scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Journal ArticleDOI

On some claims aboutif-then

01 Jan 1979-Linguistics and Philosophy (Kluwer Academic Publishers)-Vol. 3, Iss: 1, pp 35-47
TL;DR: There appears to be no good reason to doubt thatif is transitive, that the antecedent of a conditional can be strengthened, and that the contrapositive can be inferred, and the rule of conditional proof does seem to capture a commonly accepted form of argument in support ofif-then statements.
Abstract: The paper has sought to show two things. One is that the apparent variety of Stalnaker and Lewis's counterexamples is misleading. Several of their examples are quite unsatisfactory because they depend on unguarded language behavior. There is in fact only one type of counterexample that is worth serious discussion, and that has the form of Barense's. For Barense's example, I try to show that it fails as a counterexample to transitivity because one of the premisses is false within the context of the example. However, Barense's example is problematic for the Stalnaker-Lewis analysis, since their device for avoiding transitivity (rejecting the rule of conditional proof) does not in fact eliminate anomalous conclusions that can be drawn when both the premisses are taken as true. In sum, there appears to be no good reason to doubt thatif is transitive, that the antecedent of a conditional can be strengthened, and that the contrapositive can be inferred. And the rule of conditional proof does seem to capture a commonly accepted form of argument in support ofif-then statements.
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The theory of conditional proof as discussed by the authors is based on a set of pragmatic principles that govern how an if sentence is likely to be interpreted in context, and it is defined by a lexical entry that defines the information about if in semantic memory.
Abstract: The theory has 3 parts: (a) A lexical entry defines the information about if in semantic memory; its core comprises 2 inferences schemas, Modus Ponens and a schema for Conditional Proof; the latter operates under a constraint that explains differences between if and the material conditional of standard logic. (b) A propositional-logic reasoning program specifies a routine for reasoning from information as interpreted to a conclusion. (c) A set of pragmatic principles governs how an if sentence is likely to be interpreted in context

302 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: Evidence supporting a particularRepertory as the repertory of the kinds of inferences basic to the propositional reasoning of adults untutored in logic is presented.
Abstract: Publisher Summary Within psychology, there are three approaches to the issue of the relation of logic to reasoning. One approach emphasizes nonlogical processes and biases. The second approach posits that subjects proceed by constructing a mental model of the information given and reason from the model. The third approach assumes that reasoning includes logical principles and that it has been the starting point for a substantial body of work in recent years. This chapter presents evidence supporting a particular repertory as the repertory of the kinds of inferences basic to the propositional reasoning of adults untutored in logic. The measures of the difficulty of direct reasoning problems can be predicted from the number of inferences of this repertory needed to solve a problem and can very well be predicted if the problem length and the kind of inference are also taken into account. The repertory was incorporated into a reasoning program that consists of a direct reasoning routine, coupled with some strategies to be used when the routine fails to solve a problem.

150 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the notion of a conflict between two subsystems, logical and linguistic, is used in a developmental perspective to account, in a unified manner, for the observed discrepancy between subjects' behavior in deductive and inductive reasoning tasks and predictions based on formal logic.
Abstract: After a review of recent work connected with Grice's maxims of conversation, special attention is paid to the principles related to the concept of informativeness. The operation of those principles constrains logic by limiting the meaning of logical particles and, more importantly, by contradicting axioms and many theorems of the propositional calculus. It is argued that, as the development of the individual's formal operations proceeds, a conflict with laws of language use arises. The notion of a conflict between two subsystems, logical and linguistic, is used in a developmental perspective to account, in a unified manner, for the observed discrepancy between subjects' behavior in deductive and inductive reasoning tasks and predictions based on formal logic.

75 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

50 citations

References
More filters
Book
01 Jan 1955
TL;DR: Goodman's second book as mentioned in this paper is a reprint of the well-known paper, "The Prob lem of Counterfactual Conditionals", which he delivered at the University of London in 1953, is small in volume but rich in content.
Abstract: liELsoN Goodman's second book,1 which represents?excepting the first chapter, a reprint of the well-known paper, "The Prob lem of Counterfactual Conditionals"?the "Special Lectures in Philosophy" he delivered at the University of London in 1953, is small in volume but rich in content. There is a clear thread run ning through its four chapters: counterf actual conditionals (which in recent years have given such headaches to several ana lytic philosophers) speak about possible non-actual 2 events. But Goodman cannot accept talk about possible events or entities in good philosophical conscience; according to his "actualist" onto logy, as we might call it, there are no possibilities, just as for a nominalist there are no classes and other abstract entities. To put it in the formal mode of speech: he wants to find a way of trans lating all modal talk into a non-modal language. Guided by this motivation, he proceeds to examine the distinction between "law like" and "accidental" statements and, after an impressive display of analytical acumen, comes to the conclusion that the solution of this problem of explication is one with the solution of the problem of induction: what is the criterion of reasonableness of an inductive inference? How are warranted predictions to be dis tinguished from unwarranted ones? There seem to me, however, to be serious flaws in Goodman's intricate chain of argument, which I wish to examine in some detail.

2,072 citations

Book ChapterDOI
Robert Stalnaker1
01 Jan 1968
TL;DR: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is truth function of those propositions as mentioned in this paper, which has given rise to a number of philosophical problems.
Abstract: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is a truth function of those propositions I may know the truth values of “Willie Mays played in the American League” and “Willie Mays hit four hundred” without knowing whether or not Mays, would have hit four hundred if he had played in the American League This fact has tended to puzzle, displease, or delight philosophers, and many have felt that it is a fact that calls for some comment or explanation It has given rise to a number of philosophical problems; I shall discuss three of these

1,725 citations

01 Jun 1971
TL;DR: This work was supported in part by the 1970 MSSB Advanced Research Seminar in Mathematical Linguistics, sponsored by the National Science Foundation through a grant to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, and held at the Ohio State University as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: This work was supported in part by the 1970 MSSB Advanced Research Seminar in Mathematical Linguistics, sponsored by the National Science Foundation through a grant to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, and held at the Ohio State University.

385 citations