Patent•
Method and apparatus for limiting access to an integrated circuit (IC)
03 Aug 2012-
TL;DR: In this paper, a method and apparatus for limiting access to an integrated circuit (IC) upon detection of abnormal conditions is provided, at least one of abnormal voltage detection, abnormal temperature detection, and abnormal clock detection with low power consumption.
Abstract: A method and apparatus for limiting access to an integrated circuit (IC) upon detection of abnormal conditions is provided. At least one of abnormal voltage detection, abnormal temperature detection, and abnormal clock detection are provided with low power consumption. Both abnormally low and abnormally high parameter values (e.g. abnormally low or high voltage, temperature, or clock frequency) may be detected. Abnormal clock detection may also detect a stopped clock signal, including a clock signal stopped at a low logic level or at a high logic level. Furthermore, abnormal clock detection may detect an abnormal duty cycle of a clock signal. A sampled bandgap reference may be used to provide accurate voltage and current references while consuming a minimal amount of power. Upon detection of an abnormal parameter value, one or more tamper indications may be provided to initiate tampering countermeasures, such as limiting access to the IC.
Citations
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Patent•
13 Oct 2015
TL;DR: In this paper, a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behaviour is observed.
Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behavior is observed. In some instances, a physical side channel (e.g. and indirect measure of program execution such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and other physical signals) can be used to assess the execution status in a processor or digital circuit using an external monitor and detect, with extreme accuracy, when an unauthorized execution has managed to disrupt the normal operation of a target system (e.g., a computer system, etc.).
56 citations
Patent•
27 May 2016TL;DR: In this paper, a data storage device is configured to mark data for refresh in response to determining that a first measured temperature associated with writing the data to the memory exceeds a first threshold.
Abstract: A data storage device is configured to mark data for refresh in response to determining that a first measured temperature associated with writing the data to the memory exceeds a first threshold. The data storage device is further configured to refresh the marked data in response to determining that a second measured temperature associated with the memory is below a second threshold.
41 citations
Patent•
10 Dec 2012TL;DR: In this paper, a motor control apparatus includes a by-wire control circuit for sequentially switching an energized phase of a motor in a correct order of driving the motor, by calculating an address for access to the first table based on the drive permission code.
Abstract: A motor control apparatus includes a by-wire control circuit for sequentially switching an energized phase of a motor. The by-wire control circuit pre-stores a first table defining an energized phase address corresponding to each address and a second table defining an energized phase corresponding to each energized phase address. When receiving a drive permission code from a second control circuit, the by-wire control circuit switches the energized phase in a correct order of driving the motor, by calculating an address for access to the first table based on the drive permission code, calculating an energized phase address corresponding to the address by referring to the first table, and determining the energized phase corresponding to the energized phase address by referring to the second table.
30 citations
Patent•
07 Feb 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, a memory device selectively disables one or more memory operations by altering bias voltages associated with performing the memory operation, gating off a current needed for performing memory operation and limiting the needed current to a magnitude below the threshold magnitude required for the operation.
Abstract: In response to a tamper-attempt indication, a memory device selectively disables one or more memory operations. Disabling can be accomplished by different techniques, including altering bias voltages associated with performing the memory operation, gating off a current needed for performing the memory operation, and limiting the needed current to a magnitude below the threshold magnitude required for the operation. After disabling the memory operation, a mock current can be generated. The mock current is intended to mimic the current normally expended during the memory operation when not disabled, thereby leading a user to believe that the device is continuing to operate normally even though the memory operation that is being attempted is not actually being performed.
9 citations
Patent•
07 Feb 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, a technique for detecting tampering attempts directed at a memory device is proposed, where each of a plurality of detection memory cells is set to an initial predetermined state, where corresponding portions of the plurality of memory cells are included in each of the arrays of data storage memory cells on the memory device.
Abstract: A technique for detecting tampering attempts directed at a memory device includes setting each of a plurality of detection memory cells to an initial predetermined state, where corresponding portions of the plurality of detection memory cells are included in each of the arrays of data storage memory cells on the memory device. A plurality of corresponding reference bits on the memory device permanently store information representative of the initial predetermined state of each of the detection memory elements.
6 citations
References
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18 Nov 1996
TL;DR: It is concluded that trusting tamper resistance is problematic; smartcards are broken routinely, and even a device that was described by a government signals agency as 'the most secure processor generally available' turns out to be vulnerable.
Abstract: An increasing number of systems from pay-TV to electronic purses, rely on the tamper resistance of smartcards and other security processors. We describe a number of attacks on such systems -- some old, some new and some that are simply little known outside the chip testing community. We conclude that trusting tamper resistance is problematic; smartcards are broken routinely, and even a device that was described by a government signals agency as 'the most secure processor generally available' turns out to be vulnerable. Designers of secure systems should consider the consequences with care.
1,133 citations
23 Jan 2006
TL;DR: The various methods that can be used to induce faults in semiconductors and exploit such errors maliciously are covered and a series of countermeasures to thwart these attacks are described.
Abstract: The effect of faults on electronic systems has been studied since the 1970s when it was noticed that radioactive particles caused errors in chips. This led to further research on the effect of charged particles on silicon, motivated by the aerospace industry, which was becoming concerned about the effect of faults in airborne electronic systems. Since then various mechanisms for fault creation and propagation have been discovered and researched. This paper covers the various methods that can be used to induce faults in semiconductors and exploit such errors maliciously. Several examples of attacks stemming from the exploiting of faults are explained. Finally a series of countermeasures to thwart these attacks are described.
690 citations
10 May 1999
TL;DR: Techniques for extracting protected software and data from smartcard processors are described, including manual microprobing, laser cutting, focused ion-beam manipulation, glitch attacks, and power analysis.
Abstract: We describe techniques for extracting protected software and data from smartcard processors. This includes manual microprobing, laser cutting, focused ion-beam manipulation, glitch attacks, and power analysis. Many of these methods have already been used to compromise widely-fielded conditional-access systems, and current smartcards offer little protection against them. We give examples of low-cost protection concepts that make such attacks considerably more difficult.
685 citations
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: This publication provides a standard to be used by Federal organizations when these organizations specify that cryptographic-based security systems are to be use to provide protection for sensitive or valuable data.
Abstract: : The selective application of technological and related procedural safeguards is an important responsibility of every Federal organization in providing adequate security in its Computer and telecommunication systems This publication provides a standard to be used by Federal organizations when these organizations specify that cryptographic-based security systems are to be used to provide protection for sensitive or valuable data Protection of a cryptographic module within a security system is necessary to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the information protected by the module
593 citations
TL;DR: A CMOS smart temperature sensor with digital output that consumes only 7 /spl mu/W and is equipped with a facility that switches off the supply power after each sample is presented.
Abstract: A CMOS smart temperature sensor with digital output is presented It consumes only 7 /spl mu/W To achieve this extremely low-power consumption, the system is equipped with a facility that switches off the supply power after each sample The circuit uses substrate bipolars as a temperature sensor Conversion to the digital domain is done by a sigma-delta converter which makes the circuit highly insensitive to digital interference The complete system is realized in a standard CMOS process and measures only 15 mm/sup 2/ In the temperature range from -40 to +120/spl deg/C, the inaccuracy is /spl plusmn/1/spl deg/C after calibration at two temperatures The circuit operates at supply voltages down to 22 V
299 citations