Must I Accept Prosecution for Civil Disobedience
TL;DR: The authors argue that Moraro does not go far enough and that sometimes states are not agents of the people who can call lawbreakers to account, and even those states which are agents cannot demand that lawbreakers answer for their crimes in the form of a trial.
Abstract:
Piero Moraro argues that people who engage in civil disobedience do not have a pro tanto reason to accept punishment for breaking the law, although they do have a duty to undergo prosecution. This is because they have a duty to answer for their actions, and the state serves as an agent of the people by calling the lawbreaker to answer via prosecution. I argue that Moraro does not go far enough. Someone who engages in civil disobedience does not even have to show up for the trial, provided that they answer for their actions adequately via some other means. This is because sometimes states are not agents of the people who can call lawbreakers to account, and even those states which are agents cannot demand that lawbreakers answer for their crimes in the form of a trial.
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors argue that some acts of uncivil disobedience can be morally superior to their civil counterparts, when and because such acts target people who are responsible for environmental threats.
Abstract:
Social movements often impose nontrivial costs on others against their wills. Civil disobedience is no exception. How can social movements in general, and civil disobedience in particular, be justifiable despite this apparent wrong-making feature? We examine an intuitively plausible account—it is fair that everyone should bear the burdens of tackling injustice. We extend this fairness-based argument for civil disobedience to defend some acts of uncivil disobedience. Focusing on uncivil environmental activism—such as ecotage (sabotage with the aim of protecting the environment)—we argue that some acts of uncivil disobedience can be morally superior to their civil counterparts, when and because such acts target people who are responsible for environmental threats. Indeed, insofar as some acts of uncivil disobedience can more accurately target responsible people, they can better satisfy the demands of fairness compared to their civil counterparts. In some circumstances, our argument may require activists to engage in uncivil disobedience even when civil disobedience is available.
1 citations
References
More filters
Book•
13 Nov 2007
TL;DR: Answering for Crime as mentioned in this paper is a seminal work on the structure of criminal law and criminal liability, focusing on the question of what we should have to answer for, and to whom, under the threat of criminal conviction and punishment.
Abstract: This is the paperback edition of Antony Duff's acclaimed new work on the structures of criminal law and criminal liability. His starting point is a distinction between responsibility (understood as answerability) and liability, and a conception of responsibility as relational and practice-based. This focus on responsibility, as a matter of being answerable to those who have the standing to call one to account, throws new light on a range of questions in criminal law theory: on the question of criminalisation, which can now be cast as the question of what we should have to answer for, and to whom, under the threat of criminal conviction and punishment; on questions about the criminal trial, as a process through which defendants are called to answer, and about the conditions (bars to trial) given which a trial would be illegitimate; on questions about the structure of offences, the distinction between offences and defences, and the phenomena of strict liability and strict responsibility; and on questions about the structures of criminal defences. The net result is not a theory of criminal law; but it is an account of the structure of criminal law as an institution through which a liberal polity defines a realm of public wrongdoing, and calls those who perpetrate (or are accused of perpetrating) such wrongs to account. "For a criminal law theorist, this book is simply a must read. Duff's sweeping coverage of criminal law-ranging from the act requirement to justifications and excuses-offers a structural edifice that is indispensible. Though one may not always agree with Duff, his original analysis and complex rethinking provides significant insights into the most central questions within criminal law theory. One cannot help but learn from Duff. And anyone who wishes to be taken seriously in criminal law theory will have to grapple with his arguments." Kimberley Kessler Ferzan, Criminal Justice Ethics, 2009 "Philosophers who specialize in normative inquiries but find the time to read only one book in criminal theory every few years should immediately place Answering for Crime at the very top of their pile. It is the best book to have appeared in the philosophy of criminal law in the last decade, and the finest book ever to have focused on the structure of criminal responsibility. Answering for Crime cements Antony Duff's reputation as one of the two most important philosophers of criminal law living in the Anglo-American world today...Answering for Crime is an exceedingly original work of legal philosophy written in a refreshingly accessible style...I believe that any future work on the structure of criminal responsibility and liability must begin with Duff's work. No existing book in the philosophy of criminal law can rival the breadth, scope, and sophistication contained in Duff's analysis. I admire Answering for Crime deeply and recommend it strongly not only to criminal theorists, but also to all philosophers interested in how criminal theory sheds light on normative inquiry generally." Douglas Husak, Law and Philosophy, 2009 "...the book is an ambitious one, and has implications for almost every aspect of criminal law theory...As was to be expected from one of the most philosophically sophisticated yet institutionally sensitive writers in the field of criminal law theory, Answering for Crime is a rich book that makes a very substantial contribution to the discipline. ..The argument is complex and, particularly in the early chapters, does not always make for easy reading; but the conception is clear, elegant, and fully worked through..." Nicola Lacey, New Criminal Law Review, 2009 "It covers so many important issues with such clarity and rigour that one review cannot possibly do it justice...What Duff says about crimes, but also his views about a whole range of other issues, are deeply thought out and important...Duff's book does more to articulate a clear and structured view of criminal responsibility than has been achieved to date and his account of criminal responsibility and liability, as well as of the central doctrines and practices of criminal responsibility, will have lasting significance for criminal lawyers and philosophers alike." Victor Tadros, Mind, 2009
124 citations
Book•
18 Oct 2012
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection and that conscientious objection is a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing.
Abstract: The book shows that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection.
Part I explores the morality of conviction and conscience. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument begins with the communicative principle of conscientiousness (CPC). According to the CPC, having a conscientious moral conviction means not just acting consistently with our beliefs and judging ourselves and others by a common moral standard. It also means not seeking to evade the consequences of our beliefs and being willing to communicate them to others. The conviction argument shows that, as a constrained, communicative practice, civil disobedience has a better claim than private objection does to the protections that liberal societies give to conscientious dissent. This view reverses the standard liberal picture which sees private 'conscientious' objection as a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing.
The conscience argument is narrower and shows that genuinely morally responsive civil disobedience honours the best of our moral responsibilities and is protected by a duty-based moral right of conscience.
Part II translates the conviction argument and conscience argument into two legal defences. The first is a demands-of-conviction defence. The second is a necessity defence. Both of these defences apply more readily to civil disobedience than to private disobedience. Part II also examines lawful punishment, showing that, even when punishment is justifiable, civil disobedients have a moral right not to be punished.
117 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that citizens of a liberal-democratic state, one that they argue has a morally justified claim to political authority, enjoy a moral right to engage in acts of suitably constrained civil disobedience.
Abstract: In this essay I argue that citizens of a liberal-democratic state, one that I argue has a morally justified claim to political authority, enjoy a moral right to engage in acts of suitably constrained civil disobedience, or what I will call a moral right to public disobedience. Such a claim may well appear inconsistent with the duty usually thought to correlate to a legitimate state’s right to rule, namely, a moral duty to obey the law. If successful, however, the arguments that follow entail that the duty correlative to a liberal-democratic state’s justified claim to political authority is in fact a disjunctive one: either citizens of such a state must obey the law or they must publicly disobey it. In Section I, I clarify the position to be defended in this article by distinguishing it from two kinds of cases where the moral justifiability
90 citations
31 citations