Optimal coordinated supply chain strategy with price and time sensitive demand
TL;DR: The results show that the vendor gets more advantage when the collaborative model is applied and the buyer's profit is bigger in the Stackelberg game model than the Collaborative model.
Abstract: In this study, inventory models are developed for coordinated supply chain using Stackelberg game framework. In the proposed model, customer demand is assumed to be price and time sensitive. The buyer attempts to adjust retail selling prices by charging premium or offering discount to the floor selling price depending upon the optimistic or declining market conditions. The aim of this research paper is to analyse the optimal pricing policy that maximises total profit for both the players under the principles of coordination, and competition. Some numerical examples are given to study the model. The results show that the vendor gets more advantage when the collaborative model is applied and the buyer’s profit is bigger in the Stackelberg game model than the collaborative model.
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Citations
8 citations
Cites background from "Optimal coordinated supply chain st..."
...Shah et al. (2011) proposed inventory model for time-sensitive as well as price dependent demand....
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2 citations
Cites background from "Optimal coordinated supply chain st..."
...Shah et al. (2011) have analysed the optimal pricing policy in order to maximise total profit for both the players under the principles of coordination, and competition....
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1 citations
Cites result from "Optimal coordinated supply chain st..."
...According to Shah et al. (2011), goods falling under a price-time sensitive market category, the buyers (middle men in agri-foods) profit are bigger than vendor (farmers/growers) in Stackelberg game model than the collaborative model....
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...The above argument is justified by various studies conducted by Shah et al. (2011)....
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1 citations
References
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