Q1. What have the authors contributed in "Paying medicare advantage plans: to level or tilt the playing field" ?
Many analysts recommend equalizing Medicare ’ s subsidy across the options – referred to in policy circles as a “ level playing field. ” This paper studies the normative question of how to set the level of the benchmark, applying the versatile model developed by Einav and Finkelstein ( EF ) to Medicare. The authors also study other reasons to tilt the field: the relative efficiency of MA vs. TM, market power of MA plans, and institutional features of the way Medicare determines subsidies and premiums. Acknowledgements: Research for this paper was supported by the National Institute of Aging ( P01-AG032952 ). The first author would like also to thank the Henry Crown Institute of Business Research in Israel at Tel Aviv University for its financial support. The authors are grateful to Mike Chernew, Liran Einav, Randy Ellis, Amy Finkelstein, Bruce Landon, Tim Layton, Eran Politzer, Michael McWilliams, Joseph Newhouse and Richard van Kleef for helpful discussion. The views in the paper are the authors ’ own.