scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Journal ArticleDOI

On the philosophical foundations of the theory of communication: reference1

01 Sep 1977-Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Blackwell Publishing Ltd)-Vol. 2, Iss: 1, pp 165-186
About: This article is published in Midwest Studies in Philosophy.The article was published on 1977-09-01. It has received 54 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Philosophical methodology & Philosophical theory.
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: The manual annotation process and the results of an inter-annotator agreement study on a 10,000-sentence corpus of articles drawn from the world press are presented.
Abstract: This paper describes a corpus annotation project to study issues in the manual annotation of opinions, emotions, sentiments, speculations, evaluations and other private states in language. The resulting corpus annotation scheme is described, as well as examples of its use. In addition, the manual annotation process and the results of an inter-annotator agreement study on a 10,000-sentence corpus of articles drawn from the world press are presented.

1,818 citations

Book
01 Jan 1979
TL;DR: The authors argue that the essential indexical poses a problem for various otherwise plausible accounts of belief, such as the view that belief is a relation between subjects and propositions conceived as bearers of truth.
Abstract: I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn't believe that I was making a mess. That seems to be something I came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I stopped following the trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in my cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain my change in behavior. My aim in this paper is to make a key point about the characterization of this change, and of beliefs in general. At first characterizing the change seems easy. My beliefs changed, didn't they, in that I came to have a new one, namely, that I am making a mess? But things are not so simple. The reason they are not is the importance of the word "I" in my expression of what I came to believe. When we replace it with other designations of me, we no longer have an explanation of my behavior and so, it seems, no longer an attribution of the same belief. It seems to be an essential indexical. But without such a replacement, all we have to identify the belief is the sentence "I am making a mess". But that sentence by itself doesn't seem to identify the crucial belief, for if someone else had said it, they would have expressed a different belief, a false one. I argue that the essential indexical poses a problem for various otherwise plausible accounts of belief. I first argue that it is a problem for the view that belief is a relation between subjects and propositions conceived as bearers of truth and

1,104 citations

Book
11 Nov 2002
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the language of thought hypothesis and the constituency thesis for the meaning of words in a sentence, a proposition, an idea, a concept, an object, an image, or a concept.
Abstract: Preface 1. Introduction Part I. Semantic Acts and Intentions: 2. Speaker meaning 3. Expression 4. Alternative analyses 5. Communication 6. Reference Part II. Languages and Semantic Acts: 7. Languages 8. Basic word meaning 9. Conventions 10. Compositional word meaning 11. Living languages Part III. Thoughts and Ideas: 12. Thought 13. Sentences, propositions and thoughts 14. The constituency thesis 15. Ideas or concepts 16. The possession of concepts 17. The acquisition of concepts 18. The association of ideas 19. Objects, images and conceptions 20. The language of thought hypothesis Part IV. Ideational Theories of Meaning: 21. Objections to ideational theories 22. Priority objections 23. Incompleteness objections References Index.

151 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about belief reports expressed in natural language, including de re, de dicto, nested and quasi-indexical belief reports.

60 citations