Ownership structures and effects of related lending and loan guarantees on firm performance in business groups
07 May 2018-Vol. 9, pp 77-86
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the ownership structures in business groups and studied the effects of related lending and loan guarantees on firm performance in such business groups through a panel data regression with fixed effects.
Abstract: This study identifies a sample of listed Indian business group firms, which exhibit an increasing trend in leverage, related lending and loan guarantees. Business groups in India, primarily adopt pyramidal structure in which decision making is done through control rights approach. The paper examines the ownership structures in business groups and studies the effects of related lending and loan guarantees on firm performance in such business groups through a panel data regression with fixed effects. The regression results suggest that lending and loan guarantees to related parties affect the operating performance of group firms positively. The relationship has been found to be significant for most of the categories of business groups studied for the two measures of firm performance, namely gross profit to asset ratio and return on assets. However, their effect on market value is found to be negative, leading to an inference that such deals are taken adversely by the market.
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30 Sep 2020TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the relationship of board structure, ownership structure, and bank-specific variables with bank performance and value, and established a link between corporate governance attributes with the performance and market value of banks.
Abstract: The study aims to examine the relationship of board structure, ownership structure, and bank-specific variables with bank performance and value. Panel Data is collected from eighteen conventional commercial banks of Pakistan for the time period of 2012 to 2017. The analysis is carried out by employing pooled OLS model estimation, descriptive statistics, and correlation analysis, using Eviews-9, with 108 observations. The board size and board independence are found to have a determinant effect on the bank performance and value. This implies that the larger boards are more likely to improve corporate performance. Also, an ample number of independent directors, in the board of directors, result in better bank performance. The study also reveals that ownership structure does not contribute directly in bank performance and value; however, foreign shareholding is found to have positive relationship with the value of banks which reduces agency problems. Additionally, adequate capital reserves help banks sustain in the market while the size of banks and non-performing loans contribute to bank performance. The study established a link between corporate governance attributes with the performance and market value of banks while taking bank-specific variables as well. This study has an implication for almost all the stakeholders in banks i.e. corresponding banks, shareholders, central banks, practitioners, and academicians. The study includes only conventional commercial banks and can be extended to study the overall financial sector in a setting or in a comparative manner.
7 citations
Cites background from "Ownership structures and effects of..."
...The firms in concentrated ownership are managed by large shareholders and owners and managers are alike hence the problems of the agency are likely to be limited Maheshwari & Gupta (Maheshwari & Gupta, 2018)....
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References
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TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Abstract: This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
14,563 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
Abstract: We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means’s image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash f low rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.
8,270 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect.
Abstract: This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.
3,190 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect.
Abstract: This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.
2,910 citations
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2,357 citations
"Ownership structures and effects of..." refers background in this paper
...Khanna and Palepu (1997) proposed institutional voids theory and suggested that a business group is a successful organizational structure in emerging economies due to the fact that several institutional voids can be filled by groups after internalizing many functions....
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