Outlook: Discussion of Reform Proposals
01 Jan 2020-pp 517-559
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the Commission's use of commitment decisions, arguing that the recourse to the Article 9 instead of the Article 7 procedure entails only a modest relaxation of the link between harm and remedy and of the procedural safeguards; it entails also a modest negative impact on legal certainty.
Abstract: So far, the present study has argued that most of the criticism that is levelled at the Commission’s use of commitment decisions is not justified. In the view defended here, the recourse to the Article 9 instead of the Article 7 procedure entails only a modest relaxation of the link between harm and remedy and of the procedural safeguards; it entails also only a modest negative impact on legal certainty. It is submitted that these modest shortcomings are, from an abstract point of view, acceptable in view of the consensual nature of commitments and of their underlying goal of procedural economy. This conclusion applies without prejudice to the necessity to balance the respective costs and benefits of Article 7 and Article 9 in each individual case according to the circumstances of the case at hand.
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01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: The 2011 proposal of the European Court of Justice aiming to increase the number of judges of the General Court has mutated after four years into a complete change of the EU judicial system.
Abstract: The 2011 proposal of the European Court of Justice aiming to increase the number of judges of the General Court has mutated after four years into a complete change of the EU judicial system. This long legislative debate was the first implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the judicial domain. It has revealed different problems – formal and substantial – of the approach of public service reform in the European institutions.
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Journal Article•
5 citations
5 citations
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: Bulst et al. as mentioned in this paper pointed out that some decisions seem to prefer economic efficiency (particularly for the authority itself) to the respect for basic legal requirements, while the discovery of concrete solutions should remain with the market players.
Abstract: The paradigm shift in exercising powers: Foundations, risks and limits for competition authorities The reform of powers in Reg. 1/2003 (Art. 5, 7 ... 9, 17 and 29) and the German Act against Restraints of Competition (§§ 32 ... 32e GWB) led to a paradigm shift in the exercise of such powers by the European Commission and the Bundeskartellamt. In making decisions on restrictive business practices and unilateral abuses of power, the authorities now adapt to new ideas from administrative sciences as well as to the „more economic approach“. The actual decisions (e.g. commitment decisions under Art. 9) are framed in a more future-oriented way, based on a co-operative procedure with the parties, taking consumer welfare into account. This modernisation of the enforcement of competition law is welcome. Yet, the authorities need to respect certain limits. Three problematic areas need to be highlighted: Firstly, some decisions seem to prefer economic efficiency (particularly for the authority itself) to the respect for basic legal requirements. Secondly, some decisions have the flavour of market engineering while the discovery of concrete solutions should remain with the market players. Thirdly, it seems that judicial review of the activities of the competition authorities is systematically undermined. The authorities themselves, but also the law-makers should take care of such concerns. Friedrich Wenzel Bulst* Das ORWI-Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs im Lichte des Unionsrechts In seinem ORWI-Urteil befasst sich der BGH erstmals mit dem Problem der Schadensabw lzung im Kartelldeliktsrecht. Das Urteil hat Anspr che gem Art. 101 AEUV in Verbindung mit § 823 Abs. 2 BGB zum Gegenstand, so dass Unionsrecht anzuwenden war. Es d rfte in und au erhalb der EU den differenziertesten Versuch der Judikative darstellen, das Ph nomen der Schadensweiterw lzung ber die Marktstufen hinweg deliktsrechtlich zu fassen. Der Beitrag untersucht, welche unionsrechtlichen Vorgaben der BGH dabei zu beachten hatte, wie er diese rezipiert und welche Auswirkungen diese Rezeption auf die k nftige praktische Bedeutung des Einwands der Schadensabw lzung haben wird. Inhaltsverzeichnis I. Hintergrund II. Das ORWI-Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs III. Unionsrechtliche Vorgaben f r die L sung des Problems der Schadensabw lzung 1. Rechtsgrundlage und Koh renzgebot 2. Anspruchsberechtigung 3. Kausalit t (nach Danfoss) 4. Schadensumfang 5. Schadensabw lzung und Beweislast IV. Rezeption des Unionsrechts durch den Bundesgerichtshof 1. Anspruchsberechtigung 2. Schadensabw lzung und Beweislast: Erfordernis der Schadensfreiheit 2.1 Unionsrechtlicher Ursprung? 2.2 Das Schadensfreiheitserfordernis vor dem Hintergrund des deutschen Schadensersatzrechts 2.3 K nftige praktische Bedeutung des Einwands der Schadensabw lzung 3. Sekund re Darlegungslast 4. Kausalit t und Schadensnachweis durch Folgeabnehmer * Dr., iur., LL.M. (Yale), Europ ische Kommission, Juristischer Dienst, Br ssel. Der Beitrag gibt die pers nliche Auffassung des Verfassers wieder und vermag die Kommission nicht zu binden. Der Verfasser dankt Cathrin Bauer-Bulst und Christian Vollrath f r kritische Anmerkungen.
4 citations
Journal Article•
4 citations
01 Jan 2011
4 citations