O colapso e a reconstrução: uma análise do discurso sobre Estados falidos e reconstrução de Estados
23 Aug 2012-
About: The article was published on 2012-08-23 and is currently open access. It has received 7 citations till now.
Citations
More filters
01 Jan 1995
Abstract: Winner of the Modern Language Association's Katherine Singer Kovacs Prize."The Darker Side of the Renaissance "weaves together literature, semiotics, history, historiography, cartography, geography, and cultural theory to examine the role of language in the colonization of the New World.Walter D. Mignolo locates the privileging of European forms of literacy at the heart of New World colonization. He examines how alphabetic writing is linked with the exercise of power, what role "the book" has played in colonial relations, and the many connections between writing, social organization, and political control. It has long been acknowledged that Amerindians were at a disadvantage in facing European invaders because native cultures did not employ the same kind of texts (hence "knowledge") that were validated by the Europeans. Yet no study until this one has so thoroughly analyzed either the process or the implications of conquest and destruction through sign systems.Starting with the contrasts between Amerindian and European writing systems, Mignolo moves through such topics as the development of Spanish grammar, the different understandings of the book as object and text, principles of genre in history-writing, and an analysis of linguistic descriptions and mapping techniques in relation to the construction of territoriality and understandings of cultural space."The Darker Side of the Renaissance" will significantly challenge commonplace understandings of New World history. More importantly, it will continue to stimulate and provide models for new colonial and post-colonial scholarship.." . . a contribution to Renaissance studies of the first order. The field will have to reckon with it for years to come, for it will unquestionably become the point of departure for discussion not only on the foundations and achievements of the Renaissance but also on the effects and influences on colonized cultures." -- "Journal of Hispanic/ Latino Theology"Walter D. Mignolo is Professor in the Department of Romance Studies and the Program in Literature, Duke University.
619 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: The seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather, one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and deformation as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and de‹ciency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself the enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency. (Ibn al-Haytham)1
512 citations
01 Jan 2003
TL;DR: Fukuyama's seminal work "The End of History and the Last Man" as discussed by the authors was the first book to offer a picture of what the new century would look like, outlining the challenges and problems to face modern liberal democracies, and speculated what was going to come next.
Abstract: 20th anniversary edition of "The End of History and the Last Man", a landmark of political philosophy by Francis Fukuyama, author of "The Origins of Political Order". With the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 the threat of the Cold War which had dominated the second half of the twentieth century vanished. And with it the West looked to the future with optimism but renewed uncertainty. "The End of History and the Last Man" was the first book to offer a picture of what the new century would look like. Boldly outlining the challenges and problems to face modern liberal democracies, Frances Fukuyama examined what had just happened and then speculated what was going to come next. Tackling religious fundamentalism, politics, scientific progress, ethical codes and war, "The End of History and the Last Man" remains a compelling work to this day, provoking argument and debate among its readers. "Awesome ...a landmark ...profoundly realistic and important ...supremely timely and cogent ...the first book to fully fathom the depth and range of the changes now sweeping through the world." (George Gilder, "The Washington"). Post Francis Fukuyama was born in Chicago in 1952. His work includes "America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy" and "After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong". He now lives in Washington D.C. with his wife and children, where he also works as a part time photographer.
235 citations
01 Aug 1996
TL;DR: State-creation in the former colonial areas, and to a different degree in some of the former Soviet republics since 1991, has taken patterns and trajectories significantly different from those of Europe since the fifteenth century.
Abstract: State-creation in the former colonial areas, and to a different degree in some of the former Soviet republics since 1991, has taken patterns and trajectories significantly different from those of Europe since the fifteenth century. In the latter, there was a lengthy historical project to give political meaning to the geographical expressions called France, Germany, Sweden, and the like. The consequence of wars, centralization, taxes, and the provision of services was to create a form of political organization called the state. The original purposes of colonialism, in contrast, never included state-making. European overseas conquests after the fifteenth century had nothing in common with the state-consolidation projects of Louis XIV, Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, or Bismarck. Imperialism was driven by a variety of purposes: trade, slavery, exploitation of resources, “civilizing” the barbarians, religious conversion to Christianity, ending the Arab slave trade (late nineteenth century), securing strategic territories, and emulation: if the British were expanding in Africa, the Germans had to do the same in order to maintain their status as a great power. Colonialism was as much a product of European external rivalries as of domestic imperatives. Conspicuously absent from this non-exhaustive list of the purposes of colonialism is any state-making project. Whether the colonialism of the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries, or its late nineteenth-century counterpart, the colonial leaders, encompassing the military, government officials, colonial societies, political parties, and the churches, never assumed that some day the subjugated peoples should or could create a state form of political organization.
