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Market liquidity and funding liquidity
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity and traders' funding liquidity, i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding, to explain the empirically documented features that market liquidity can suddenly dry up, has commonality across securities, is related to volatility, is subject to flight to quality, and comoves with the market.
Abstract: We provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity - i.e., the ease with which it is traded - and traders' funding liquidity - i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding. Traders provide market liquidity, and their ability to do so depends on their availability of funding. Conversely, traders' funding, i.e., their capital and the margins they are charged, depend on the assets' market liquidity. We show that, under certain conditions, margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. The model explains the empirically documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up, (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) is subject to “flight to quality¶, and (v) comoves with the market, and it provides new testable predictions. Keywords: Liquidity Risk Management, Liquidity, Liquidation, Systemic Risk, Leverage, Margins, Haircuts, Value-at-Risk, Counterparty Credit Risk
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TL;DR: The authors summarizes and explains the main events of the liquidity and credit crunch in 2007-08, starting with the trends leading up to the crisis and explaining how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets.
Abstract: This paper summarizes and explains the main events of the liquidity and credit crunch in 2007-08. Starting with the trends leading up to the crisis, I explain how these events unfolded and how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets.
3,033 citations
Cites background from "Market liquidity and funding liquid..."
...Source: Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)....
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...Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that a vicious cycle emerges, where higher margins and haircuts force de-leveraging and more sales, which increase margins further and force more sales, leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria....
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...It is useful to divide the concept of liquidity into two categories: funding liquidity and market liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009)....
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...positions at fire-sale prices. ( Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005 )....
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...5 First, unexpected price shocks may be a harbinger of higher future volatility (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009)....
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TL;DR: In a financial system in which balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes appear immediately as changes in net worth, eliciting responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In a financial system in which balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes appear immediately as changes in net worth, eliciting responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets. We document evidence that marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical. Such behavior has aggregate consequences. Changes in dealer repos—the primary margin of adjustment for the aggregate balance sheets of intermediaries—forecast changes in financial market risk as measured by the innovations in the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). Aggregate liquidity can be seen as the rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the financial intermediaries.
1,950 citations
TL;DR: The authors developed a canonical framework to think about credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current crisis, and used the framework to address two issues in particular: first, how disruptions in financial intermediation can induce a crisis that affects real activity; and second, how various credit market interventions by the central bank and the Treasury of the type we have seen recently, might work to mitigate the crisis.
Abstract: We develop a canonical framework to think about credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current crisis. We use the framework to address two issues in particular: first, how disruptions in financial intermediation can induce a crisis that affects real activity; and second, how various credit market interventions by the central bank and the Treasury of the type we have seen recently, might work to mitigate the crisis. We make use of earlier literature to develop our framework and characterize how very recent literature is incorporating insights from the crisis.
1,900 citations
Cites background from "Market liquidity and funding liquid..."
...3 Let ht be the Lagrangian multiplier for the incentive constraint (11) faced by bank of type h and t P...
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TL;DR: Discount-rate variation is the central organizing question of current asset-pricing research as discussed by the authors, and a survey of discount-rate theories and applications can be found in the survey.
Abstract: Discount-rate variation is the central organizing question of current asset-pricing research. I survey facts, theories, and applications. Previously, we thought returns were unpredictable, with variation in price-dividend ratios due to variation in expected cashflows. Now it seems all price-dividend variation corresponds to discount-rate variation. We also thought that the cross-section of expected returns came from the CAPM. Now we have a zoo of new factors. I categorize discount-rate theories based on central ingredients and data sources. Incorporating discount-rate variation affects finance applications, including portfolio theory, accounting, cost of capital, capital structure, compensation, and macroeconomics.
1,624 citations
Cites background from "Market liquidity and funding liquid..."
...41 Brunnermeier (2009) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), for example....
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TL;DR: This paper presented a model with leverage and margin constraints that vary across investors and time, and found evidence consistent with each of the model's five central predictions: constrained investors bid up high-beta assets, high beta is associated with low alpha, as they find empirically for U.S. equities, 20 international equity markets, Treasury bonds, corporate bonds, and futures.
Abstract: We present a model with leverage and margin constraints that vary across investors and time. We find evidence consistent with each of the model’s five central predictions: (1) Since constrained investors bid up high-beta assets, high beta is associated with low alpha, as we find empirically for U.S. equities, 20 international equity markets, Treasury bonds, corporate bonds, and futures; (2) A betting-against-beta (BAB) factor, which is long leveraged low beta assets and short high-beta assets, produces significant positive risk-adjusted returns; (3) When funding constraints tighten, the return of the BAB factor is low; (4) Increased funding liquidity risk compresses betas toward one; (5) More constrained investors hold riskier assets.
