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Noncooperative justifications for old bankruptcy rules
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In this article, two different sets of Commonly Accepted Equity Principles (CEP) were used to provide new characterizations of well known bankruptcy rules from an strategic viewpoint, and the results obtained by Chun, 1989, and Herrero, 2003, who followed the van Damme's approach, 1986, for solving Nash type bargaining problems, but in bankruptcy problems.Abstract:
In this paper we use two different sets of Commonly Accepted Equity Principles to provide new characterizations of well known bankruptcy rules from an strategic viewpoint In this sense, we extend the results obtained by Chun, 1989, and Herrero, 2003, who followed the van Damme's approach, 1986, for solving Nash type bargaining problems, but in bankruptcy problems Specifially, by using, on the one hand, the Unanimous Concessions mechanism we justify Piniles' and the Constrained Egalitarian rules, and, on the other hand, with the Diminishing Claims procedure we retrieve the Dual of Pinile's and the Dual of Constrained Egalitarian rulesread more
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Journal ArticleDOI
Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
TL;DR: For three different bankruptcy problems, the 2000-year old Babylonian Talmud prescribes solutions that equal precisely the nucleoli of the corresponding coalitional games, and a rationale for these solutions that is independent of game theory is given in this article.
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Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
TL;DR: This essay is an update of Thomson (2003), a survey of the literature devoted to the study of such problems as a group of agents having claims on a resource but there is not enough of it to honor all of the claims.
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The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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Distributive justice in taxation
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a continuous and continuous tax-apportionment method with four properties: (i) the way that taxpayers split a given tax total depends only on their own taxable incomes; (ii) an increase in the tax total implies that everyone pays more; (iii) every incremental increase in tax is apportioned according to taxpayers' current after-tax incomes; and (iv) the ordering of taxpayers by pre-tax income and after tax income is the same.
Journal ArticleDOI
Bankruptcy games
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors considered bankruptcy problems from a game theoretic point of view and provided necessary and sufficient conditions for a division rule for bankruptcy problems to be a game-theoretic rule.
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