Book ChapterDOI
Non-cooperative games
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In this article, it was shown that the set of equilibrium points of a two-person zero-sum game can be defined as a set of all pairs of opposing "good" strategies.Abstract:
we would call cooperative. This theory is based on an analysis of the interrelationships of the various coalitions which can be formed by the players of the game. Our theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence of coalitions in that it is assumed that each participant acts independently, without collaboration or communication with any of the others. The notion of an equilibrium point is the basic ingredient in our theory. This notion yields a generalization of the concept of the solution of a two-person zerosum game. It turns out that the set of equilibrium points of a two-person zerosum game is simply the set of all pairs of opposing "good strategies." In the immediately following sections we shall define equilibrium points and prove that a finite non-cooperative game always has at least one equilibrium point. We shall also introduce the notions of solvability and strong solvability of a non-cooperative game and prove a theorem on the geometrical structure of the set of equilibrium points of a solvable game. As an example of the application of our theory we include a solution of aread more
Citations
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Cognitive radio: brain-empowered wireless communications
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Prediction, learning, and games
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a comprehensive treatment of the problem of predicting individual sequences using expert advice, a general framework within which many related problems can be cast and discussed, such as repeated game playing, adaptive data compression, sequential investment in the stock market, sequential pattern analysis, and several other problems.
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Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
TL;DR: The concept of perfect equilibrium point has been introduced in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames [Selten 1965 and 1973]. Unfortunately this definition of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may arise with respect to unreached parts of the game.
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Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I-III
TL;DR: The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the game, etc.
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Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Yoav Shoham,Kevin Leyton-Brown +1 more
TL;DR: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multi agent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics.
References
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Book
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
TL;DR: Theory of games and economic behavior as mentioned in this paper is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based, and it has been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Equilibrium points in n-person games
TL;DR: A concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple ofpure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player.
Journal ArticleDOI
Two-Person Cooperative Games
TL;DR: In this paper, a new approach involving the elaboration of the threat concept is introduced involving a wider class of situations in which threats can play a role, and the autor extends his previous treatment of "The Bargaining Problem" to a wider set of situations where threats can be played a role.