On What There Is
TL;DR: The authors consider the ontological problem in the sense that it does not follow that what an expression means is identical with what it denotes; for, as the example of "the morning star" and "the evening star" shows, two expressions may denote the same object without having the same meaning.
Abstract: In this paper I begin by considering some remarks of Professor W. V. Quine’s on what he calls ‘the ontological problem’.1 Professor Quine holds that from the fact that a sign has meaning it does not, in general, follow either that there is anything that it stands for, or that there is anything that it denotes. This applies, in his view, not only to words like ‘red’ which are sometimes thought to stand for properties, but also to words like ‘Pegasus’ which are commonly regarded as names; for he argues that it is always possible to convert such names into descriptions, and then analyse out the descriptions in the way that Russell has suggested. Moreover, even in the case where an expression does denote something, it does not follow that what it means is identical with what it denotes; for, as the example of ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ shows, two expressions may denote the same object without having the same meaning. Whether in such cases, or indeed in any others, Professor Quine would wish to say that an expression named, or stood for, what it denoted, is not clear to me; nor is it clear to me whether he thinks that there are any signs, such as demonstratives or pronouns, which are meaningful only if there is something which they denote.
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01 Jan 1985
TL;DR: McCloskey as discussed by the authors describes how economic discourse employs metaphor, authority, symmetry, and other rhetorical means of persuasion, showing economists to be human persuaders and poets of the marketplace, even in their most technical and mathematical moods.
Abstract: In this revised second edition, Deirdre McCloskey demonstrates how economic discourse employs metaphor, authority, symmetry and other rhetorical means of persuasion. ""The Rhetoric of Economics"" shows economists to be human persuaders and poets of the marketplace, even in their most technical and mathematical moods. It is further enhanced by three new chapters and two new bibliographies.
2,068 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present three familiar and related arguments against psychophysical functionalism and the computer model of the mind: the first is that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and argues that there is no way to account for this awareness in a functional view.
Abstract: There are three familiar and related arguments against psychophysical functionalism and the computer model of the mind. The first is that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and argues that there is no way to account for this awareness in a functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third claims that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.
852 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the traditional notions of being and becoming are problematic, and instead, they theorise children as being and becomings, which not only addresses the temporality of childhood that children themselves voice, but presents a conceptually realistic construction suitable to both childhood researchers and practitioners.
Abstract: Notions of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ are intrinsic to childhood research. Whilst the ‘being’ child is seen as a social actor actively constructing ‘childhood’, the ‘becoming’ child is seen as an ‘adult in the making’, lacking competencies of the ‘adult’ that he or she will ‘become’. However, I argue that both approaches are in themselves problematic. Instead, theorising children as ‘being and becomings’ not only addresses the temporality of childhood that children themselves voice, but presents a conceptually realistic construction suitable to both childhood researchers and practitioners.
534 citations
TL;DR: The article defends the view that physical objects are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically, types of reflectance, and defends it against objections made in the recent literature that are often taken as fatal.
Abstract: The target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically, types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical objects are not colored, and that the colors are "subjective" or "in the mind." The article has two other purposes: First, to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to some distinctively philosophical tools that are useful in tackling the problem of color realism and, second, to clarify the various positions and central arguments in the debate. The first part explains the problem of color realism and makes some useful distinctions. These distinctions are then used to expose various confusions that often prevent people from seeing that the issues are genuine and difficult, and that the problem of color realism ought to be of interest to anyone working in the field of color science. The second part explains the various leading answers to the prob- lem of color realism, and (briefly) argues that all views other than our own have serious difficulties or are unmotivated. The third part explains and motivates our own view, that colors are types of reflectances and defends it against objections made in the recent literature that are often taken as fatal.
362 citations