Postmaterialism in a Social Democratic State An Analysis of the Distinctness and Congruity of the Inglehart Value Syndrome in Norway
TL;DR: In this paper, the status of postmaterialist syndrome in Norway is established empirically based on a national sample survey carried out in 1981 (N = 1, 170), and the analysis focuses on two major questions: the distinctness of post materialism in a left-right context, and the congruity between different value domains.
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to establish empirically the status of Ronald Inglehart's postmaterialist syndrome in Norway. As a prototypical social democratic state, and one of the only European countries yet to be adequately tested for postmaterialism, Norway represents a particularly interesting case for the Inglehart thesis. On the basis of a national sample survey carried out in 1981 (N = 1, 170), the analysis focuses on two major questions: the distinctness of postmaterialism in a left-right context, and the congruity between different value domains. Of particular importance is the finding that there exists a postmaterialist profile for democratic values that is much more distinct than the literature has allowed for up to now.
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TL;DR: The publics of different societies are characterized by durable cultural orientations that have major political and economic consequences as mentioned in this paper, and those societies that rank high on this syndrome are much likelier to be stable democracies than those that rank low. But in those countries that attained high levels of prosperity, there eventually emerged postmaterialist values that tended to neutralize the emphasis on economic accumulation that earlier characterized Protestant societies.
Abstract: The publics of different societies are characterized by durable cultural orientations that have major political and economic consequences. Throughout the period from 1973 to 1987, given nationalities consistently showed relative high or low levels of a “civic culture”—a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order. Those societies that rank high on this syndrome are much likelier to be stable democracies than those that rank low. Economic development and cultural change are linked in a complex pattern of reciprocal influence. Originally, Protestantism may have facilitated the rise of capitalism, leading to economic development, which in turn favored the emergence of the civic culture. But in those countries that attained high levels of prosperity, there eventually emerged postmaterialist values that tended to neutralize the emphasis on economic accumulation that earlier characterized Protestant societies.
591 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that while most major political parties in Western countries tend to be aligned along a social class-based axis, support for new political movements and new political parties largely reflects the tension between materialist and postmaterialist goals and values.
Abstract: Ronald Inglehart has argued that, while most of the major political parties in Western countries tend to be aligned along a social class–based axis, support for new political movements and new political parties largely reflects the tension between materialist and postmaterialist goals and values. This has presented something of a dilemma to the traditional parties, and helps account for the decline of social-class voting. Scott Flanagan takes issue with Inglehart's interpretation in several particulars. Although their views converge in many respects, Flanagan urges conceptual reorientations and adumbrates a different interpretation of post–World War II political development in Europe and Japan.
577 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a time series analysis controlling for the joint effects of inflation and unemployment demonstrates that there is a statistically significant trend toward postmaterialism in all eight West European countries for which data are available over the past two decades.
Abstract: Confirming Inglehart's prediction (1971) of an intergenerational shift toward postmaterialist values, a time series analysis controlling for the joint effects of inflation and unemployment demonstrates that there is a statistically significant trend toward postmaterialism in all eight West European countries for which data are available over the past two decades. Evidence from the 1981–83 and 1990–91 World Values Surveys indicates that this value shift occurs in any society that has experienced sufficient economic growth in recent decades so that the preadult experiences of younger birth cohorts were significantly more secure than those of older cohorts. Large intergenerational differences tend to be found in societies that have experienced rapid growth in gross national product per capita, and are negligible in societies that have had little or no growth. Accordingly, postmaterialism increased in 18 of the 20 societies on five continents for which we have comparable data over the past decade.
356 citations
TL;DR: In the early stages of industrial society, economic factors tend to play a dominant role in early stages, in advanced industrial society their relative importance diminishes; and self-expression, "belonging" and the quality of the physical and social environment become increasingly important.
Abstract: Throughout this century, the Marxist Left in Europe has emphasized an economic interpretation of history, with state ownership of the means of production as the key element in their prescription for society. Political polarization is depicted as a direct reflection of social class conflict, with the working class the natural base of support for the Left. This diagnosis has become increasingly out of touch with reality in recent years, which have seen the decline of orthodox Marxist parties in Western Europe and the diminishing credibility of the ideology on which they are based. For as advanced industrial society emerges, economic determinism provides a progressively less adequate analysis of society, and class-based parties and the policies they advocate become less central to politics. Economic development reduces the impact of economic determinism. Though economic factors tend to play a dominant role in the early stages of industrial society, in advanced industrial society their relative importance diminishes; and self-expression, ‘belonging’ and the quality of the physical and social environment become increasingly important.
