Opportunism Galore: The Case of Delhi–Gurgaon Super Connectivity Limited
06 Dec 2017-pp 489-512
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the hypotheses that opportunistic behaviour of project participants in infrastructure public-private partnerships (PPPs) changes over the project's life cycle and provide a closer understanding of how opportunistic behaviours evolve over projects' life cycle.
Abstract: To recognize and investigate the hypotheses that opportunistic behaviour of project participants in infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) changes over the project’s life cycle. Case study methodology is adopted. The first Indian highway PPP project, awarded with negative grant, is used as the case context. Opportunistic behaviour is a continuous game played by the project stakeholders. Its manifestation depends on the vulnerability of the other party at that point in time in the project life cycle and the past display of opportunism. Because the study is limited to a highway project in an emerging economy, the findings may lack generalizability for which further research is recommended. PPP is increasingly popular. Stakeholders recognize that the existing ex-ante contractual arrangements that seek to mitigate opportunism are not enough for project success. This study addresses this difficulty by providing a closer understanding of how opportunistic behaviours evolve over projects’ life cycle and what steps are necessary to negotiate. Failure to address the antecedents of opportunistic behaviour in time leads to a competition to be more opportunistic, in which the common public gets short changed. This study is an attempt to advance understanding of stakeholders’ behaviour outside the ambit of contract. The extant literature is largely silent on the timing and vulnerability of opportunistic behaviour, viewing it as a static concept. The study demonstrates the changing nature of opportunism that manifests in different forms over the projects life cycle.
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TL;DR: In this paper , an exploratory factor analysis was used and the standard factor loading was the criteria to measure the criticality of the factors that influence the performance of highway projects, and it was concluded that the complexity of the sub-contractor's performance, frequent modification in alignment, project design, loopholes in safety, and ambiguities in specifications are the main factors that impact highway projects.
Abstract: Highway construction projects have always suffered from cost overruns due to extended project delivery, causing a loss of public funds. Since highways are the backbone of a nation, the purpose of this study is to measure the criticality of the factors that influence the performance of highway projects. A survey instrument was prepared and distributed to 185 project managers. To achieve the aim of the study, exploratory factor analysis was used and the standard factor loading was the criteria to measure the criticality. From the analysis, it was identified that the factors were grouped under four categories: (a) Execution constraints (b) Operational factors, (c) Stakeholder and political constraints, (d) Design Constraints. Further, it was concluded that the complexity of the sub-contractor’s performance, frequent modification in alignment, project design, loopholes in safety, and ambiguities in specifications are the main factors that impact the performance of highway projects. Therefore, it was recommended to develop an efficient project planning methodology which is a continuum of project management skills and tacit knowledge of managing a site which operates efficiently.
9 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , a survey was conducted with 435 respondents from the field of highway projects with a minimum experience of 1 year as Project Manager to measure and articulate the impact of project governance constraint, project constraint and stakeholder induced constraints on project success.
Abstract: Purpose Highway projects in India have a history of cost overruns and delay in project delivery, thus incurring huge losses to public funds. The study aimed to measure the extent of influence of various constraints on the overall success of highway projects (e.g. National highway project, state highway projects and major district roads). Based on the literature, various factors were grouped under three categories (a) Project Constraints, (b) Project Governance Constraints and (c) Stakeholder Induced Constraints. Design/methodology/approach A quantitative approach was adopted. A questionnaire-based survey was conducted with 435 respondents from the field of highway projects with a minimum experience of 1 year as Project Manager. The data was analyzed by partial least squares structural equation modeling technique. Findings It was identified that the impact of project constraints (ES = 0.313) on project success is more than that of project governance constraints (ES = 0.231) and stakeholder induced constraints. Additionally, it was found that project governance constraints have a strong impact on project constraints (ES = 0.535) and stakeholder induced constraints (ES = 0.403). Originality/value The study presented in this paper is first of its kind to measure and articulate the impact of project governance constraint, project constraint and stakeholder induced constraints on project success.
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TL;DR: For instance, the authors argues that if transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any advantages one mode of organization appears to hold over another will simply be eliminated by costless contracting.
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