highlight how the fuzzy boundaries of interest communities obfuscate sampling and that surveying interest organizations requires researchers to navigate through a specific organizational context to reach and motivate respondents. We also demonstrate how a careful survey plan can positively affect response rates and enable the creation of robust comparative data sets.
33 citations
TL;DR: Although it is increasingly accepted in the literature on lobbying that European political institutions are facing historically high levels of interest group pressure, only a few studies have hithe... as mentioned in this paper, and
Abstract: Although it is increasingly accepted in the literature on lobbying that European political institutions are facing historically high levels of interest group pressure, only a few studies have hithe...
27 citations
TL;DR: The authors examined the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals and found that lobbying success is partially contingent on the extent to which finance is united behind a common position.
Abstract: This article examines the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals. I argue that lobbying success is a function of how well finance is able to speak with a unified voice. Building on existing studies, I examine industry unity as explicit preference alignment between actors but also in terms of actors abstaining from stating preferences. Staying silent on an issue sends signals to policymakers about issue saliency and industry support. Using a novel dataset derived from document coding and interviews, I examine the impact of industry unity on lobbying success in shaping six financial regulatory proposals in the context of the European Union. My findings show that lobbying success is partially contingent on the extent to which finance is united behind a common position. Critically, however, lobbying success is also related to the nature of that position, whether supporting the proposal or whether in favor of strengthening or weakening regulatory stringency.
26 citations
References
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9,592 citations
01 Jan 1971
6,455 citations
"Making Inference across Mobilisatio..." refers background in this paper
...Most notably, Mancur Olson (1965) assumed that influence was a direct artefact of the mobilisation processes of individual interest groups....
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Book•
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: Baumgartner and Leech as mentioned in this paper reviewed hundreds of books and articles about interest groups from the 1940s to today; examine the methodological and conceptual problems that have beset the field; and suggest research strategies to return interest-group studies to a position of greater relevance.
Abstract: A generation ago, scholars saw interest groups as the single most important element in the American political system. Today, political scientists are more likely to see groups as a marginal influence compared to institutions such as Congress, the presidency, and the judiciary. Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech show that scholars have veered from one extreme to another not because of changes in the political system, but because of changes in political science. They review hundreds of books and articles about interest groups from the 1940s to today; examine the methodological and conceptual problems that have beset the field; and suggest research strategies to return interest-group studies to a position of greater relevance. The authors begin by explaining how the group approach to politics became dominant forty years ago in reaction to the constitutional-legal approach that preceded it. They show how it fell into decline in the 1970s as scholars ignored the impact of groups on government to focus on more quantifiable but narrower subjects, such as collective-action dilemmas and the dynamics of recruitment. As a result, despite intense research activity, we still know very little about how groups influence day-to-day governing. Baumgartner and Leech argue that scholars need to develop a more coherent set of research questions, focus on large-scale studies, and pay more attention to the context of group behavior. Their book will give new impetus and direction to a field that has been in the academic wilderness too long.
726 citations
Book•
15 Jul 2009
TL;DR: For example, the authors found that sixty percent of recent lobbying campaigns failed to change policy despite millions of dollars spent trying, and that resources explain less than five percent of the difference between successful and unsuccessful efforts.
Abstract: During the 2008 election season, politicians from both sides of the aisle promised to rid government of lobbyists' undue influence. For the authors of Lobbying and Policy Change, the most extensive study ever done on the topic, these promises ring hollow - not because politicians fail to keep them but because lobbies are far less influential than political rhetoric suggests. Based on a comprehensive examination of ninety-eight issues, this volume demonstrates that sixty percent of recent lobbying campaigns failed to change policy despite millions of dollars spent trying. Why? The authors find that resources explain less than five percent of the difference between successful and unsuccessful efforts. Moreover, they show, these attempts must overcome an entrenched Washington system with a tremendous bias in favor of the status quo. Though elected officials and existing policies carry more weight, lobbies have an impact too, and when advocates for a given issue finally succeed, policy tends to change significantly. The authors argue, however, that the lobbying community so strongly reflects elite interests that it will not fundamentally alter the balance of power unless its makeup shifts dramatically in favor of average Americans' concerns.
704 citations
Book•
15 Nov 1987
TL;DR: The Federal Government in the United States is a government "of the people, by the people and for the people" as mentioned in this paper, and it is composed of three branches of government: the Presidency, the Senate, and the House of Representatives.
Abstract: The Federal Government in the United States is a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people." Presidents are elected by popular vote in the nation (filtered through the electoral college), Senators are elected by popular vote in their states, and Representatives are elected by popular vote in their Congressional districts. Cabinet members and agency heads are appointed by the elected president, as are members of the Supreme Court. But this says nothing about politics. Professor Lauman and Knoke have asked, in this book, how policies were made, in the period 1977-1980, in the areas of energy and health. The question is a very different one from the question of how the positions of president and Congress are filled.
632 citations