Mean voter representation and partisan constituency representation: Do parties respond to the mean voter position or to their supporters?
TL;DR: In this article, a cross-national analysis based on observations from Eurobarometer surveys and parties' policy programs in 15 countries from 1973 to 2002 was conducted to investigate whether political parties respond to shifts in the preferences of their supporters.
Abstract: Do political parties respond to shifts in the preferences of their supporters, which we label the partisan constituency model, or to shifts in the mean voter position (the general electorate model)? Cross-national analyses — based on observations from Eurobarometer surveys and parties’ policy programmes in 15 countries from 1973 to 2002 — suggest that the general electorate model characterizes the policy shifts of mainstream parties. Alternatively, when we analyse the policy shifts of Communist, Green and extreme Nationalist parties (i.e. ‘niche’ parties), we find that these parties respond to shifts in the mean position of their supporters. The findings have implications for spatial theories and political representation.
Citations
More filters
[...]
517 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extended the literature on issue evolution from the U.S. context to multiparty systems and argued that within multiparty competition not all parties in opposition have an incentive to change the issue basis of political competition.
Abstract: How do issues enter the political arena and come to affect party competition? This study extends the literature on issue evolution from the U.S. context to multiparty systems. While traditional models assume opposition parties to be the agents of issue evolution, this study argues that within multiparty competition not all parties in opposition have an incentive to change the issue basis of political competition. The central propositions of our issue entrepreneurship model are twofold: First, political parties are more likely to become issue entrepreneurs when they are losers on the dominant dimension of contestation. We focus on three components of political loss in multiparty systems relating to the office-seeking, voting-seeking, and policy-seeking objectives of parties. Second, parties will choose which issue to promote on the basis of their internal cohesion and proximity to the mean voter on that same issue. We test these propositions by examining the evolution of the issue of European integration i...
232 citations
Cites background from "Mean voter representation and parti..."
...Unlike parties in two-party, single-member plurality systems, parties operating in a multiparty system using proportional representation may seek to maximize votes not by adopting the position of the mean voter on the new issue, but by adopting a position away from the mean voter position, closer to their party supporters (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow et al., 2011)....
[...]
...…operating in a multiparty system using proportional representation may seek to maximize votes not by adopting the position of the mean voter on the new issue, but by adopting a position away from the mean voter position, closer to their party supporters (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow et al., 2011)....
[...]
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors review empirical studies on multiparty elections, i.e., elections involving three or more major parties, that evaluate party elites' policy responses to these factors.
Abstract: The spatial model of elections identifies factors that motivate party elites to shift their policy positions, including changes in voters' policy preferences, rival parties' policy shifts, past election results, and changes in party elites' valence images with respect to dimensions of evaluation such as competence and integrity. I review empirical studies on multiparty elections, i.e., elections involving three or more major parties, that evaluate party elites' policy responses to these factors, along with empirical studies on the electoral consequences of parties' policy shifts. This review reveals a paradox: on the one hand, empirical studies conclude that parties systematically shift their policy positions in response to the factors that spatial modelers have identified. On the other hand, there is only weak and inconsistent empirical evidence that voters actually perceive parties' policy shifts, and/or that these shifts have significant electoral consequences. Thus the predictions of spatial theory ar...
219 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a pooled time-series analysis of 55 parties in 10 European democracies between 1977 and 2003 was conducted to investigate the extent to which environmental incentives (mean voter change, party voter change and office exclusion) drove party-position change.
Abstract: What motivates parties to change their positions? Earlier studies demonstrate that parties change their position in response to environmental incentives, such as voter shifts. Yet, this work also suggests that parties differ in their responses. What accounts for this variation? We argue and empirically substantiate that differences in party organization explain the divergent responses of parties to environmental incentives. By means of a pooled time-series analysis of 55 parties in 10 European democracies between 1977 and 2003, this study demonstrates how the party organizational balance-of-power between party activists and party leaders conditions the extent to which environmental incentives (mean voter change, party voter change, and office exclusion) drive party-position change. The study’s findings have important implications for our understanding of parties’ electoral strategies as well as for models of representation.
184 citations
Cites background or result from "Mean voter representation and parti..."
...The underlying argument is that niche parties respond to party supporters and are less interested in short term electoral gain because of these parties’ smallness and their horizontal party organization (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011)....
[...]
...This is in line with part of the literature (Budge 1994; Ezrow et al. 2011; Somer- Topcu 2009)....
[...]
...Model 1 supports the common findings in the literature since both the change in the party voter’s position and the change in the mean voter’s position have a positive effect on party position change while defeat is not significant (Adams et al. 2004; 2009; Ezrow et al. 2011)....
[...]
