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Book ChapterDOI

Perfect and essentially perfect authentication schemes

Albrecht Beutelspacher1
13 Apr 1987-pp 167-170
TL;DR: In this chapter, a good guy X looks for his chance to alter M in his favour and a bad guy A authenticates the message M in order to make the bad guy's life difficult.
Abstract: Suppose that A wants to send a message M to B It is important that B receives the message without any alteration On the other hand, a bad guy X looks for his chance to alter M in his favour In order t o make the bad guy's life difficult, A authenticates the message M For this, A and B have to agree on an authentication function f and a secret key K The function f has M and K as its input, and the authenticator (also called message authentication code) f(M,K) as its output

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Citations
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Book
01 Jan 1991
TL;DR: This protocol uses a simple 'swapping' technique which can be applied to many zero knowledge proofs (arguments) and obtains a divertible zero-knowledge proof for graph isomorphism.
Abstract: We present a divertible zero-knowledge proof (argument) for SAT under the assumption that probabilistic encryption homomorphisms exist. Our protocol uses a simple 'swapping' technique which can be applied to many zero knowledge proofs (arguments). In particular we obtain a divertible zero-knowledge proof for graph isomorphism. The consequences for abuse-free zero-knowledge proofs are also considered.

202 citations

Patent
16 May 1996
TL;DR: In this article, a rolling code transmitter is used in a security system for providing secure encrypted RF transmission comprising an interleaved trinary bit fixed code and rolling code, where a receiver demodulates the encrypted RF transmissions and recovers the fixed codes and rolling codes.
Abstract: A rolling code transmitter is useful in a security system for providing secure encrypted RF transmission comprising an interleaved trinary bit fixed code and rolling code. A receiver demodulates the encrypted RF transmission and recovers the fixed code and rolling code. Upon comparison of the fixed and rolling codes with stored codes and determining that the signal has emanated from an authorized transmitter, a signal is generated to actuate an electric motor to open or close a movable barrier.

135 citations

Book ChapterDOI
25 May 1988
TL;DR: The aim of this paper is to deal with codes having unconditional security, which means that the security is independent of the computing power.
Abstract: We deal with authentication / secrecy codes having unconditional security. Besides some new results for a “spoofing attack of order L”, we give several constructions using finite incidence structures (designs, generalized quadrangles).

52 citations

Book ChapterDOI
21 Feb 1996
TL;DR: The HKM / HFX cryptosystem is proposed for standardization at the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector Study Group 8 and is designed to provide authenticity and confidentiality of FAX messages at a commercial level of security.
Abstract: The HKM / HFX cryptosystem is proposed for standardization at the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector Study Group 8. It is designed to provide authenticity and confidentiality of FAX messages at a commercial level of security. In addition, the HKM / HFX cryptosystem is designed for unrestricted export.

45 citations

Proceedings Article
M. Soet1
01 Apr 1988
TL;DR: Besides some new results for a "spoofing attack of order L", several constructions using finite incidence structures (designs, generalized quadrangles) are given.
Abstract: We deal with authentication / secrecy codes having unconditional security Besides some new results for a "spoofing attack of order L" we give several constructions using finite incidence structures (designs, generalized quadrangles)

39 citations

References
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Book
01 Jan 1968

1,788 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: If the key can take K values, then an optimal strategy for B secures him a probability of an undetected substitution ≪ K−1, and several encoding functions Φ(.,.) are given, some of which achieve this bound.
Abstract: We consider a new kind of coding problem, which has applications in a variety of situations. A message x is to be encoded using a key m to form an encrypted message y = Φ(x, m), which is then supplied to a user G. G knows m and so can calculate x. It is desired to choose Φ(.,.) so as to protect G against B, who knows x, y, and Φ(.,.) (but not m); B may substitute a false message y' for y. It is shown that if the key can take K values, then an optimal strategy for B secures him a probability of an undetected substitution ≪ K−1. Several encoding functions Φ(.,.) are given, some of which achieve this bound.

396 citations