On limiting the market for status signals
TL;DR: In this paper, the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered, and the benefits of a Pareto-improving tax policy are discussed. But the authors do not consider the impact of tax on the signaling equilibrium.
About: This article is published in Journal of Public Economics.The article was published on 1994-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 265 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Tax policy & Inefficiency.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate optimal indirect taxation when both the intrinsic qualities of goods and signaling motivate consumption choices, and provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the D1 sequential equilibrium strategies.
37 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the impact of the shape of the status function on the equilibrium outcome of the model, and in particular the relationship between inequality and wasteful conspicuous consumption, and found that if status depends in an ordinal way on individuals' relative standing in terms of economic resources, then redistributing resources from the rich to the poor increases social waste.
35 citations
TL;DR: This paper developed a model of conspicuous consumption in which a consumer cares not only about the direct utility she receives from consumption, but also about the way her consumption pattern affects her peer group's belief about her well-being.
Abstract: How do differences in the motive for conspicuous consumption in the United States and China affect the incidence of taxes in those countries? In this paper I develop a model of conspicuous consumption in which a consumer cares not only about the direct utility she receives from consumption, but also about the way her consumption pattern affects her peer group's belief about her well-being. Estimating the model on American and Chinese data, I find that a Chinese consumer cares 20% more than an American consumer about peer beliefs. I use the estimated model in several experiments related to tax incidence. I find that the 1990–2002 American luxury tax on automobiles led to widespread but small welfare gains, and that the stronger Chinese motive for conspicuous consumption leads to fewer households harmed and larger median welfare gains from a 10% tobacco excise tax.
33 citations
04 Mar 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a laboratory experiment that provides evidence of a relevant interaction effect in the context of ethical consumption, showing that participants who are not intrinsically motivated to buy Fairtrade seem to be concerned with their social image and react to the treatment.
Abstract: Even though the interaction of intrinsic motivation and concerns for social approval has important implications both for crowding out of intrinsic motivation through incentives and for producer choices, little is known about this interaction empirically. We present a laboratory experiment that provides evidence of a relevant interaction effect in the context of ethical consumption. We elicit a proxy for Fairtrade preferences before the experiment in which we elicit willingness to pay for conventional and Fairtrade chocolate. Treatments vary whether this can be signaled to other participants. Our results document that subjects state a higher Fairtrade premium when signaling is possible and that the effect of social approval seeking is heterogenous. Only participants who are not intrinsically motivated to buy Fairtrade seem to be concerned with their social image and react to the treatment.
29 citations
TL;DR: The authors used a lab and a field experiment to disentangle the budget constraint from non-BC effects of prices on demand, and found that although prices positively affect stated willingness to pay, non-budget constraint price elasticities are considerably smaller than BC price elasticity, are often statistically insignificant, and do not increase with product uncertainty.
Abstract: Elementary consumer theory assumes prices affect demand only because they affect the budget constraint (BC). Alternative models, and some evidence, suggest prices can affect demand through other, non-BC channels (e.g., by signaling quality). This paper uses a lab and a field experiment to disentangle BC from non-BC effects of prices on demand. In the lab, we find that although prices positively affect stated willingness to pay, non-BC price elasticities are considerably smaller than BC price elasticities, are often statistically insignificant, and do not increase with product uncertainty. We do not detect any non-BC effects in our field experiment.
29 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model the negative self-characterizations of welfare recipients as a form of social stigma, and use a utility maximization model to predict the impact of welfare programs on the low-income population.
Abstract: Perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that "more is better than less." Virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can, in a certain sense, be derived from the assumption that "goods are good." Interestingly, however, this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low-income population, for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls. For example, it has been estimated that in 1970, only about 69 percent of the families eligible for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) participated in the program (see Richard Michel, 1980). The corresponding percentage for AFDC-U, the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible, was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the Food Stamp Program was only 38 percent (see Maurice McDonald, 1977). This phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets. Consequently, most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior. In this paper, this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma -that is, from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se.1 The existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature (Patrick Horan and Patricia Austin, 1974; Lee Rainwater, 1979), where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self-respect and " negative self-characterizations" from participation in welfare. Nevertheless, this phenomenon has not been modeled, and many questions consequently remain. When is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation? Shouldn't we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions? What is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit? Also, in a slightly different vein, how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma? These questions have been given scant attention by economists, yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population. Here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility-maximizing decision. The model is developed and estimated for the AFDC program.2 The model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income, but
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm's internal wage structure and conclude that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products.
Abstract: Status is, like Coase's social costs, a reciprocal phenomenon. Given that one person's gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others, and that workers are free to choose their coworkers, it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products.' The purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm's internal wage structure. The paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers. Section II then confronts the predictions of Section I by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed. Section II also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors, an occupation in which individual productivity differences are, for a variety of obvious reasons, relatively more difficult to measure. All of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that, within firms, wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values. Section III discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis. It suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform. Section IV concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of "equity considerations." It argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status, and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions.
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