158 citations
132 citations
References
More filters
TL;DR: The United States and the rest of the world need to develop the tools to both prevent conflict and manage its aftermath when it does occur, and such efforts will entail not just peacekeeping measures, but also influencing the choices that troubled countries make about their economies, their political systems, the rule of law, and their internal security as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: IN TODAY'S increasingly interconnected world, weak and failed states pose an acute risk to U.S. and global security. Indeed, they present one of the most important foreign policy challenges of the contemporary era. States are most vulnerable to collapse in the time immediately before, during, and after conflict. When chaos prevails, terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons proliferation, and other forms of organized crime can flourish. Left in dire straits, subject to depredation, and denied access to basic services, people become susceptible to the exhortations of demagogues and hatemongers. It was in such circum stances that in 2001 one of the poorest countries in the world, Afghanistan, became the base for the deadliest attack ever on the U.S. homeland, graphically and tragically illustrating that the problems of other countries often do not affect them alone. The international community is not, however, adequately organized to deal with governance failures. The United States and the rest of the world need to develop the tools to both prevent conflict and manage its aftermath when it does occur. Such efforts will entail not just peacekeeping measures, but also influencing the choices that troubled countries make about their economies, their political systems, the rule of law, and their internal security. Weak countries are unable to take advantage of the global economy not just because of a lack of resources,
158 citations
01 Aug 1996
TL;DR: State-creation in the former colonial areas, and to a different degree in some of the former Soviet republics since 1991, has taken patterns and trajectories significantly different from those of Europe since the fifteenth century.
Abstract: State-creation in the former colonial areas, and to a different degree in some of the former Soviet republics since 1991, has taken patterns and trajectories significantly different from those of Europe since the fifteenth century. In the latter, there was a lengthy historical project to give political meaning to the geographical expressions called France, Germany, Sweden, and the like. The consequence of wars, centralization, taxes, and the provision of services was to create a form of political organization called the state. The original purposes of colonialism, in contrast, never included state-making. European overseas conquests after the fifteenth century had nothing in common with the state-consolidation projects of Louis XIV, Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, or Bismarck. Imperialism was driven by a variety of purposes: trade, slavery, exploitation of resources, “civilizing” the barbarians, religious conversion to Christianity, ending the Arab slave trade (late nineteenth century), securing strategic territories, and emulation: if the British were expanding in Africa, the Germans had to do the same in order to maintain their status as a great power. Colonialism was as much a product of European external rivalries as of domestic imperatives. Conspicuously absent from this non-exhaustive list of the purposes of colonialism is any state-making project. Whether the colonialism of the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries, or its late nineteenth-century counterpart, the colonial leaders, encompassing the military, government officials, colonial societies, political parties, and the churches, never assumed that some day the subjugated peoples should or could create a state form of political organization.
158 citations
01 Jan 2003
TL;DR: This paper showed that the quality of institutions overcomes everything else in terms of the impact of geography and trade on the distribution of income of a family. But they did not find that trade has a significant effect on institutional quality, but no direct positive effect on income.
Abstract: see how these theories would fare when tested simultaneously against each other. Using regression analysis, we came up with some sharp and striking results that have broad implications for development conditionality, discussed below. Our results indicate that the quality of institutions overrides everything else. Controlling for institutions, geography has, at best, weak direct effects on incomes, although it has a strong indirect effect through institutions by influencing their quality. Similarly, trade has a significant effect on institutional quality, but it has no direct positive effect on income. How did we arrive at these findings?
143 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: Pillar as discussed by the authors provides a guide to constructing and executing counterterrorist policy, urging that it be formulated as an integral part of broader U.S. foreign policy, and concludes that terrorism cannot be ''defeated'' only reduced, attenuated, and to some degree, controlled.
Abstract: The United States government-backed by the overwhelming support of the American public-takes a hard line against international terrorism. The tenets of official U.S. counterterrorist policy are: make no concessions or deals with terrorists; bring them to justice for their crimes; isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism; and bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of countries willing to work with the United States. While these tenets are sound principles, their application, specifically overseas, raises difficult questions. Does the ""no deal"" policy actually deter terrorists acts? Are there cases where agreements might reduce terrorism, while advancing other U.S. interests? Do isolation and pressure really force offending states to alter their support for terrorists? What factors affect the willingness, not just the capability, of foreign governments to help the United States in counterterrorism? In this critical study, a career CIA officer provides a guide to constructing and executing counterterrorist policy, urging that it be formulated as an integral part of broader U.S. foreign policy. In the first four chapters, Paul R. Pillar identifies the necessary elements of counterterrorist policy, he examines why the United States is a prime terrorist target, and he reveals why the counterterrorist policies that seem strongest are not always the most effective. Chapter 5 examines the widely varying nature of terrorist groups and the policy tools most appropriately applied to them. Chapter 6 focuses on states that sponsor terrorism (including Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba), along with those that enable it to occur (particularly Greece and Pakistan). Pillar examines ways in which the American public's perspective toward terrorism can actually constrain counterterrorist policy, and he concludes that terrorism cannot be ""defeated"" only reduced, attenuated, and to some degree, controlled. The final chapter summarizes his recommendations for amending U.S. policy.
142 citations
TL;DR: The authors empirically test what has become a central component of US anti-terrorism policy under the Bush administration: that terrorism is a byproduct of illiberal political and economic systems, and find that variables measuring democracy and degree of economic openness are not significant predictors of terrorism.
Abstract: This study empirically tests what has become a central component of US anti-terrorism policy under the Bush administration: that terrorism is a byproduct of illiberal political and economic systems. Employing a series of statistical analyses on incidents of terrorism in 153 countries from 1986 to 2003, the author finds that variables measuring democracy and degree of economic openness are not significant predictors of terrorism. However, the study does find that experience of state failures is significant, thus providing empirical backing for a small, descriptive body of scholarship linking failed states to terrorism.
142 citations