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Network externalities, competition, and compatibility
01 Jan 1985-The American Economic Review (American Economic Association)-Vol. 75, Iss: 3, pp 424-440
About: This article is published in The American Economic Review.The article was published on 1985-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 6100 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Network economics.
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TL;DR: The dynamic capabilities framework as mentioned in this paper analyzes the sources and methods of wealth creation and capture by private enterprise firms operating in environments of rapid technological change, and suggests that private wealth creation in regimes of rapid technology change depends in large measure on honing intemal technological, organizational, and managerial processes inside the firm.
Abstract: The dynamic capabilities framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealth creation and capture by private enterprise firms operating in environments of rapid technological change. The competitive advantage of firms is seen as resting on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and combining), shaped by the firm's (specific) asset positions (such as the firm's portfolio of difftcult-to- trade knowledge assets and complementary assets), and the evolution path(s) it has aflopted or inherited. The importance of path dependencies is amplified where conditions of increasing retums exist. Whether and how a firm's competitive advantage is eroded depends on the stability of market demand, and the ease of replicability (expanding intemally) and imitatability (replication by competitors). If correct, the framework suggests that private wealth creation in regimes of rapid technological change depends in large measure on honing intemal technological, organizational, and managerial processes inside the firm. In short, identifying new opportunities and organizing effectively and efficiently to embrace them are generally more fundamental to private wealth creation than is strategizing, if by strategizing one means engaging in business conduct that keeps competitors off balance, raises rival's costs, and excludes new entrants. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
27,902 citations
Cites background from "Network externalities, competition,..."
...Increasing retums to adoption has many sources including network extemalities ( Katz and Shapiro, 1985 ), the presence of complementary assets (Teece, 1986b) and supporting infrastructure (Nelson, 1996), leaming by using (Rosenberg, 1982), and scale economies in production and distribution....
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...It is well recognized thatincluding network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985), the presence of complementary assets how far and how fast a particular area of industrial activity can proceed is in part due to the(Teece, 1986b) and supporting infrastructure (Nelson, 1996), learning by using…...
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze a sequential decision model in which each decision maker looks at the decisions made by previous decision makers in taking her own decision, and they show that the decision rules that are chosen by optimizing individuals will be characterized by herd behavior.
Abstract: We analyze a sequential decision model in which each decision maker looks at the decisions made by previous decision makers in taking her own decision. This is rational for her because these other decision makers may have some information that is important for her. We then show that the decision rules that are chosen by optimizing individuals will be characterized by herd behavior; i.e., people will be doing what others are doing rather than using their information. We then show that the resulting equilibrium is inefficient.
5,956 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the dynamics of allocation under increasing returns in a context where increasing returns arise naturally: agents choosing between technologies competing for adoption, and examine how these influence selection of the outcome.
Abstract: This paper explores the dynamics of allocation under increasing returns in a context where increasing returns arise naturally: agents choosing between technologies competing for adoption. Modern, complex technologies often display increasing returns to adoption in that the more they are adopted, the more experience is gained with them, and the more they are improved.1 When two or more increasing-return technologies 'compete' then, for a 'market' of potential adopters, insignificant events may by chance give one of them an initial advantage in adoptions. This technology may then improve more than the others, so it may appeal to a wider proportion of potential adopters. It may therefore become further adopted and further improved. Thus a technology that by chance gains an early lead in adoption may eventually 'corner the market' of potential adopters, with the other technologies becoming locked out. Of course, under different 'insignificant events' - unexpected successes in the performance of prototypes, whims of early developers, political circumstances - a different technology might achieve sufficient adoption and improvement to come to dominate. Competitions between technologies may have, multiple potential outcomes. It is well known that allocation problems with increasing returns tend to exhibit multiple equilibria, and so it is not surprising that multiple outcomes should appear here. Static analysis can typically locate these multiple equilibria, but usually it cannot tell us which one will be 'selected'. A dynamic approach might be able to say more. By allowing the possibility of 'random events' occurring during adoption, it might examine how these influence ' selection' of the outcome - how some sets of random 'historical events' might cumulate to drive the process towards one market-share outcome, others to drive it towards another. It might also reveal how the two familiar increasingreturns properties of non-predictability and potential inefficiency come about: how increasing returns act to magnify chance events as adoptions take place, so that
5,583 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that under regimes of monopoly and monopolistic competition, product characteristics (which are often endogenous variables) are not usually optimally set under the pressure of market forces, and that regulation is also beset with difficulties when price and quality are decision variables.
Abstract: * The argument in this paper reduces to three basic points. Under regimes of monopoly (and monopolistic competition), product characteristics (which are often endogenous variables) are not usually optimally set under the pressure of market forces. Second, regulation is also beset with difficulties when price and quality are decision variables. These difficulties are informational, and are closely related to the sources of market failure in the unregulated market. Third, rate of return regula
1,062 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed an economic model that determines both the required critical mass size for startup and the ultimate expansion level of such a system and evaluated the effects of different pricing structures for the service under the assumption that users maximize benefits minus cost and a monopoly supplier maximizes profit.
Abstract: Most communication services have a demand "externality" in that the benefit to a subscriber depends upon how many of his communication partners also subscribe. This article develops an economic model that determines both the required critical mass size for startup and the ultimate expansion level of such a system. The effects of different pricing structures for the service are evaluated under the assumption that users maximize benefits minus cost and a monopoly supplier maximizes profit.
182 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors use the conjectural variations model of oligopoly to analyze the way in which the incidence of a tax depends upon the pattern of firm interaction and show that the errors that arise in excess burden calculations when incorrect assumptions on market structure are made.
Abstract: In this paper we analyze taxation using the conjectural variations model of oligopoly. We demonstrate the way in which the incidence of a tax depends upon the pattern of firm interaction. The results obtained have important implications for the controversy surrounding the question of whether a tax oncorporate income can be over-shifted. We also study normative aspects of taxation. The focus here is on the errors that can arise in excess burden calculations when incorrect assumptions on market structure are made.
134 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use the conjectural variations model of oligopoly to analyze the way in which the incidence of a tax depends on the pattern of firm interaction and show that the errors that can arise in excess burden calculations when incorrect assumptions on market structure are made.
Abstract: In this article we analyze taxation using the conjectural variations model of oligopoly. We demonstrate the way in which the incidence of a tax depends on the pattern of firm interaction. The results obtained have important implications for the controversy surrounding the question of whether a tax on corporate income can be overshifted. We also study normative aspects of taxation. The focus here is on the errors that can arise in excess burden calculations when incorrect assumptions on market structure are made.
110 citations