En la presente tesis se aborda el sistema de libertad condicional espanol con referencia a otros sistemas de liberacion condicional foraneos. Este estudio se realiza desde distintas perspectivas: la historica, la relativa a su justificacion, la juridica y la de aplicacion practica. En primer lugar, desde una perspectiva historica, se trata el nacimiento de distintos sistemas de libertad condicional en el contexto occidental, en los planos cultural, legislativo y de practica penitenciaria. En segundo lugar se realiza una justificacion de la libertad condicional por una parte, acudiendo a las principales doctrinas de justificacion de la pena. Por otra parte, se trata el fundamento de la libertad condicional de acuerdo a la Constitucion espanola de 1978, con especial atencion a los articulo 25.2 y 15 de dicho texto. A continuacion, a luz del fundamento constitucional, se realiza un analisis juridico de la institucion. Finalmente, respecto a la practica de la libertad condicional, se incluye un estudio empirico cuantitativo, en el que se analiza la incidencia de una serie de variables de tipo personal, penal y penitenciario en la concesion de esta medida.

/pdf/el-modelo-de-libertad-condicional-espanol-4r3wosrto4.pdf

Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons

El Modelo de libertad condicional español

With strong interest and support coming from government agencies, the search for “criminal types” is again popular. Several examples are reviewed, and it is suggested that their basis is more mythologic than scientific. This “New Phrenology” is viewed in historical and social perspective, and implications, including the dangers of preventive detention in the name of violence prediction and treatment, are discussed.

Perspectives on the medical research of violence

Impositions on others need justification. Punishment we generally justify as a just or deserved response to wrongdoing or crime. What about quarantine and preventive detention, where, it would seem, there has been no wrongdoing to justify the imposition? It is tempting to argue that both are justified by reference to the social dangerousness of their occasioning conditions - in the case of quarantine, an easily communicable disease; in the case of preventive detention, the likelihood that a person will engage in culpably dangerous conduct. Yet neither of these responses is trouble free. Predictions of dangerousness are notoriously unreliable and, in the absence of some actual harm, impositions based on mere dangerousness might be thought violative of autonomy. In this exchange, Michael Corrado and Michael Davis address these problematic questions. The exchange was prompted originally by a symposium sponsored by the American Philosophical Association, in which both Davis and Corrado participated. The debate here focuses on an argument which goes as follows: If a person knows that he will harm others (either intentionally or because of a contagious disease), he has an obligation to have himself detained/quarantined. If he fails to act on this obligation, he can be charged with reckless endangerment and punished. If, at the end of the period of punishment, he remains dangerous but is still unwiring to detain himself, he can be charged and punished again - and so on, indefinitely. Preventive detention is detention of dangerous persons to prevent future crimes. The persons to be detained may or may not have committed crimes in the past; the crimes to be prevented may or may not be presently intended. Under the law of most western countries, preventive detention is limited to those who have demonstrated their dangerousness by committing crimes in the past; but in theory it need not be so, and in fact it is now possible in the United States to preventively detain someone before trial,(1) which means before he has been convicted of any crime. In addition, some sexual predator laws apparently provide for preventive detention without a prior conviction.(2) Those so detained may have no present intention of committing any crimes and indeed may have every intention of remaining within the law. If, in spite of that, it is more or less reliably predicted that they will commit violent crimes, then they are candidates for preventive detention. A single instance of incarceration may be an example of both punishment and preventive detention. If Jones has committed a crime, we may imprison him as much to keep him off the streets as to punish him. Pure preventive detention is incarceration that does not also purport to be punishment. Someone who has been convicted of no prior crime, for example, if he is detained to prevent future crimes, has been subjected to pure preventive detention. But so has the person who has been convicted of a crime, if he is detained beyond the completion of his penal sentence. