Outlook: Discussion of Reform Proposals

Abstract: The 2011 proposal of the European Court of Justice aiming to increase the number of judges of the General Court has mutated after four years into a complete change of the EU judicial system. This long legislative debate was the first implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the judicial domain. It has revealed different problems – formal and substantial – of the approach of public service reform in the European institutions.

Abstract: The development of competition law in the EU can be explored through three interrelated perspectives: the extent to which controversies in economic thinking affect the design of the law; how changing political visions about the objectives of competition law have caused shifts in the interpretation of the rules; and the institution in charge of applying the rules. The economic and political debates on competition law show that it is a contested terrain, and the way courts and competition authorities apply the law reflects their responses to the objectives and economics of competition law. By characterising the application of competition law as a continuous response to policy and economic debates, the author casts fresh perspectives on the subject. Written with competition law students in mind, Monti sets out economic concepts in a non-technical manner and explores the policy dimension of competition law by referring to key cases and contemporary policy initiatives.

Abstract: Recognized by antitrust practitioners and the courts as the most authoritative and comprehensive treatise on antitrust principles and practice, Antitrust Law explains the interplay of judicial, statutory, public policy, and economic forces that shape the world of antitrust. Its thorough analysis and criticism of U.S. Supreme Court, appellate court and major lower court antitrust decisions will help you truly understand the underpinnings of the law and frame successful arguments in litigation. The most recently revised volumes contain greatly expanded coverage of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; state action, implied, and statutory immunity; and the international and extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. Author Herbert Hovenkamp is recognized as one of the foremost experts on antitrust law in the country and has consulted extensively for both the government and the private sector.

Abstract: Bearbeitet von Prof. Dr. Josef Aicher, Wien; Dr. Rüdiger Bandilla, Brüssel; Dr. Jürgen Bast, Heidelberg; Prof. Dr. Martina Benecke, Augsburg; Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Benedek, Graz; Prof. Dr. Hermann-Josef Blanke, Erfurt; Detlev Boeing, Brüssel; Prof. Dr. Armin von Bogdandy, Heidelberg; Dr. Dierk Booß, Brüssel; Dorothe Dalheimer, Brüssel; Dr. Wolfgang Deselaers, Brüssel; Dr. Barbara Dutzler, Wien; Dr. Henning Eikenberg, Königswinter; Dr. Christoph T. Feddersen, Brüssel; PD Dr. Hans-Peter Folz, Augsburg; Dr. Ulrich Forsthoff, Luxemburg; Prof. DDr. Christoph Grabenwarter, Wien; Prof. Dr. Eberhard Grabitz j , Berlin; Prof. Dr. Stefan Griller, Wien; Johann Hahlen, Wiesbaden; Dr. Joachim-Friedrich Heine, Brüssel; Prof. Dr. Meinhard Hilf, Hamburg; PD Dr. Sven Hölscheidt, Berlin; Prof. Dr. Frank Hoffmeister, Brüssel; Dr. Gerhard Hütz, Luxemburg; PD Dr. Liv Jaeckel, Leipzig; Dr. Bernhard Jansen, Kraainem; Dr. Christian Jung, Köln; Prof. Dr. Peter Karpenstein f, Brüssel; Dr. Ulrich Karpenstein, Brüssel; Dr. Werner Kaufmann-Bühler, Bad Honnef; Dr. Ulrich Klinke, Luxemburg; Prof. Dr. Markus Kotzur, Leipzig; Prof. Dr. Markus Krajewski, Potsdam; Dr. Bernd Langeheine, Tervuren; Prof. Dr. Christine Langenfeld, Friedrichsdorf; Dr. Olaf Langner, Berlin; Prof. Dr. Helmut Lecheler, Berlin; Prof. Dr. Stefan Leible, Bayreuth; Dr. Tobias Lochen, Duisburg; Dr. Stefan Lorenzmeier, Augsburg; Prof. Dr. Siegfried Magiera, Speyer; Prof. Dr. Thilo Marauhn, Gießen; Prof. Dr. Franz C. Mayer, Bielefeld; Dr. Nikolaus MeyerLandrut, Brüssel; Dr. Gerald Miersch, Brüssel; Prof. Dr. Martin Nettesheim, Tübingen; Prof. Dr. Eckhard Pache, Würzburg; Dr. Ulrich Palm, Heidelberg; Prof. Dr. Ingolf Pernice, Berlin; Prof. Dr. Thomas Pfeiffer, Heidelberg; Dr. Reinhard Priebe, Brüssel; Prof. Dr. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Berlin; Prof. Dr. Dr. Georg Ress, Saarbrücken; PD Dr. Volker Roben, Heidelberg; Ulrich Rösslein, Brüssel; Dr. Dieter Rogalla, Sprockhövel; PD Dr. Birgit Schmidt am Busch, München; Dr. Henning C. Schneider, Hamburg; Prof. Dr. Frank Schorkopf, Heidelberg; Prof. Dr. Dirk Schroeder, Köln; Dr. Florian Schuhmacher, Wien; Prof. Dr. Michael Schweitzer, Passau; Prof. Dr. Bruno Simma, München; Dr. Christoph Sobotta, Luxemburg; Dr. Wolfgang Stabenowj", Brüssel; Dr. Peter Stockenhuber, Wien; Prof. Dr. Peter-Tobias Stoll, Heidelberg; Dr. Jörg Philipp Terhechte, Hamburg; Prof. Dr. Christian Tietje, Halle; Dr. Jörg Ukrow, Saarbrücken; Prof. Dr. Christoph Vedder, Augsburg; Dr. Silja Vöneky, Heidelberg; Dr. Reimer Voß | , Wohltorf; Prof. Dr. Gabriela von Wallenberg, Regensburg; Dr. Stephan Wernicke, Luxemburg; Dr. Klaus Wiedner, Brüssel; Daniela Winkler, Tübingen

