Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide
28 Aug 2014-The American Economic Review (American Economic Association 2014 Broadway, Suite 305, Nashville, TN 37203)-Vol. 104, Iss: 9, pp 2830-2857
TL;DR: The authors investigated whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage modification programs and found that the increase in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default otherwise, suggesting that strategic behavior should be an important consideration in designing mortgage modification program.
Abstract: We investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage modification programs. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in modification policy induced by settlement of US state government lawsuits against Countrywide Financial Corporation, which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that Countrywide's monthly delinquency rate increased more than 0.54 percentage points—a 10 percent relative increase—immediately after the settlement's announcement. The estimated increase in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default otherwise. These results suggest that strategic behavior should be an important consideration in designing mortgage modification programs. (JEL D14, G21, K22, R31)
Citations
More filters
••
TL;DR: Mian and Sufi as mentioned in this paper examined the home equity-based borrowing channel using a dataset consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency and showed that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006.
Abstract: US household leverage sharply increased in the years preceding the 2007 eco nomic recession. The top panel of Figure 1 shows the steady rise in household debt since 1975, which accelerated beginning in 2002. In just five years, the household sector doubled its debt balance. In comparison, the contemporaneous increase in corporate debt was modest. The middle panel shows that the increase in household debt from 2002 to 2007 translated into a striking rise in household leverage as mea sured by the debt-to-income ratio. During the same time period, corporate leverage declined. The dramatic absolute and relative rise in US household leverage from 2002 to 2007 is unprecedented compared to the last 25 years. One reason for the rapid expansion in household leverage during this period is that mortgage credit became more easily available to new home buyers (Mian and Sufi 2009). Strong house price appreciation from 2002 to 2006, however, which may have been fueled by the availability of mortgage credit to a riskier set of new home buyers, could also have had an important feedback effect on household lever age through existing homeowners. Given that 65 percent of US households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices, the feedback from house prices to borrowing may be an important source of the rapid rise in household leverage that preceded the economic downturn. Our central goals in this study are to estimate how homeowner borrowing responded to the increase in house prices and to identify which homeowners responded most aggressively. We examine this home equity-based borrowing channel using a dataset consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency. We follow a random sample of over 74,000 US homeowners (who owned their homes as of 1997) at an annual frequency from the end of 1997 until the end of 2008. The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots the growth in debt of 1997 homeowners over time and shows that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006. While the aggregate trend is suggestive
672 citations
••
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study how two forces, regulatory differences and technological advantages, contributed to the growth of shadow banks in residential mortgage origination, concluding that traditional banks contracted in markets where they faced more regulatory constraints; shadow banks partially filled these gaps.
584 citations
••
TL;DR: The market for housing differs in several important ways from the textbook model of a liquid asset market with exogenous fundamentals as mentioned in this paper, which implies that the price at which a house is sold can be influenced not only by general supply and demand conditions, but also by idiosyncratic factors, including the urgency of the sale and the effects of ownership transfer on the physical quality of the house.
Abstract: The market for housing differs in several important ways from the textbook model of a liquid asset market with exogenous fundamentals. This implies that the price at which a house is sold can be influenced not only by general supply and demand conditions, but also by idiosyncratic factors, including the urgency of the sale and the effects of the ownership transfer on the physical quality of the house. First, houses are productive only when people are living in them. Owning an empty house is equivalent to throwing away the dividend on a financial asset. Second, houses are fragile assets that need maintenance, and are vulnerable to van dalism. Unoccupied houses are particularly vulnerable and expensive to protect. Third, short-term rental contracts involve high transactions costs, resulting from the moving costs of renters and the need of homeowners to protect their property against damage. Fourth, houses are expensive, indivisible, and heterogeneous assets. Each house has certain unique characteristics which are likely to appeal to certain poten tial buyers and not to others, so selling a house requires matching it with an appro priate buyer. Because of the high costs of intermediation in housing, this task is normally undertaken by a real estate broker rather than a dealer. Fifth, most home owners must finance their purchases using mortgages, collateralized debt contracts that transfer home ownership to the mortgage lender through a foreclosure process if the homeowner defaults. The expansion of mortgage credit in the early 2000s and the recent decline in house prices have led to an unprecedented increase in foreclosures since 2006. Foreclosures transfer houses to financial institutions which must maintain and pro tect them until they can be sold. Foreclosed houses are likely to sell at low prices, both because they may have been physically damaged during the foreclosure pro cess, and because financial institutions have an incentive to sell them quickly. In a liquid market, an asset can be sold rapidly with a minimal impact on its price, but
528 citations
••
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors exploit variation in the timing of resets of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) to find that a sizable decline in mortgage payments (up to 50 percent) induces a significant increase in c...
Abstract: Exploiting variation in the timing of resets of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), we find that a sizable decline in mortgage payments (up to 50 percent) induces a significant increase in c...
