Journal ArticleDOI
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
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In this article, the principal can restrict himself to incentive-compatible direct coordination mechanisms, in which agents report their information to the principal, who then recommends to them decisions forming a correlated equilibrium.About:
This article is published in Journal of Mathematical Economics.The article was published on 1982-06-01. It has received 934 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Principal (computer security) & Unobservable.read more
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Diversification's effect on firm value
Philip G. Berger,Eli Ofek +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors estimate diversification's effect on firm value by imputing stand-alone values for individual business segments and compare the sum of these standalone values to the firm's actual value, and find that overinvestment and cross-subsidization contribute to the value loss.
Book
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
TL;DR: Laffont and Martimort as mentioned in this paper focus on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract, the essence of management and contract theory.
Book
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Yoav Shoham,Kevin Leyton-Brown +1 more
TL;DR: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multi agent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics.
A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed the optimal financial contract in light of this predatory threat and found that the optimal contract balances the benefits of deterring predation by relaxing financial constraints against the cost of exacerbating incentive problems.
Posted Content
Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly
Chaim Fershtman,Kenneth L. Judd +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the incentives which competing principals give their agents, focusing on two oligopoly models where owners write incentive contracts with the managers, and show that a principal will distort his agent's incentives when the agent competes with agents of competing principals.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Moral Hazard and Observability
TL;DR: In this article, the role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered, and a necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived.
Journal ArticleDOI
Optimal Auction Design
TL;DR: Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.
Posted Content
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
TL;DR: The canonical agency problem can be posed as follows as discussed by the authors : the agent may choose an act, aCA, a feasible action space, and the random payoff from this act, w(a, 0), will depend on the random state of nature O(EQ the state space set), unknown to the agent when a is chosen.
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Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that any non-dictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation, i.e., an individual can manipulate a voting scheme if, by misrepresenting his preferences, he secures an outcome he prefers to the "honest" outcome.