On the Measurement of Inequality
TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of comparing two frequency distributions f(u) of an attribute y which for convenience I shall refer to as income is defined as a risk in the theory of decision-making under uncertainty.
About: This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 1970-09-01. It has received 5002 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Income inequality metrics & Income distribution.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the welfare inferences drawn from subjective answers to questions on qualitative surveys are clouded by concerns about the structure of measurement errors and how latent psychological factors influence observed respondent characteristics.
Abstract: The authors argue that the welfare inferences drawn from subjective answers to questions on qualitative surveys are clouded by concerns about the structure of measurement errors and how latent psychological factors influence observed respondent characteristics. They propose a panel data model to high-quality panel data for Russia for 1994-96, they find that some results widely reported in past studies of subjective well-being appear to be robust but others do not. Household income, for example, is a highly significant predictor of self-rated economic welfare; per capita income is a weaker predictor. Ill health and loss of a job reduce self-reported economic welfare; per capita income is a weaker predictor. Ill health and loss of a job reduce self-reported economic welfare, but demographic effects are weak at a given current income. And the effects of unemployment is not robust. Returning to work does not restore a sense of welfare unless there is an income gain. The results imply that even transient unemployment brings the feeling of a permanent welfare loss, suggesting that high unemployment benefits do not attract people out of work but do discourage a return to work.
321 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine another and more neglected dimension of development, the distribution of income, and assess, in light of these and governmental policy measures in the 1960's, the apparent changes between 1960 and 1970.
Abstract: The two postwar decades have resolved definitively the capacity of developing nations to expand at rates in excess of 2 percent per capita. Yet it has become increasingly apparent that such a yardstick is an inadequate measure of performance. Here I examine another and more neglected dimension of development, the distribution of income. My objectives are fourfold: to describe briefly the procedures used to derive an estimated income distribution for Brazil for 1960;1 to discuss the profile of poverty as it presents itself in a developing country; to indicate the factors operating to produce skewness in the Brazilian distribution; and to assess, in light of these and governmental policy measures in the 1960's, the apparent changes between 1960 and 1970.
321 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a methodology for calculating the distribution of gains and losses from a policy change using data for a large sample of households is discussed, based on the equivalent income function, which is money metric utility defined over observable variables.
320 citations
TL;DR: JSTOR as mentioned in this paper is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship, which is used to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources.
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320 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define a solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games in characteristic function form, in a framework where individuals believe in equality as a desirable social goal, although private preferences dictate selfish behavior.
Abstract: We define a new solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games in characteristic function form, in a framework where individuals believe in equality as a desirable social goal, although private preferences dictate selfish behavior. This latter aspect implies that the solution outcome(s) must satisfy core-like participation constraints while the concern for equality entails choice of Lorenz maximal elements from within the set of payoffs satisfying the participation constraints
319 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a measure of risk aversion in the small, the risk premium or insurance premium for an arbitrary risk, and a natural concept of decreasing risk aversion are discussed and related to one another.
Abstract: This paper concerns utility functions for money. A measure of risk aversion in the small, the risk premium or insurance premium for an arbitrary risk, and a natural concept of decreasing risk aversion are discussed and related to one another. Risks are also considered as a proportion of total assets.
5,207 citations
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"On the Measurement of Inequality" refers background in this paper
...3 See Rothschild and Stiglitz [13], Hadar and Russell [ 5 ], and Hanoch and Levy [6]....
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1,738 citations
"On the Measurement of Inequality" refers methods in this paper
...Then by applying the results of Pratt [l 11, Arrow [ 2 ], and others, we can see that this requirement (which may be referred to as constant (relative) inequality-aversion) implies that U(y) has the form...
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TL;DR: JSTOR as discussed by the authors is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship, which is used to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources.
Abstract: you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
1,544 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an analysis of the first step of the decision-making process of an individual decision maker among alternative risky ventures is presented, in terms of a single dimension such as money, both for the utility functions and for the probability distributions.
Abstract: Publisher Summary The choice of an individual decision maker among alternative risky ventures may be regarded as a two-step procedure. The decision maker chooses an efficient set among all available portfolios, independently of his tastes or preferences. Then, the decision maker applies individual preferences to this set to choose the desired portfolio. The subject of this chapter is the analysis of the first step. It deals with optimal selection rules that minimize the efficient set by discarding any portfolio that is inefficient in the sense that it is inferior to a member of the efficient set, from point of view of each and every individual, when all individuals' utility functions are assumed to be of a given general class of admissible functions. The analysis presented in the chapter is carried out in terms of a single dimension such as money, both for the utility functions and for the probability distributions. However, the results may easily be extended, with minor changes in the theorems and the proofs, to the multivariate case. The chapter explains a necessary and sufficient condition for efficiency, when no further restrictions are imposed on the utility functions. It presents proofs of the optimal efficiency criterion in the presence of general risk aversion, that is, for concave utility functions.
1,160 citations