scispace - formally typeset
Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition

Alex Gershkov, +1 more
- 01 Jan 2009 - 
- Vol. 144, Iss: 1, pp 36-68
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
It is shown that, of all mechanisms, a sequential one is optimal and works as follows: one agent at a time is selected to acquire information and report the resulting signal and the restriction to ex-post efficiency is shown to be without loss when the available signals are sufficiently imprecise.
About: 
This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 2009-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 96 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Optimal decision.

read more

Citations
More filters
Book ChapterDOI

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Giving and Receiving Advice

Joel Sobel
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors classify the literature on communication between informed experts and uninformed decision makers along four dimensions: strategic, technological, institutional, and cultural, and provide some insight into what constitutes a persuasive statement and under what conditions a decision maker will benefit from consulting an expert.
Journal ArticleDOI

Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning

Yeon-Koo Che, +1 more
- 01 May 2018 - 
TL;DR: This article studies how a recommender system may incentivize users to learn about a product collaboratively and “seed” incentives for user exploration and determine the speed and trajectory of social learning.
Journal ArticleDOI

Optimal auctions with information acquisition

Xianwen Shi
- 01 Mar 2012 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information gathering was studied and it was shown that the optimal monopoly price is always lower than the standard monopoly price.
Journal ArticleDOI

Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process

Raphael Boleslavsky, +1 more
- 01 Jan 2013 - 
TL;DR: In this article, a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves is examined. And the realized values are also private information.
Journal Article

A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Yukio Koriyama, +1 more
- 09 Jun 2009 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the optimal size of a deliberating committee where there is no conflict of interest among individuals and information acquisition is costly is analyzed, and it is shown that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2.
References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI

Information acquisition in auctions

Nicola Persico
- 01 Jan 2000 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce the notion of risk-sensitiity and establish that the value of information is higher in decision problems that are more risk-sensitive, and apply this result to auctions: they show that a first price auction induces more information acquisition than a second price auction.
Journal ArticleDOI

Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Nicola Persico
- 01 Jan 2004 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the arrangements for collective decision making in a world where agents must be motivated to acquire information and identify some basic forces shaping the design of panels of decision makers-referees, managers, jurors, etc.
Journal ArticleDOI

Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents

Andrew McLennan
- 01 Jun 1998 - 
TL;DR: The Condorcet Jury Theorem as mentioned in this paper is a result, pertaining to an election in which the agents have common preferences but diverse information, asserting that the outcome is better, on average, than the one that would be chosen by any particular individual.
Journal ArticleDOI

Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections

Eddie Dekel, +1 more
- 01 Jan 2000 - 
TL;DR: This work explores sequential voting in symmetric two‐option environments and shows that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultancous voting game are alsoEquilibria in any sequential voting structure, including unanimity games.
Journal ArticleDOI

Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design

Dirk Bergemann, +1 more
- 01 May 2002 - 
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism and the central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex post.
Related Papers (5)

Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Nicola Persico
- 01 Jan 2004 - 

Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

David Austen-Smith, +1 more
- 01 Jan 1996 - 

The Swing Voter's Curse

Timothy J. Feddersen, +1 more
- 01 Jun 1996 - 

Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting

Timothy J. Feddersen, +1 more
- 01 Mar 1998 - 

Strategic information transmission

Vincent P. Crawford, +1 more
- 01 Nov 1982 - 
Frequently Asked Questions (5)
Q1. What are the contributions in "Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition∗" ?

This paper analyzes a voting model where ( i ) there is no conflict of interest among the voters, and ( ii ) information acquisition is costly and unobservable. The social planner asks, at random, one voter at a time to invest in information and to report the resulting signal. Voters are informed of neither their position in the sequence nor the reports of previous voters. Obeying the planner by investing and reporting truthfully is optimal for voters. In this scheme, the social planner stops aggregating information and makes a decision when the precision of his posterior exceeds a cut-off which decreases with each additional report. 

The authors also show that, if the cost of information acquisition is small, then, surprisingly, the ex-ante optimal mechanism is often ex-post inefficient. 

It will be shown that if the cost of information acquisition is small enough, then the optimal ex-post efficient mechanism can be improved upon by replacing a continuation mechanism with an ex-post inefficient continuation mechanism. 

Since the SP orders the voters independently of the realizations of the signals,p (A ∩B) = p (s) 2i+ d N ,where (2i+ d) /N is the probability that the deviator is asked to report a signal if a decision is made after a sequence with length 2i+d. 

The authors argue that for given p and c, there always exists a k0 ∈ N such that the mechanism is not incentive compatible if the SP stops asking voters only if |d| ≥ k0.