267 citations
••
TL;DR: The authors assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of mortgage default: negative equity and illiquidity, with comparably sized marginal effects, and find that negative equity is significantly associated with mortgage default.
Abstract: This paper assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of mortgage default: negative equity and illiquidity. To do so, the authors combine loan-level mortgage data with detailed credit bureau information about the borrower's broader balance sheet. This gives them a direct way to measure illiquid borrowers: those with high credit card utilization rates. The authors find that both negative equity and illiquidity are significantly associated with mortgage default, with comparably sized marginal effects. Moreover, these two factors interact with each other: The effect of illiquidity on default generally increases with high combined loan-to-value ratios (CLTV), though it is significant even for low CLTV. County-level unemployment shocks are also associated with higher default risk (though less so than high utilization) and strongly interact with CLTV. In addition, having a second mortgage implies significantly higher default risk, particularly for borrowers who have a first-mortgage LTV approaching 100 percent. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
205 citations
References
More filters
••
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present the correct way to estimate the magnitude and standard errors of the interaction effect in nonlinear models, which is the same way as in this paper.
5,500 citations
••
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment durations were investigated and individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse was found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment.
Abstract: This paper tests the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment durations. The paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse. Higher unemployment insurance benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment. However, the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse. Individual data are used with accurate information of spell durations, and the level and length of benefits. The semiparametric estimation techniques used in the paper yield more plausible estimates than conventional approaches and provide useful diagnostics. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.
1,367 citations
••
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors conduct a within-county analysis using detailed ZIP code-level data to document new findings regarding the origins of the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression, finding that the sharp increase in mortgage defaults in 2007 is significantly amplified in subprime ZIP codes, or ZIP codes with a disproportionately large share of subprime borrowers as of 1996.
Abstract: We conduct a within-county analysis using detailed ZIP code—level data to document new findings regarding the origins of the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. The sharp increase in mortgage defaults in 2007 is significantly amplified in subprime ZIP codes, or ZIP codes with a disproportionately large share of subprime borrowers as of 1996. Prior to the default crisis, these subprime ZIP codes experience an unprecedented relative growth in mortgage credit. The expansion in mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005 to subprime ZIP codes occurs despite sharply declining relative (and in some cases absolute) income growth in these neighborhoods. In fact, 2002 to 2005 is the only period in the past eighteen years in which income and mortgage credit growth are negatively correlated. We show that the expansion in mortgage credit to subprime ZIP codes and its dissociation from income growth is closely correlated with the increase in securitization of subprime mortgages.
1,217 citations
••
TL;DR: In this article, the authors characterize the optimal regulation, which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets, and establish the robustness of their insights when the set of optimal regulations is set.
Abstract: The paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy. When everyone engages in maturity transformation, authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing. In turn, refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity. The key ingredient is that monetary policy is non-targeted. The ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage, while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed. This insight has important consequences. First, banks choose to correlate their risk exposures. Second, private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest-rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity. Third, optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent. Fourth, macro-prudential supervision is called for. We characterize the optimal regulation, which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets. We establish the robustness of our insights when the set of
1,124 citations
••
TL;DR: Mian and Sufi as mentioned in this paper examined the home equity-based borrowing channel using a dataset consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency and showed that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006.
Abstract: US household leverage sharply increased in the years preceding the 2007 eco nomic recession. The top panel of Figure 1 shows the steady rise in household debt since 1975, which accelerated beginning in 2002. In just five years, the household sector doubled its debt balance. In comparison, the contemporaneous increase in corporate debt was modest. The middle panel shows that the increase in household debt from 2002 to 2007 translated into a striking rise in household leverage as mea sured by the debt-to-income ratio. During the same time period, corporate leverage declined. The dramatic absolute and relative rise in US household leverage from 2002 to 2007 is unprecedented compared to the last 25 years. One reason for the rapid expansion in household leverage during this period is that mortgage credit became more easily available to new home buyers (Mian and Sufi 2009). Strong house price appreciation from 2002 to 2006, however, which may have been fueled by the availability of mortgage credit to a riskier set of new home buyers, could also have had an important feedback effect on household lever age through existing homeowners. Given that 65 percent of US households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices, the feedback from house prices to borrowing may be an important source of the rapid rise in household leverage that preceded the economic downturn. Our central goals in this study are to estimate how homeowner borrowing responded to the increase in house prices and to identify which homeowners responded most aggressively. We examine this home equity-based borrowing channel using a dataset consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency. We follow a random sample of over 74,000 US homeowners (who owned their homes as of 1997) at an annual frequency from the end of 1997 until the end of 2008. The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots the growth in debt of 1997 homeowners over time and shows that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006. While the aggregate trend is suggestive
672 citations