Abstract: In the current system of EC antitrust enforcement, the European Commission combines the investigative and prosecutorial function with the adjudicative or decision-making function. The purpose of this article is to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of this system, in comparison with a system in which the adjudicative function is separated from the investigative and prosecutorial function, such as the US system in which the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission (under the pre-merger notification programme) investigates and prosecutes before a federal court. The first chapter of the article contains a description of the current EC system, a comparative description of the US system, an overview of the legal debate on the compatibility of the current EC system with Article 6 ECHR and on the scope for change under the current EC Treaty, and an introduction to the wider policy debate. The second chapter deals with accuracy, in particular the question whether there is a risk of prosecutorial bias in a system in which the investigative and prosecutorial function is combined with the adjudicative function. The third chapter deals with administrative cost, in particular the question whether a system in which the European Commission would prosecute before the Community Courts would be more expensive or slower than the current system. The fourth and last chapter contains a summary and conclusion.

Abstract: This article contends that the European Commission’s procedures for enforcing competition law are inadequate and do not match the importance and prestige of the institution as a world leader in antitrust enforcement. The topic is especially urgent due to the heavy consequences of being found to have infringed competition rules, the punitive and adjudicatory nature of the process, and the increasingly important case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The article identifies three weaknesses in the current system: the adoption of a decision finding guilt by 27 political appointees who have not heard or studied the evidence; the lack of any hearing before a decision-maker; and the fact that the same case team in the Commission handles both the investigation of the case and the reaching of a decision. An institution as talented and prestigious as the Commission does not deserve such unique, and uniquely unsatisfactory, procedures. This article suggests some palliatives which would not necessarily involve Treaty change but which would endow Europe’s premier competition authorities with better processes. It is proposed that the determination of the facts be made by a qualified person or trio of persons who would hear both prosecution and defence on equal terms, would reach a conclusion on the factual and legal soundness of the accusations, and would then pass to the College of Commissioners a draft decision for endorsement or rejection. The author submits that the Commission ought to act before it is faced with a negative finding by a competent court about its current practices.