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Metropolitan governance : conflict, competition, and cooperation

01 Jan 2004-
TL;DR: Feiock et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed game-theoretic models of metropolitan cooperation and Institutional Collective Action (ICA) in the context of local government boundary change and metropolitan governance.
Abstract: List of Figures and TablesPreface Part One: Theoretical Explorations 1. Introduction: Regionalism and Institutional Collective ActionRichard C. Feiock 2. The Study of Metropolitan GovernanceRonald J. Oakerson 3. Game-Theoretic Models of Metropolitan CooperationAnnette Steinacker 4. Metropolitan Area Governance and Institutional Collective ActionStephanie S. Post Part Two: Empirical Investigations 5. An Old Debate Confronts New Realities: Large Suburbs and Economic Development in the MetropolisPaul G. Lewis 6. Courting Business: Competition for Economic Development among CitiesMartin Johnson and Max Neiman 7. Institutional Collective Action: Social Capital and the Formation of Regional Partnerships Richard C. Feiock, Jill Tao, and Linda Johnson 8. Metropolitan Structure and the Sex BusinessElaine B. Sharp 9. Charter Schools as a Tool to Reform Local Schools by Transforming GovernanceMark Schneider and Jack Buckley 10. Whose Game Do We Play? Local Government Boundary Change and Metropolitan GovernanceJered B. Carr 11. Concluding Thoughts: Regionalism, Urban Politics, and GovernanceRichard C. Feiock ContributorsIndex
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors classified the mechanisms for mitigating institutional collective action dilemmas according to their scope and enforcement, and proposed an agenda to advance the theoretical and empirical development of the ICA approach.
Abstract: Institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas arise from the division or partitioning of authority in which decisions by one government in one or more specific functional area impacts other governments and/or other functions. The focus on externalities of choice in fragmented systems integrates multiple research traditions into a conceptual system to understand and investigate collective dilemmas ubiquitous in contemporary governance arrangements. The mechanisms for mitigating ICA dilemmas are classified according to their scope and enforcement. Incentives to participate in a mechanism are hypothesized to favor mechanisms that provide the greatest gain for the least cost under different conditions of collaboration risk as determined by the nature of the underlying ICA problem, the compositions of affected jurisdictions, and institutional contexts. After reviewing empirical applications of the framework, an agenda to advance the theoretical and empirical development of the ICA approach is advanced.

458 citations


Cites background from "Metropolitan governance : conflict,..."

  • ...The ICA framework accounts for this as a result of political conflict and the availability of alternative, less costly integration mechanisms (Carr & Feiock, 2004)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a second-generation rational choice explanation for voluntary regional governance, identifying the interests that motivate interlocal collaboration and arguing that volunta... and argue that VOLUME 7, 2019
Abstract: This article presents a “second-generation” rational choice explanation for voluntary regional governance. It identifies the interests that motivate interlocal collaboration and argues that volunta...

453 citations


Cites background from "Metropolitan governance : conflict,..."

  • ...ICA focuses on how local government officials perceive and weigh the various costs and benefits of cooperation as they contemplate interlocal service agreements and other forms of intergovernmental cooperation....

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  • ...Certain political system institutions have been shown to constrain risks of opportunistic behavior by both elected and appointed leaders (Feiock, 2004)....

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  • ...Feiock (2004) argues that collaboration through institutional collective action can produce coordinated metropolitan governance, at best he provides an incomplete account of how or under what conditions cooperative governance arrangements might emerge....

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  • ...Taken together these mechanisms can be referred to as institutional collective action (ICA) (Feiock, 2004, 2005)....

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  • ...Scharpf (1997: 140) argues that mutual dependence can be represented as a battle of the sexes game in which both players have an interest in concluding the deal but have differences in preference for one or the other coordinated outcome....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe the institutional collective action (ICA) framework and its application to the study of governance arrangements in metropolitan areas by focusing on the tools of regional governance for solving ICA problems.
Abstract: This article describes the institutional collective action (ICA) framework and its application to the study of governance arrangements in metropolitan areas by focusing on the tools of regional governance for solving ICA problems. Regional governance mechanisms are classified by their focus on either collective or network relationships. The role of these within these mechanisms is analyzed and the transaction costs barriers to the emergence of regional governance institutions are identified. The concluding discussion identifies the limitations of self-organizing mechanisms and develops a research agenda to investigate the emergence, evolution, and performance of regional governance institutions.