TL;DR: This paper found that polarization correlates with individual partisanship across space and time, and perceiving party polarization makes people more likely to be partisan, and that the relationship appears to be causal: using a long-term panel survey from the United States, they find that citizens become more partisan as they perceive polarization increasing.
Abstract: Scholars view polarization with trepidation. But polarization may clarify voters’ choices and generate stronger party attachments. The link between party polarization and mass partisanship remains unclear. I look to theories of partisanship to derive implications about the relationships among polarization, citizens’ perceptions of polarization, and mass partisanship. I test those implications using cross-national and longitudinal survey data. My results confirm that polarization correlates with individual partisanship across space and time. Citizens in polarized systems also perceive their parties to be more polarized. And perceiving party polarization makes people more likely to be partisan. That relationship appears to be causal: using a long-term panel survey from the United States, I find that citizens become more partisan as they perceive polarization increasing.
182 citations
Cites background from "Mean voter representation and parti..."
...Parties shift their positions in response to changes in public opinion (Ezrow et al. 2011), economic conditions or shocks (Ura and Ellis 2012), and shifting international constraints (Haupt 2010)....
[...]
References
More filters
Book•
01 Jan 1957
TL;DR: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout as discussed by the authors, particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Abstract: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout. Particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote. This conclusion, especially as elaborated on by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) has shifted the attention of modern political scientists from explaining why people don't vote to explaining why they do.
14,677 citations
TL;DR: The generalized least squares approach of Parks produces standard errors that lead to extreme overconfidence, often underestimating variability by 50% or more, and a new method is offered that is both easier to implement and produces accurate standard errors.
Abstract: We examine some issues in the estimation of time-series cross-section models, calling into question the conclusions of many published studies, particularly in the field of comparative political economy. We show that the generalized least squares approach of Parks produces standard errors that lead to extreme overconfidence, often underestimating variability by 50% or more. We also provide an alternative estimator of the standard errors that is correct when the error structures show complications found in this type of model. Monte Carlo analysis shows that these “panel-corrected standard errors” perform well. The utility of our approach is demonstrated via a reanalysis of one “social democratic corporatist” model.
5,670 citations
TL;DR: A survey of the top three political science journals from 1998 to 2002 suggests that the execution of these models is often flawed and inferential errors are common as discussed by the authors, and that scholars follow the simple checklist of dos and don'ts for using multiplicative interaction models presented in this article.
Abstract: Multiplicative interaction models are common in the quantitative political science literature. This is so for good reason. Institutional arguments frequently imply that the relationship between political inputs and outcomes varies depending on the institutional context. Models of strategic interaction typically produce conditional hypotheses as well. Although conditional hypotheses are ubiquitous in political science and multiplicative interaction models have been found to capture their intuition quite well, a survey of the top three political science journals from 1998 to 2002 suggests that the execution of these models is often flawed and inferential errors are common. We believe that considerable progress in our understanding of the political world can occur if scholars follow the simple checklist of dos and don'ts for using multiplicative interaction models presented in this article. Only 10% of the articles in our survey followed the checklist.
5,235 citations
Additional excerpts
...…varðB3Þ þ ½niche 2 varðB5Þ þ 2½niche covðB3;B5Þ q (see Brambor et al., 2006), where DP(t) and DS(t) stand for the variables [change in party position (t)] and [mean shift – party…...
[...]
TL;DR: This article examined 36 democracies from 1945 to 1996 and found that consensual systems stimulate economic growth, control inflation and unemployment, and limit budget deficits, and that majority rule works best in most democracies.
Abstract: Examining 36 democracies from 1945 to 1996, this text arrives at important - and unexpected - conclusions about what type of democracy works best. It demonstrates that consensual systems stimulate economic growth, control inflation and unemployment, and limit budget deficits.
3,442 citations
"Mean voter representation and parti..." refers background in this paper
...…from this perspective, G. Bingham Powell presents two visions of democracy that are based on constitutional design: the nature of party–citizen linkages varies depending on whether the political system is characterized as ‘majoritarian’ or ‘proportional’ (Powell, 2000; see also Lijphart, 1999)....
[...]
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the residuals are sorted and the observation is located in the residual corresponding to the quantile in question, taking into account weights if they are applied, and the square root of the sum of the weights is calculated.
Abstract: We first sort the residuals and locate the observation in the residuals corresponding to the quantile in question, taking into account weights if they are applied. We then calculate wn, the square root of the sum of the weights. Unweighted data is equivalent to weighted data where each observation has weight 1, resulting in wn p n. For analytically weighted data, the weights are rescaled so that the sum of the weights is the sum of the observations, resulting in p n again. For frequency weighted data, wn literally is the square of the sum of the weights.
3,087 citations