On the computation of fully proportional representation
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396 citations
Cites background or methods from "On the computation of fully proport..."
...The complexity class ΘP2 is the class of problems that can be solved, in polynomial time, by a (hypothetical) machine that has access to an oracle capable of deciding NP-complete problems in an instant, with the restriction that the number of queries to the oracle must be at most logarithmic in the size of the problem....
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...ΠP2 , a complexity class located at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, is the class of decision problems for which a certificate for a negative answer can be verified in polynomial time by a machine that has access to an oracle for answering NP-complete problems in an instant....
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..., 2008) Winner determination for the Chamberlin-Courant scheme with the Borda misrepresentation function is NP-complete (Lu and Boutilier, 2011a) Winner determination for the minimax versions of the Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe schemes is NP-complete (Betzler et al., 2013)...
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...While we have seen that the premise-based rule can be manipulated, doing so is hard, at least in the worst case and for agendas involving large formulas:15 Proposition 11 (Endriss et al., 2012) The manipulation problem for the premise-based rule and judges with Hamming preferences is NP-complete....
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...Domain restrictions: for single-peaked profiles, most multiwinner problems discussed above become polynomial; the only rule that remains NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule (Betzler et al., 2013)....
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214 citations
Cites background or methods from "On the computation of fully proport..."
...On the other hand, Betzler et al. (2013) used the framework of parameterized complexity to show that winner determination for these rules can be solved efficiently for elections with few voters or with few alternatives....
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..., 2008), even when certain natural parameters of the election are small (Betzler et al., 2013) or when preferences of the voters are single-crossing (Skowron et al., 2015b) (hardness for single-peaked elections is known only for a more general variant of the rule (Betzler et al., 2013)). Yet, recently, Skowron et al. (2015a) proposed a greedy variant of this rule:...
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...…according to the Monroe rule is computationally hard (Procaccia et al., 2008), even when certain natural parameters of the election are small (Betzler et al., 2013) or when preferences of the voters are single-crossing (Skowron et al., 2015b) (hardness for single-peaked elections is known…...
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...On the other hand, Betzler et al. (2013) used the framework of parameterized complexity to show that winner determination for these rules can be solved efficiently for elections with few voters or with few alternatives. They also showed that these rules are polynomial-time computable for single-peaked elections, whereas Skowron et al. (2015b) have shown the same for single-crossing elections....
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..., 2008), even when certain natural parameters of the election are small (Betzler et al., 2013) or when preferences of the voters are single-crossing (Skowron et al....
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185 citations
181 citations
Cites background or methods from "On the computation of fully proport..."
...Computational complexity of winner determination For -Monroe and -CC with ∈ { 1, min}, it is known that finding even a single winning committee is computationally hard (Procaccia et al. 2008; Lu and Boutilier 2011; Betzler et al. 2013)....
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...Unfortunately, these rules are hard to compute, irrespective of tie-breaking, both for the Borda satisfaction function (Lu and Boutilier 2011; Betzler et al. 2013) and for various approvalbased satisfaction functions (Procaccia et al. 2008; Betzler et al. 2013)....
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...One way to classify them is according to the type of the input: there are preference-based rules (whose inputs are sequences of linear orders; see, e.g., the work of Brams and Fishburn (2002)), approval-based rules (whose inputs are sequences of dichotomies; see, e.g., the works of Brams et al.…...
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...The main idea is to provide an optimal assignment of committee members to voters, by using a satisfaction function to measure the quality of the assignment....
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...…be efficiently approximated, or admit polynomial-time algorithms when voters’ preferences are drawn from restricted domains (Lu and Boutilier 2011; Betzler et al. 2013; Cornaz et al. 2012; Yu et al. 2013; Skowron et al. 2015, 2016; Skowron and Faliszewski 2015; Skowron et al. 2015; Elkind and…...
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171 citations
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