Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions.
TL;DR: In this article, Frank shows that looking out for Number One may require that we look out for others, and he finds evidence in our emotional acts, like the blush on telling a lie, they can serve as hard-to-fake signals of a commitment to social values.
Abstract: The \"Me\" generation has justified itself by appealing to social scientists who see selfishness as the only rational basis for action. But what are we to make of selfless acts in business, personal life, even politics? In this provocative book, Robert Frank shows us that looking out for Number One may require that we look out for others, too. He finds his evidence in our emotional acts. Like the blush on telling a lie, they can serve as hard-to-fake signals of a commitment to social values. We recognize these signs; we know people we trust; and if we can identify trustworthy fellows we can reject those who do not merit our faith.
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TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium, and that if payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutualmax and mutualmin outcomes; if payoff are large, fairness equilibrium are roughly a set of Nash equilibra.
Abstract: People like to help those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes rejecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person maximizes the other's material payoffs, and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other's payoffs. It is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium. If payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of Nash equilibria. Several economic examples are considered and possible welfare implications of fairness are explored. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
4,981 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the developmental process of cooperative interorganizational relationships (IORs) that entail transaction-specific investments in deals that cannot be fully specified or controlled by the parties in advance of their execution.
Abstract: This article examines the developmental process of cooperative interorganizational relationships (IORs) that entail transaction-specific investments in deals that cannot be fully specified or controlled by the parties in advance of their execution. A process framework is introduced that focuses on formal, legal, and informal social-psychological processes by which organizational parties jointly negotiate, commit to. and execute their relationship in ways that achieve efficient and equitable outcomes and internal solutions to conflicts when they arise. The framework is elaborated with a set of propositions that explain how and why cooperative IORs emerge, evolve, and dissolve. The propositions have academic implications for enriching interorganizational relationships, transaction cost economics, agency theories, and practical implications for managing the relationship journey.
4,904 citations
Book•
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15 Jun 1993
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the role of emotion in the development of the human brain and its role in human emotion processing, and propose a framework to understand the relationship between human emotion and the brain.
Abstract: Part 1. Interdisciplinary Foundations. R.C. Solomon, The Philosophy of Emotions. P.N. Stearns, History of Emotions: Issues of Change and Impact. J.E. Stets, J.H. Turner, The Sociology of Emotions. J. Panksepp, The Affective Brain and Core Consciousness: How Does Neural Activity Generate Emotional Feelings? N.H. Frijda, The Psychologist's Point of View. L.S. Greenberg, The Clinical Application of Emotion in Psychotherapy. P.N. Johnson-Laird, K. Oatley, Emotions, Music, and Literature. J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, The Evolutionary Psychology of the Emotions and Their Relationship to Internal Regulatory Variables. R. Loewenstein, G. Loewenstein, The Role of Emotion in Economic Behavior. Part 2. Biological and Neurophysiological Approaches to Emotion. J.E. LeDoux, E.A. Phelps, Emotional Networks in the Brain. J.T. Larsen, G.G. Berntson, K.M. Poehlmann, T.A. Ito, J.T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Emotion. J. Bachorowski, M.J. Owren, Vocal Expressions of Emotion. D. Matsumoto, D. Keltner, M.N. Shiota, M. O'Sullivan, M. Frank, Facial Expressions of Emotion. J.M. Haviland-Jones, P.J. Wilson, A "Nose" for Emotion: Emotional Information and Challenges in Odors and Semiochemicals. T.D. Wager, L. Feldman Barrett, E. Bliss-Moreau, K. Lindquist, S. Duncan, H. Kober, J. Joseph, M. Davidson, J. Mize, The Neuroimaging of Emotion. A.D. Craig, Interoception and Emotion: A Neuroanatomical Perspective. Part 3. Developmental Changes. L.A. Camras, S.S. Fatani, The Development of Facial Expressions: Current Perspectives on Infant Emotions. M. Lewis, The Emergence of Human Emotions. P.L. Harris, Children's Understanding of Emotion. C. Saarni, The Interface of Emotional Development with Social Context. S.C. Widen, J.A. Russell, Young Children's Understanding of Others' Emotions. A.S. Walker-Andrews, Intermodal Emotional Processes in Infancy. C. Magai, Long-Lived Emotions: A Lifecourse Perspective on Emotional Development. Part 4. Social Perspectives. L.R. Brody, J.A. Hall, Gender and Emotion in Context. R.A. Shweder, J. Haidt, R. Horton, C. Joseph, The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions: Ancient and Renewed. E.R. Smith, D.M. Mackie, Intergroup Emotions. M.L. Hoffman, Empathy and Prosocial Behavior. A.H. Fischer, A.S.R. Manstead, Social Functions of Emotion. Part 5. Personality Issues. R.E. Lucas, E. Diener, Subjective Well-Being. J.E. Bates, J.A. Goodnight, J.E. Fite, Temperament and Emotion. J.J. Gross, Emotion Regulation. K.A. Lindquist, L. Feldman Barrett, Emotional Complexity. Part 6. Cognitive Factors. P. Salovey, B.T. Detweiler-Bedell, J.B. Detweiler-Bedell, J.D. Mayer, Emotional Intelligence. A.M. Isen, Some Ways in which Positive Affect Influences Decision Making and Problem Solving. N.L. Stein, M.W. Hernandez, T. Trabasso, Advances in Modeling Emotion and Thought: The Importance of Development, On-Line and Multilevel Analyses. P.M. Niedenthal, Emotion Concepts. E.A. Kensinger, D.L. Schacter, Memory and Emotion. M. Minsky, A Framework for Representing Emotional States. G.L. Clore, A. Ortony, Appraisal Theories: How Cognition Shapes Affect into Emotion. Part 7. Health and Emotions. M.A. Diefenbach, S.M. Miller, M. Porter, E. Peters, M. Stefanek, H. Leventhal, Emotions and Health Behavior: A Self-Regulation Perspective. M.E. Kemeny, A. Shestyuk, Emotions, the Neuroendocrine and Immune Systems, and Health. N.S. Consedine, Emotions and Health. A.M. Kring, Emotion Disturbances as Transdiagnostic Processes in Psychopathology. Part 8. Select Emotions. A. Ohman, Fear and Anxiety: Overlaps and Dissociations. E.A. Lemerise, K.A. Dodge, The Development of Anger and Hostile Interactions. M. Lewis, Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt. P. Rozin, J. Haidt, C.R. McCauley, Disgust. B.L. Fredrickson, M.A. Cohn, Positive Emotions. G.A. Bonanno, L. Goorin, K.G. Coifman, Sadness and Grief.
3,892 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: It is shown experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation, and that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punished.
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the sel®sh motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation ¯ourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
3,813 citations
TL;DR: Promising strategies for addressing critical problems of the environment include dialogue among interested parties, officials, and scientists; complex, redundant, and layered institutions; a mix of institutional types; and designs that facilitate experimentation, learning, and change.
Abstract: Human institutions—ways of organizing activities—affect the resilience of the environment. Locally evolved institutional arrangements governed by stable communities and buffered from outside forces have sustained resources successfully for centuries, although they often fail when rapid change occurs. Ideal conditions for governance are increasingly rare. Critical problems, such as transboundary pollution, tropical deforestation, and climate change, are at larger scales and involve nonlocal influences. Promising strategies for addressing these problems include dialogue among interested parties, officials, and scientists; complex, redundant, and layered institutions; a mix of institutional types; and designs that facilitate experimentation, learning, and change.
3,706 citations