Metaphysical Grounding: Varieties of ontological dependence
01 Oct 2012-pp 186-213
About: The article was published on 2012-10-01. It has received 172 citations till now.
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TL;DR: This paper argued that grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of grounding leave open such basic questions as whether grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from grounding goingson, whether their are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to these basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence.
Abstract: It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation— ‘Grounding’—is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold ‘in virtue of’’, be (constitutively) ‘metaphysically dependent on’, or be ‘nothing over and above’ some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work (better than merely modal notions, in particular) in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether Grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from Grounding goings-on, whether they are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to such basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence. There is no avoiding appeal to the specific metaphysical relations typically at issue in investigations into dependence—for example, type...
390 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors take the analogy between grounding and causation seriously, by providing an account of grounding in the image of causation, on the template of structural equation models for causation.
Abstract: Grounding is often glossed as metaphysical causation, yet no current theory of grounding looks remotely like a plausible treatment of causation. I propose to take the analogy between grounding and causation seriously, by providing an account of grounding in the image of causation, on the template of structural equation models for causation.
316 citations
Cites background from "Metaphysical Grounding: Varieties o..."
...41 Fine (1995; cf. Koslicki 2012) offers a relation of ontological dependence between entities understood in terms of essence, on which one entity x depends upon some others y1, y2, … if and only if y1, y2, … feature in x’s constitutive essence (that is, y1, y2,… show up in the ‘‘real definition’’…...
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TL;DR: In this paper, a mathematical account of Plateau's laws for soap films is presented, and the authors argue that this example falls into a class of cases that expert practitioners count as an explanation.
Abstract: This article focuses on a case that expert practitioners count as an explanation: a mathematical account of Plateau’s laws for soap films. I argue that this example falls into a class of e...
77 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence is proposed, one which understand them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and others.
Abstract: Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are—as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree—widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and others. We argue that the account comports with antecedently plausible principles governing grounding, essence, and identity taken individually, and illuminates how the three interact. We also argue that the account compares favorably to an alternative unification of grounding and essence recently proposed by Kit Fine. Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are—as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree—widely thought to be intimately related: grounding (when some phenomenon non-causally ‘derives’ from another) and essence (when some phenomenon is in the ‘nature’ of another). However, how they’re related remains quite opaque.1 We aim to clarify their link by proposing a unified and uniform account of both notions that analyzes them in terms of a third: what we call, following Linnebo (2014), generalized identity. Along with the intrinsic desirability of accounting for either notion alone (which has proven elusive), our proposal illuminates how the two interact by means of a single, relatively wellbehaved conceptual tool. What do we mean by “generalized” identity? Objectual identities (e.g. “Hesperus is Phosphorus”) are familiar, and display a canonical form: an identity-indicating * This article is the product of full and equal collaboration between its authors; the order of authorship is alphabetical. 1 How grounding and essence interact is explicitly taken up in Audi (2012; 2015), Carnino (2014), Correia (2005; 2013), Dasgupta (2014; 2016), Fine (2012; 2015), Guigon (forthcoming), Greenberg (2014), Kment (2014), Koslicki (2012; 2015), Rosen (2012; 2015), Skiles (2015), Trogdon (2015), and Zylstra (forthcoming).
64 citations
Cites background from "Metaphysical Grounding: Varieties o..."
...We cannot appraise every such constraint that has been suggested here (see e.g. King 1998 and Koslicki 2012 for just a couple)....
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...…(2012; 2015), Carnino (2014), Correia (2005; 2013), Dasgupta (2014; 2016), Fine (2012; 2015), Guigon (forthcoming), Greenberg (2014), Kment (2014), Koslicki (2012; 2015), Rosen (2012; 2015), Skiles (2015), Trogdon (2015), and Zylstra (forthcoming). phrase like “is” gets treated as a relational…...
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...…case of (13)—characterizes not what the word “human” happens to mean in English (which is the purview of a nominal definition), but rather what being a human is ‘in itself’ (see e.g. Fine 1994; Kment 2014, pp. 158-9; Koslicki 2012, pp. 190, 197-201; Lowe 2012, pp. 104-5; Rosen 2010, p. 122; 2015)....
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...First, “To be F …” statements are often introduced as generic essence statements, then assumed to at least entail an objectual identity involving the property being F (see e.g. King 1998, p. 157 and fn. 26; Kment 2014, p. 153-5; Koslicki 2012, pp. 197-201; Wedgwood 2007, pp. 138- 9)....
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01 Nov 2019
TL;DR: The analytic tradition in philosophy is associated with the mathematical logic of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Gödel, and Tarski as mentioned in this paper, which makes for a lingua franca, an admirable prevailing level of clarity and rigor, and interdisciplinary permeability with cognate fields sharing this affiliation.
Abstract: A great strength of the analytic tradition in philosophy (I count myself among it) is its affiliation with the mathematical logic of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Gödel, and Tarski: all graduate students are forced to learn its basics, and soon come to discipline their thoughts to fit its structures. This makes for a lingua franca, an admirable prevailing level of clarity and rigor, and interdisciplinary permeability with cognate fields sharing this affiliation. These all contribute to the continuing growth and dynamism of the global analytic-philosophical research community, which shows no sign of losing steam. But mathematical logic is not theory-neutral. Its characteristic use of truth as the fundamental analysans for validity and entailment reflects its origins as a tool for representing the discourse of the natural sciences, which aim at the truth from ‘outside’ their subject-matter. And—though this would conflict with the ‘unity of science’ (Carnap 1928/1927, Oppenheim and Putnam 1958) characteristically embraced by the analytic tradition—perhaps the discourse of the ‘human’ sciences is fundamentally different. After all, a disjuncture between ‘naturalistic’ and ‘humanistic’ discourse—less poetically, physical and mental—is the mainstay of the continental hermeneutic tradition (Schleiermacher 1834/1998, Dilthey 1883/1989, Gadamer 1976, Ricouer 1981); and for the twentieth-century anglophone nonanalytic philosopher Collingwood (1933/2005, 1946/1993), the ‘relation between the sciences of the body, or natural sciences, and the sciences of the mind[] is the relation inquiry into which ought to be substituted for the make-believe inquiry into the make-believe problem of ‘the relation between body and mind’ ’ (Collingwood 1942/92, 2.49). More specifically,
55 citations