345 citations


Cites background from "Metropolitan governance : conflict,..."

  • ...…institutional analysis and development (Ostrom 1990) frameworks by extending theories of contracting and collective action among individuals to institutional actors such as cities, counties, government agencies, and other organizations (Bickers and Stein 2004; Feiock 2004; Scholz and Feiock 2007)....

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  • ...Insights drawn from these studies have informed the study or regional land use, economic development, and service delivery (Feiock 2004)....

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  • ...…of politics and administration though an appointed manager is claimed to “reduce information costs associated with policymaking in a complex environment” (Krueger and McGuire 2005: 11) and to constrain risks of opportunistic behavior by both elected and appointed leaders (Feiock 2004; Miller 2000)....

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  • ...The failures of consolidation efforts are attributed to political conflict and the availability of alternative, less costly coordination mechanisms (Carr and Feiock 2004)....

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References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the concept of social capital is introduced and illustrated, its forms are described, the social structural conditions under which it arises are examined, and it is used in an analys...
Abstract: In this paper, the concept of social capital is introduced and illustrated, its forms are described, the social structural conditions under which it arises are examined, and it is used in an analys...

31,693 citations

Book
01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: Douglass C. North as discussed by the authors developed an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time.
Abstract: Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)

27,080 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time.
Abstract: Examines the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time. Institutions are separate from organizations, which are assemblages of people directed to strategically operating within institutional constraints. Institutions affect the economy by influencing, together with technology, transaction and production costs. They do this by reducing uncertainty in human interaction, albeit not always efficiently. Entrepreneurs accomplish incremental changes in institutions by perceiving opportunities to do better through altering the institutional framework of political and economic organizations. Importantly, the ability to perceive these opportunities depends on both the completeness of information and the mental constructs used to process that information. Thus, institutions and entrepreneurs stand in a symbiotic relationship where each gives feedback to the other. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient institutions ought to be rapidly replaced. This symbiotic relationship helps explain why this theoretical consequence is often not observed: while this relationship allows growth, it also allows inefficient institutions to persist. The author identifies changes in relative prices and prevailing ideas as the source of institutional alterations. Transaction costs, however, may keep relative price changes from being fully exploited. Transaction costs are influenced by institutions and institutional development is accordingly path-dependent. (CAR)

26,011 citations

Book
01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: Putnam as mentioned in this paper showed that changes in work, family structure, age, suburban life, television, computers, women's roles and other factors are isolating Americans from each other in a trend whose reflection can clearly be seen in British society.
Abstract: BOWLING ALONE warns Americans that their stock of "social capital", the very fabric of their connections with each other, has been accelerating down. Putnam describes the resulting impoverishment of their lives and communities. Drawing on evidence that includes nearly half a million interviews conducted over a quarter of a century in America, Putnam shows how changes in work, family structure, age, suburban life, television, computers, women's roles and other factors are isolating Americans from each other in a trend whose reflection can clearly be seen in British society. We sign 30 percent fewer petitions than we did ten years ago. Membership in organisations- from the Boy Scouts to political parties and the Church is falling. Ties with friends and relatives are fraying: we're 35 percent less likely to visit our neighbours or have dinner with our families than we were thirty years ago. We watch sport alone instead of with our friends. A century ago, American citizens' means of connecting were at a low point after decades of urbanisation, industrialisation and immigration uprooted them from families and friends. That generation demonstrated a capacity for renewal by creating the organisations that pulled Americans together. Putnam shows how we can learn from them and reinvent common enterprises that will make us secure, productive, happy and hopeful.

24,532 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors discusses the central role of propensity scores and balancing scores in the analysis of observational studies and shows that adjustment for the scalar propensity score is sufficient to remove bias due to all observed covariates.
Abstract: : The results of observational studies are often disputed because of nonrandom treatment assignment. For example, patients at greater risk may be overrepresented in some treatment group. This paper discusses the central role of propensity scores and balancing scores in the analysis of observational studies. The propensity score is the (estimated) conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of observed covariates. Both large and small sample theory show that adjustment for the scalar propensity score is sufficient to remove bias due to all observed covariates. Applications include: matched sampling on the univariate propensity score which is equal percent bias reducing under more general conditions than required for discriminant matching, multivariate adjustment by subclassification on balancing scores where the same subclasses are used to estimate treatment effects for all outcome variables and in all subpopulations, and visual representation of multivariate adjustment by a two-dimensional plot. (Author)

23,744 citations