Out of Control
TL;DR: In contrast, the authors argue that there are many everyday contexts in which we hold agents responsible for their acts even though considerations unrelated to determinism strongly suggest that they cannot help performing them.
Abstract: Incompatibilists affirm, while compatibilists deny, that the truth of determinism would mean that we lack control over, and so are not responsible for, any of our actions. Though defined as opposites, compatibilism and incompatibilism both treat determinism as the main threat to our having enough control over our actions to be morally responsible for them. Here, by contrast, I want to call attention to another, less exotic threat to our having that much control. There are, I will argue, many everyday contexts in which we hold agents responsible for their acts even though considerations unrelated to determinism strongly suggest that they cannot help performing them. These contexts may not prevent us from specifying a conception of control that preserves our standard judgments of responsibility, but they do make that task even more difficult than is generally appreciated.
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Book•
21 Apr 2008
TL;DR: Feedback Systems develops transfer functions through the exponential response of a system, and is accessible across a range of disciplines that utilize feedback in physical, biological, information, and economic systems.
Abstract: This book provides an introduction to the mathematics needed to model, analyze, and design feedback systems. It is an ideal textbook for undergraduate and graduate students, and is indispensable for researchers seeking a self-contained reference on control theory. Unlike most books on the subject, Feedback Systems develops transfer functions through the exponential response of a system, and is accessible across a range of disciplines that utilize feedback in physical, biological, information, and economic systems. Karl strm and Richard Murray use techniques from physics, computer science, and operations research to introduce control-oriented modeling. They begin with state space tools for analysis and design, including stability of solutions, Lyapunov functions, reachability, state feedback observability, and estimators. The matrix exponential plays a central role in the analysis of linear control systems, allowing a concise development of many of the key concepts for this class of models. strm and Murray then develop and explain tools in the frequency domain, including transfer functions, Nyquist analysis, PID control, frequency domain design, and robustness. They provide exercises at the end of every chapter, and an accompanying electronic solutions manual is available. Feedback Systems is a complete one-volume resource for students and researchers in mathematics, engineering, and the sciences.Covers the mathematics needed to model, analyze, and design feedback systems Serves as an introductory textbook for students and a self-contained resource for researchers Includes exercises at the end of every chapter Features an electronic solutions manual Offers techniques applicable across a range of disciplines
1,927 citations
01 May 2005
TL;DR: In the case of empirical giftedness research, the roots reach back to the beginning of the last century as discussed by the authors, when many scholars were fascinated by the phenomenon that some persons act much more efficiently in particular fields than others and it seemed to be completely out of the question that a normal person would be able to attain this same level of efficiency, even through extensive learning and with the best means of support.
Abstract: Every empirical science must first determine its object of investigation. In most cases, this is predetermined by a cultural imprint. In the case of empirical giftedness research, the roots reach back to the beginning of the last century. Many scholars were fascinated by the phenomenon that some persons act much more efficiently in particular fields than others. It seemed to be completely out of the question that a normal person would be able to attain this same level of efficiency, even through extensive learning and with the best means of support. However, terms such as gifts, talents , or genius were suggested as causal explanations – regardless of the fact that they originated from mythological, theological, and metaphysical traditions (Ziegler & Heller, 2002). No science can be content with nonscientific concepts in the long run. Consequently, the theoretical development in the last century was marked by the longing to determine what these terms “really” meant and to supply them with an empirical substance. Obviously, this attempt only makes sense if there are entities within the human psyche that correspond to these terms. Unfortunately, this has only rarely, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Margolin, 1994; Tannenbaum, 1983), been subjected to serious scrutiny. Fascinating terms such as genius or talent were bandied about, and a spectacular quest for the psychic entities with which these names could be christened was inaugurated. The first momentous attempt to replace talent with a psychological construct was made by Terman (1925).
180 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility, arguing that what really matters in determining a person's responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments.
Abstract: Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor.
172 citations
Cites background from "Out of Control"
...bility. For other recent defenses of non-volitionalism, see Scanlon (1988, 1998); Sher (2005, 2006) ; and Smith (2000, 2005)....
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Book•
16 Nov 2014
TL;DR: The work of the Onlife initiative as mentioned in this paper explores how the development and widespread use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) have a radical impact on the human condition and explores how ICTs are not mere tools but rather social forces that are increasingly affecting our self-conception (who we are), our mutual interactions (how we socialise); our conception of reality (our metaphysics); and our interactions with reality (Our agency).
Abstract: What is the impact of information and communication technologies (ICTs) on the human condition? In order to address this question, in 2012 the European Commission organized a research project entitled The Onlife Initiative: concept reengineering for rethinking societal concerns in the digital transition. This volume collects the work of the Onlife Initiative. It explores how the development and widespread use of ICTs have a radical impact on the human condition.
ICTs are not mere tools but rather social forces that are increasingly affecting our self-conception (who we are), our mutual interactions (how we socialise); our conception of reality (our metaphysics); and our interactions with reality (our agency). In each case, ICTs have a huge ethical, legal, and political significance, yet one with which we have begun to come to terms only recently.
The impact exercised by ICTs is due to at least four major transformations: the blurring of the distinction between reality and virtuality; the blurring of the distinction between human, machine and nature; the reversal from information scarcity to information abundance; and the shift from the primacy of stand-alone things, properties, and binary relations, to the primacy of interactions, processes and networks.
Such transformations are testing the foundations of our conceptual frameworks. Our current conceptual toolbox is no longer fitted to address new ICT-related challenges. This is not only a problem in itself. It is also a risk, because the lack of a clear understanding of our present time may easily lead to negative projections about the future. The goal of The Manifesto, and of the whole book that contextualises, is therefore that of contributing to the update of our philosophy. It is a constructive goal. The book is meant to be a positive contribution to rethinking the philosophy on which policies are built in a hyperconnected world, so that we may have a better chance of understanding our ICT-related problems and solving them satisfactorily.
The Manifesto launches an open debate on the impacts of ICTs on public spaces, politics and societal expectations toward policymaking in the Digital Agenda for Europe’s remit. More broadly, it helps start a reflection on the way in which a hyperconnected world calls for rethinking the referential frameworks on which policies are built.
171 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model the brain as a multi-agent organization and introduce asymmetric information as a restriction on optimal choices, which generates endogenous constraints in decision-making, and show the optimality of a self-disciplining rule of the type "work more today if you want to consume more today".
Abstract: We model the brain as a multi-agent organization. Based on recent neuroscience evidence, we assume that different systems of the brain have different time-horizons and different access to information. Introducing asymmetric information as a restriction on optimal choices generates endogenous constraints in decision-making. In this game played between brain systems, we show the optimality of a self-disciplining rule of the type "work more today if you want to consume more today" and discuss its behavioral implications for the distribution of consumption over the life-cycle. We also argue that our dual-system theory provides "micro-microfoundations" for discounting and offer testable implications that depart from traditional models with no conflict and exogenous discounting. Last, we analyze a variant in which the agent has salient incentives or biased motivations. The previous rule is then replaced by a simple, non-intrusive precept of the type "consume what you want, just don't abuse".
162 citations