130 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that postmaterialist values significantly increase the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism, while materialist values not, with controls in place for partisanship, ideology, and other democratic norms.
Abstract: Understanding how people engage in politics, and what motivates them to do so, has been an ongoing concern in the social science literature. Over the past decade, scholarly interest in boycotts and buycotts, which collectively comprise political consumerism—the deliberate purchase or avoidance of products for political or ethical reasons—has increased. However, these activities not been well conceptualized, and it is not clear what motivates people to engage in political consumerism. In this paper, I theorize that postmaterialist values increase the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism in the United States. To test this expectation, I use original, nationally representative U.S. survey data, and I find that postmaterialist values significantly increase the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism, while materialist values not, with controls in place for partisanship, ideology, and other democratic norms.
89 citations
Cites background from "Postmaterialism in a Social Democra..."
...These variables include ideology, partisanship, and support for democratic norms (Davis, 2000; DeGraaf & Evans, 1996; Lafferty & Knutsen, 1985)....
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...On one hand, several researchers argue that Inglehart’s measure is a proxy for ideology; whereas conservatives tend to endorse materialist values, liberals tend to favor postmaterialist values (DeGraaf & Evans, 1996; Lafferty & Knutsen, 1985)....
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...…numerous concerns about the validity and reliability of Inglehart’s measure of postmaterialism (Brooks & Manza, 1994; Davis, 2000; Davis & Davenport, 1999; DeGraaf & Evans, 1996; Duch & Taylor, 1993; Flanagan, 1979, 1980; Flanagan & Lee, 2003; Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Lafferty & Knutsen, 1985)....
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08 Mar 2015
3,590 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that the value priorities of the more affluent postwar group do contrast with those of groups raised under conditions of lesser economic and physical security, suggesting that the age-group differences reflect the persistence of pre-adult experiences, rather than life cycle effects.
Abstract: A transformation of basic political priorities may be taking place in Western Europe. I hypothesize: (1) that people have a variety of needs which are given high or low priority according to their degree of fulfillment: people act on behalf of their most important unsatisfied need, giving relatively little attention to needs already satisfied—except that (2) people tend to retain the value priorities adopted in their formative years throughout adult life. In contemporary Western Europe, needs for physical safety and economic security are relatively well satisfied for an unprecedentedly large share of the population. Younger, more affluent groups have been formed entirely under these conditions, and seem relatively likely to give top priority to fulfillment of needs which remain secondary to the older and less affluent majority of the population. Needs for belonging and intellectual and esthetic self-fulfillment (characterized as “post-bourgeois” values) may take top priorities among the former group. Survey data from six countries indicate that the value priorities of the more affluent postwar group do contrast with those of groups raised under conditions of lesser economic and physical security. National patterns of value priorities correspond to the given nation's economic history, moreover, suggesting that the age-group differences reflect the persistence of preadult experiences, rather than life cycle effects. The distinctive value priorities imply distinctive political behavior—being empirically linked with preferences for specific political issues and political parties in a predictable fashion. If the respective age cohorts retain their present value priorities, we would expect long-term shifts in the political goals and patterns of political partisanship prevailing in these societies.
1,334 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test the hypothesis that postwar affluence led to an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist values among Western publics, and analyzes the consequences of the economic uncertainty prevailing since 1973.
Abstract: This article tests the hypothesis that postwar affluence led to an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist values among Western publics, and analyzes the consequences of the economic uncertainty prevailing since 1973. The young emphasize Post-Materialist values more than the old. Time-series data indicate that this reflects generational change far more than aging effects, but that the recession of the mid-1970s also produced significant period effects. As Post-Materialists aged, they moved out of the student ghetto and became a predominant influence among young technocrats, contributing to the rise of a “New Class.” They furnish the ideologues and core support for the environmental, zero-growth and antinuclear movements; and their opposition to those who give top priority to reindustrialization and rearmament constitutes a distinctive and persisting dimension of political cleavage.
656 citations