Journal Article•
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem
TL;DR: The neurophenomenology approach of as mentioned in this paper is inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology and seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive sciences.
Abstract: This paper starts with one of Chalmers' basic points: first-hand experience is an irreducible field of phenomena. I claim there is no 'theoretical fix' or 'extra ingredient' in nature that can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, the field of conscious phenomena requires a rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis. My proposed approach, inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology, I have called neurophenomenol- ogy. It seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive sciences. It needs to expand into a widening research community in which the method is cultivated further. This paper responds to the issues raised by D.J. Chalmers (1995) by offering a research direction which is quite radical in the way in which some basic methodological principles are linked to the scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I am using here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thus placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of phenomenology. 1 My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special Issues of the Journal of Consciousness Studies can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools ena- bling them to develop a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I open my proposal by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness in the light of Chalmers' hard problem. Next, I outline the (neuro)pheno- menological strategy. I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and conse- quences of this strategy.
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TL;DR: Meditation can be conceptualized as a family of complex emotional and attentional regulatory training regimes developed for various ends, including the cultivation of well-being and emotional balance, which could have a long-term impact on the brain and behavior.
1,961 citations
TL;DR: Psychological and clinical effects of meditation are summarized, integrated, and discussed with respect to neuroimaging data, and meditation appears to reflect changes in anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal areas.
Abstract: Neuroelectric and imaging studies of meditation are reviewed. Electroencephalographic measures indicate an overall slowing subsequent to meditation, with theta and alpha activation related to proficiency of practice. Sensory evoked potential assessment of concentrative meditation yields amplitude and latency changes for some components and practices. Cognitive event-related potential evaluation of meditation implies that practice changes attentional allocation. Neuroimaging studies indicate increased regional cerebral blood flow measures during meditation. Taken together, meditation appears to reflect changes in anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal areas. Neurophysiological meditative state and trait effects are variable but are beginning to demonstrate consistent outcomes for research and clinical applications. Psychological and clinical effects of meditation are summarized, integrated, and discussed with respect to neuroimaging data.
1,384 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2007TL;DR: The Enactive Approach to Cognitive Science and Human Experience is indebted to Husserl and Cognitive Science, as well as to others who have contributed to this work.
Abstract: Preface Acknowledgements Part I: The Enactive Approach 1. Cognitive Science and Human Experience 2. The Phenomenological Connection 3. Autonomy and Emergence 4. The Structure of Behavior Part II: Life in Mind 5. Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living 6. Life and Mind: The Philosophy of the Organism 7. Laying Down a Path in Walking: Development and Evolution Part III: Consciousness in Life 8. Life Beyond the Gap 9. Sensorimotor Subjectivity 10. Look Again: Consciousness and Mental Imagery 11. Temporality and the Living Present 12. Primordial Dynamism: Emotion and Valence 13. Empathy and Enculturation Appendix 1: Husserl and Cognitive Science Appendix 2: Emergence and the Problem of Downward Causation References
1,303 citations
TL;DR: The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sensemaking as discussed by the authors, which reframes the problem of social cognition as that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it.
Abstract: As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly the individual only.
1,021 citations
Book•
04 Jun 2000
TL;DR: The results of these studies provide the basis for a revision of the CCC theory that specifies more clearly the circumstances in which children will have difficulty using rules at various levels of complexity, provides a more detailed account of how to determine the complexity of rules required in a task, takes account of both the activation and inhibition of rules as a function of experience, and highlights the importance of taking intentionality seriously in the study of executive function.
Abstract: According to the Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC) theory, the development of executive function can be understood in terms of age-related increases in the maximum complexity of the rules children can formulate and use when solving problems. This Monograph describes four studies (9 experiments) designed to test hypotheses derived from the CCC theory and from alternative theoretical perspectives on the development of executive function (memory accounts, inhibition accounts, and redescription accounts). Each study employed a version of the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), in which children are required first to sort cards by one pair of rules (e.g., color rules: "If red then here, if blue then there"), and then sort the same cards by another, incompatible pair of rules (e.g., shape rules). Study 1 found that although most 3- to 4-year-olds failed the standard version of this task (i.e., they perseverated on the preswitch rules during the postswitch phase), they usually performed well when they were required to use four rules (including bidimensional rules) and those rules were not in conflict (i.e., they did not require children to respond in two different ways to the same test card). These findings indicate that children's perseveration cannot be attributed in a straightforward fashion to limitations in children's memory capacity. Study 2 examined the circumstances in which children can use conflicting rules. Three experiments demonstrated effects of rule dimensionality (uni- vs. bidimensional rules) but no effects of stimulus characteristics (1 vs. 2 test cards; spatially integrated vs. separated stimuli). Taken together, these studies suggest that conflict among rules is a key determinant of difficulty, but that conflict interacts with dimensionality. Study 3 examined what types of conflict pose problems for 3- to 4-year-olds by comparing performance on standard, Partial Change, and Total Change versions of the DCCS. Results revealed effects of conflict at the level of specific rules (e.g., "If red, then there"), rather than specific stimulus configurations or dimensions per se, indicating that activation of the preswitch rules persists into the postswitch phase. Study 4 examined whether negative priming also contributes to difficulty on the DCCS. Two experiments suggested that the active selection of preswitch rules against a competing alternative results in the lasting suppression of the alternative. Taken together, the results of these studies provide the basis for a revision of the CCC theory (CCC-r) that specifies more clearly the circumstances in which children will have difficulty using rules at various levels of complexity, provides a more detailed account of how to determine the complexity of rules required in a task, takes account of both the activation and inhibition of rules as a function of experience, and highlights the importance of taking intentionality seriously in the study of executive function.
