Nash equilibrium strategies of generating companies (Gencos) in the simultaneous operation of active and reactive power market, with considering voltage stability margin
TL;DR: The paper describes a method for analyzing the competition among transmission-constrained Gencos with incomplete information that employs the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) for modeling a Genco’s bidding strategy in energy market and uses Expected Payment Function (EPF) to construct a bidding framework in the reactive power market.
About: This article is published in Energy Conversion and Management.The article was published on 2013-01-01. It has received 17 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Market clearing & Bidding.
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TL;DR: In this article, a game theoretic approach was used to evaluate the decision-making process of the industry and the environment in a decision making process of energy management, by the scope of the energy management.
62 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a game theoretic bidding strategy for wind power producers to maximize their expected payoff or profit through the proposed Nash equilibrium based bidding strategy, which is evaluated on two realistic case studies considering different technical constraints.
58 citations
Additional excerpts
...Game-theoretic and non-game theoretic models [3-19]....
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a mathematical model that can quantify control parameters for optimum demand response and decide which resources to switch and when, and achieved optimization as a function of cost savings vs. customer comfort using mathematical market analysis.
53 citations
TL;DR: This study suggests a new meta-heuristic Bat-inspired Algorithm to achieve the nearly global solution of the bi level optimization problem and a novel self-adaptive learning mechanism is utilized on the original BA to improve the population diversity and global searching capability.
47 citations
TL;DR: A novel prey-predator optimization algorithm is suggested to solve the first level of the bilevel problem and using the iterative method to find out the supply function equilibrium that is the optimal BSs of GENCOs.
Abstract: In order to find out the optimal bidding strategies (BSs) of generating companies (GENCOs) in a competitive electricity market, it is necessary to solve a bilevel optimization problem. The first level of the problem relates to the GENCOs to strategically bid, and the second level solves the independent system operator's market clearing problem based on the maximization of social welfare. In order to model the incomplete information of participants in the market about cost coefficients of opponents and their forecast errors, a scenario-based programming framework is presented. In addition, a roulette wheel mechanism is used for scenario-generation process so that the forecast errors of coefficients are considered as random variables with known probability distribution functions. Then, each GENCO solves the bilevel optimization problem and maximizes its expected profit function. These bilevel problems are nonconvex, and the mathematical-based optimization technique is unable to handle the problem and obtain the nearly global optima. In order to resolve this issue, a novel prey–predator optimization algorithm is suggested to solve the first level of the bilevel problem and using the iterative method to find out the supply function equilibrium that is the optimal BSs of GENCOs. Applying to the IEEE 57- and 118-bus test systems with incomplete information studies, the performance of the proposed approach is successfully approved.
29 citations
Cites background from "Nash equilibrium strategies of gene..."
...Hence, the fourth model is selected by each generator g similar to [5], [7], and [14]....
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...Moreover, four known types of economic models are presented, such as Bertrand, Cournot, Stackelberg, and supply function equilibrium (SFE) models, in the literature [5]–[7]....
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References
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TL;DR: In this article, a method for analyzing the competition among transmission-constrained generating companies (GENCOs) with incomplete information is presented. But the authors do not consider the impact of transfer capability on GENCOs' bidding strategies.
Abstract: This work describes a method for analyzing the competition among transmission-constrained generating companies (GENCOs) with incomplete information. Each GENCO models its opponents' unknown information with specific types for transforming the incomplete game into a complete game with imperfect information. The proposed methodology employs the supply function equilibrium for modeling a GENCO's bidding strategy. The competition is modeled as a bilevel problem with the upper subproblem representing individual GENCOs and the lower subproblem representing the independent system operator (ISO). The upper subproblem maximizes the individual GENCOs' payoffs and the lower subproblem solves the ISO's market clearing problem for minimizing consumers' payments. The bilevel problem is solved by developing sensitivity functions for a GENCO's payoff with respect to its bidding strategies. An eight-bus system is employed to illustrate the proposed method, and the numerical results show the impact of transfer capability on GENCOs' bidding strategies.
292 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the design of a competitive market for reactive power ancillary services is presented, and the reactive power market is settled on uniform price auction, using a compromise programming approach based on a modified optimal power flow model.
Abstract: This paper presents the design of a competitive market for reactive power ancillary services. Generator reactive power capability characteristics are used to analyze the reactive power costs and subsequently to construct a bidding framework. The reactive power market is settled on uniform price auction, using a compromise programming approach based on a modified optimal power flow model. The paper examines market power issues in these markets and identifies locations where strategic market power advantages are present that need to be removed through investments in reactive power devices.
260 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a comprehensive literature analysis on the state-of-the-art research of bidding strategy modeling methods, including game theory, mathematical programming, game theory and agent-based models.
195 citations
10 Dec 2002
TL;DR: In this paper, a modal analysis based generator participation factor is proposed to solve the problem of reactive power support in a large-scale power system, where a five-bus system demonstrates the concepts and applications.
Abstract: Open access permits all generators to transmit active power into a system. Due to differences in location, output and other factors, however, some generators need more reactive power support than others. Each generator therefore consumes a different amount of reactive power capability of the system. It is very important to develop a quantitative index that can measure the reactive service needs of various generators. Potential applications for such an index include a fair compensation scheme for the procurement of reactive support services from generators, and a market signal for system security oriented generator dispatch. A modal analysis based generator participation factor is proposed to solve the problem. The theory of generator participation factor is presented. A five-bus system demonstrates the concepts and applications. Further case studies are performed using a real-life large-scale power system. Margin sensitivity studies are conducted to confirm the validity of the proposed index.
59 citations