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Munich: The Price of Peace
01 Jan 1979-
About: The article was published on 1979-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 50 citations till now.
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TL;DR: The state of international studies as the 20th century draws to a close is disconcerting as mentioned in this paper. Among the shortcomings are intolerance of competing paradigms, models, methods, and findings; a closed-mind mentality; a tendency to research fashions; the increasingly visible retreat from science in International Studies; and the low value placed by most scholars on cumulation of knowledge.
Abstract: The state of International Studies as the 20th century draws to a close is disconcerting. Among the shortcomings are intolerance of competing paradigms, models, methods, and findings; a closed-mind mentality; a tendency to research fashions; the increasingly-visible retreat from science in International Studies; and the low value placed by most scholars on cumulation of knowledge.
Flawed dichotomies are pervasive: theory versus history as approaches to knowledge; deductive versus inductive paths to theory; a horizontal (breadth) versus vertical (in-depth) focus of inquiry, based upon aggregate data (quantitative) vs. case study (qualitative) methods of analysis, using large ‘N’ vs. small ‘N’ clusters of data; system vs. actor as the optimal level of analysis, and closely related, unitary vs. multiple competing actors; rational calculus vs. psychological constraints on choice, and the related divide over reality vs. image as the key to explaining state behavior; and neo-realism vs. neo-institutionalism as the correct paradigm for the study of world politics.
Without the integration of knowledge, revised from time to time in the light of fresh theoretical insights, improved methods, and new evidence, International Studies is destined to remain a collection of bits and pieces of explanation of reality and behavior.
In this spirit, an attempt to overcome the dichotomies and to achieve synthesis, along with cumulation, was the raison d' etre of the International Crisis Behavior Project, now entering its 25th year of systematic research on crisis, conflict and war in the 20th century. From the flawed dichotomies has emerged synthesis in paths to theory, methodologies, the testing of propositions, and cumulation of knowledge, one demonstration that it is possible to transform International Studies into a genuine social science discipline.
107 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that what appears to be an empirical and methodological debate actually arises from the inadequacy of classical rational deterrence theory, which fails to comprehend the implications of states' strategic self-selection into international disputes.
Abstract: The empirical question of how often deterrent threats issued during international disputes succeed has been hotly debated for years, with some researchers arguing that virtually no robust cases of success can be identified. I argue that what appears to be an empirical and methodological debate actually arises from the inadequacy of classical rational deterrence theory, which fails to comprehend the implications of states’ strategic self-selection into international disputes. Rational self-selection is shown to imply that in a sample of crises, deterrent threats issued after an initial challenge will tend to fail in precisely those cases where they are relatively most credible signals of an intent to resist with force. The product of a selection effect, this paradoxical implication allows a resolution of the debate on the efficacy of deterrence in crises. And because selection effects can arise whenever a historical “case” is the product of choices by actors who also influence the outcome in question, this example from the study of deterrence has broad relevance for empirical research.
103 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state is stylized as a situation where the declining state prefers to appease the rising state's demands rather than go to war to oppose them.
Abstract: Great Britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930s, and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state. If those aims are limited, then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state's demands rather than go to war to oppose them. If, however, the rising state's demands are unlimited, then the declining state prefers fighting. And, given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time, it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be a war. This situation creates a trade-off: The earlier a state stands firm, the stronger it will be if war ensues, but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war. In equilibrium, the declining state generally tries to appease the rising state by making a series of concessions.
93 citations
01 Mar 2003
TL;DR: The first chapter contains an annotated list of twenty-five books that Dr. Murray considers essential to the library of a warfighter, scholar, or student of military history as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: : Military historian Williamson Murray has prepared this selected bibliography as a guide to the vast body of military histories and as a reading program that could extend our understanding and comprehension of that terrible, yet intriguing, human phenomenon that is war. JAWP) is making it available to those individuals in DoD and the Services who feel that history can shed light on the problems they confront today. The bibliography is derived from the substantial literature on European and American military history The works were chosen for a variety of reasons: quality of scholarship, point of view subject matter, and readability. They are categorized by period and subject matter, and given a rating by the author. The first chapter contains an annotated list of twenty-five books that Dr. Murray considers essential to the library of a warfighter, scholar, or student of military history.
93 citations
TL;DR: A core element of the Reagan Administration's defense buildup lies in its plan to increase the size of the U.S. Navy to 600 ships as discussed by the authors, which is the Navy's blueprint for fighting a global conventional war against the Soviet Union.
Abstract: A core element of the Reagan Administration’s defense buildup lies in its plan to increase the size of the U.S. Navy to 600 ships.’ This 600-ship force is purportedly required to implement “The Maritime Strategy,” which is the Navy‘s blueprint for fighting a global conventional war against the Soviet Union. It is being built at the expense of American air and ground forces in Central Europe, which have not been significantly strengthened during the Reagan Administration’s tenure, even though the Administration has expressed the view that the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional balance in Europe clearly favors the Pact.2 Serious controversy has surrounded both the naval buildup and its attendant Maritime Strategy. Critics have charged that the Maritime Strategy is not coherent or complete, and does not provide an adequate rationale for
64 citations