851 citations
References
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Book•
01 Jan 1890
TL;DR: For instance, the authors discusses the multiplicity of the consciousness of self in the form of the stream of thought and the perception of space in the human brain, which is the basis for our work.
Abstract: Arguably the greatest single work in the history of psychology. James's analyses of habit, the nature of emotion, the phenomenology of attention, the stream of thought, the perception of space, and the multiplicity of the consciousness of self are still widely cited and incorporated into contemporary theoretical accounts of these phenomena.
14,049 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: The authors argued that rational decisions are not the product of logic alone - they require the support of emotion and feeling, drawing on his experience with neurological patients affected with brain damage, Dr Damasio showed how absence of emotions and feelings can break down rationality.
Abstract: Descartes' Error offers the scientific basis for ending the division between mind and body. Antonio Damasio contends that rational decisions are not the product of logic alone - they require the support of emotion and feeling. Drawing on his experience with neurological patients affected with brain damage, Dr Damasio shows how absence of emotions and feelings can break down rationality. He also offers a new perspective on what emotions and feelings actually are: a direct view of our own body states; a link between the body and its survival-oriented regulation on the one hand, and consciousness on the other. Written as a conversation between the author and an imaginary listener, Descartes' Error leads us to conclude that human organisms are endowed from their very beginning with a spirited passion for making choices, which the social mind can then use to build rational behaviour.
9,648 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1991TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the role of reflection in the analysis of experience, experimentation and experiential analysis, and define the enactive approach, enactive cognitive science.
Abstract: Part 1 The departing ground: a fundamental circularity - in the mind of the reflective scientist - an already-given condition, what is cognitive science?, cognitive science within the circle, the theme of this book what do we mean "Human Experience"? - science and the phenomenological tradition, the breakdown of phenomenology, a non-western philosophical tradition, examining experience with a method - mindfulness/awareness, the role of reflection in the analysis of experience, experimentation and experiential analysis. Part 2 Varieties of cognitivism: symbols - the cognitivist hypothesis - the foundational cloud, defining the cognitivist hypothesis, manifestations of cognitivism, cognitivism and human experience, experience and the computational mind the I of the storm - what do we mean by "Self"?, looking for a self in the aggregates, momentariness and the brain, the aggregates without a self. Part 3 Varieties of emergence: emergent properties and connectionism - self-organization - the roots of an alternative, the connectionist strategy, emergence and self-organization, connectionism today, neuronal emergences, exeunt the symbols, linking symbols and emergence selfless minds - societies of mind, the society of object relations, co-dependent arising, basic element analysis, mindfulness and freedom, selfless minds, divided agents, minding the world. Part 4 Steps to a middle way: the Cartesian anxiety - a sense of dissatisfaction, representation revisited, the Cartesian anxiety, steps to a middle way, enaction - embodied cognition - recovering common sense, self-organization revisited, colour as a study case, cognition as embodied action, the retreat into natural selection evolutionary path making and natural drift - adaptationism - an idea in transition, a horizon of multiple mechanisms, beyond the best in evolution and cognition, evolution - ecology and development in congruence, lessons from evolution as natural drift, defining the enactive approach, enactive cognitive science. Part 5 Worlds without ground: the middle way - evocations of groundlessness, Nagarjuna and the Madhyamika tradition, the two truths, groundlessness in contemporary thought laying down a path in walking - science and experience in circulation, nihilism and the need for planetary thinking, Nishitani Keiji, ethics and human transformation. Appendices: meditation terminology categories of experiential events used in mindfulness/awareness works on Buddhism and mindfulness/awareness.
4,505 citations
Book•
[...]
01 Jan 1986
TL;DR: Nagel as mentioned in this paper argues that our divided nature is the root of a whole range of philosophical problems, touching, as it does, every aspect of human life, and deals with its manifestations in such fields of philosophy as: the mind-body problem, personal identity, knowledge and skepticism, thought and reality, free will, ethics, the relation between moral and other values, the meaning of life and death.
Abstract: Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way: We can think about the world in terms that transcend our own experience or interest, and consider the world from a vantage point that is, in Nagel's words, "nowhere in particular." At the same time, each of us is a particular person in a particular place, each with his own "personal" view of the world, a view that we can recognize as just one aspect of the whole. How do we reconcile these two standpoints--intellectually, morally, and practically? To what extent are they irreconcilable and to what extent can they be integrated? Thomas Nagel's ambitious and lively book tackles this fundamental issue, arguing that our divided nature is the root of a whole range of philosophical problems, touching, as it does, every aspect of human life. He deals with its manifestations in such fields of philosophy as: the mind-body problem, personal identity, knowledge and skepticism, thought and reality, free will, ethics, the relation between moral and other values, the meaning of life, and death. Excessive objectification has been a malady of recent analytic philosophy, claims Nagel, it has led to implausible forms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind and elsewhere. The solution is not to inhibit the objectifying impulse, but to insist that it learn to live alongside the internal perspectives that cannot be either discarded or objectified. Reconciliation between the two standpoints, in the end, is not always possible.
3,194 citations