Optimal Design for Social Learning
Citations
581 citations
Cites background from "Optimal Design for Social Learning"
...Market design principles have generally focused on increasing the information flow and quality within a platform (Bolton et al 2013, Che and Horner 2014, Dai et al 2014, Fradkin et al 2014), but we highlight a situation in which platforms may be providing too much information....
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References
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"Optimal Design for Social Learning" refers background in this paper
...The first-best policy calls for the agents to start experimenting strictly before the true posterior rises to c, namely when p∗∗b c is reached....
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...In standard models (for instance, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welsch, 1992; Banerjee, 1993), the sequence of agents take decisions myopically, ignoring the impact of their action on learning and future decisions and welfare....
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"Optimal Design for Social Learning" refers background or methods in this paper
...To prove this claim, we invoke a verification theorem (see, for instance, Thm. 5.1 in Fleming and Soner, 2005)....
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...The agents’ belief gt concerning the arrival of news is determined via (3):...
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...Hence, α = α(l) := h− l k − lσ , (3) where h := l + α(k − l)....
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...where (pt, gt) must follow the required laws of motion: (2) and (3), and μt = ρ + αt is the total experimentation rate and r is the discount rate of the designer....
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...It is readily checked from (3) that the slope of the locus α t (l) is larger than the slope dα/dl along the locus (α t , l s t )s∈[0,mt], so that they cross only once....
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2,371 citations
"Optimal Design for Social Learning" refers methods in this paper
...A solution exists by the Filippov-Cesari theorem (Cesari, 1983)....
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