1,431 citations
Cites background from "Market liquidity and funding liquid..."
...Furthermore, funding liquidity risk is linked to market liquidity risk (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), which also affects required returns (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005)....
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References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns.
Abstract: We present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns. The unpredictability of noise traders' beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them. As a result, prices can diverge significantly from fundamental values even in the absence of fundamental risk. Moreover, bearing a disproportionate amount of risk that they themselves create enables noise traders to earn a higher expected return than rational investors do. The model sheds light on a number of financial anomalies, including the excess volatility of asset prices, the mean reversion of stock returns, the underpricing of closed-end mutual funds, and the Mehra-Prescott equity premium puzzle.
5,703 citations
"Market liquidity and funding liquid..." refers background in this paper
...9 See also DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002)....
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TL;DR: The authors constructs a simple neoclassical model of intrinsic business cycle dynamics in which borrowers' balance sheet positions play an important role and shows that the agency costs of undertaking physical investments are inversely related to the entrepreneur's/borrower's net worth.
Abstract: This paper constructs a simple neoclassical model of intrinsic business cycle dynamics in which borrowers' balance sheet positions play an important role. The critical insight is that the agency costs of undertaking physical investments are inversely related to the entrepreneur's/borrower's net worth. As a result, accelerator effects on investment emerge: Strengthened borrower balance sheets resulting from good times expand investment demand, which in turn tends to amplify the upturn; weakened balance sheets in bad times do just the opposite. Further, redistributions or other shocks that affect borrowers' balance sheets (as in a debt-deflation} may have aggregate real effects.
4,286 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that arbitrage is performed by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors who take large positions using other people's money, which has a number of interesting implications for security pricing.
Abstract: In traditional models, arbitrage in a given security is performed by a large number of diversified investors taking small positions against its mispricing. In reality, however, arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors who take large positions using other people's money. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them.
3,997 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a general model of the firm is developed, and then the financial structure of firms, debt collecting and bankruptcy is analyzed in greater depth, and the authors contribute to contact theory as developed in economic analysis.
Abstract: This essay contributes to contact theory as it has been developed in economic analysis, particularly in the context of the firm. It develops a general model of the firm, and then analyzes in greater depth the financial structure of firms, debt collecting and bankruptcy.
3,585 citations
"Market liquidity and funding liquid..." refers background in this paper
...Liu and Longstaff (2004) derive the optimal dynamic arbitrage strategy under funding constraints in a setting with an exogenous price process....
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...This literature explains how funding liquidity problems arise because of agency problems combined with contract and market incompleteness (see e.g. Hart (1995) and references therein)....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the determinants of liquidation values of assets, particularly focusing on the potential buyers of assets and use this focus on asset buyers to explain variation in debt capacity across industries and over the business cycle.
Abstract: We explore the determinants of liquidation values of assets, particularly focusing on the potential buyers of assets. WVhen a firm in financial distress needs to sell assets, its industry peers are likely to be experiencing problems themselves, leading to asset sales at prices below value in best use. Such illiquidity makes assets cheap in bad times, and so ex ante is a significant private cost of leverage. We use this focus on asset buyers to explain variation in debt capacity across industries and over the business cycle, as well as the rise in U.S. corporate leverage in the 1980s. How DO FIRMS CHOOSE debt levels, and why do firms or even whole industries sometimes change how much debt they have? Why, for example, have American firms increased their leverage in the 1980s (Bernanke and Campbell (1988), Warshawsky (1990)), and why has this debt increase been the greatest in some industries, such as food and timber? Despite substantial progress in research on leverage, these questions remain largely open. In this paper, we explore an approach to debt capacity based on the cost of asset sales. We argue that the focus on asset sales and liquidations helps clarify the crosssectional determinants of leverage, as well as why debt increased in the 1980s. Williamson (1988) stresses the link between debt capacity and the liquidation value of assets. He argues that assets which are redeployable-have alternative uses-also have high liquidation values. For example, commercial land can be used for many different purposes. Such assets are good candidates for debt finance because, if they are managed improperly, the manager will be unable to pay the debt, and then creditors will take the assets away from him and redeploy them. Williamson thus identifies one important determinant of liquidation value and debt capacity, namely, asset redeploya
2,821 citations
"Market liquidity and funding liquid..." refers background or methods in this paper
...Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show, within a corporate finance context, that a funding crisis can lead to “fire sales” of machines since potential buyers of these industry-specific machines also face similar funding problems at the same time....
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...In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) credit rationing is due to adverse selection and moral hazard in the lending market, and Geanakoplos (2003) considers endogenous contracts in a general-equilibrium framework of imperfect commitment....
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...Our model applies the corporate finance insights of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Allen and Gale to study endogenous market liquidity when the market making sector faces margins constraints of different forms....
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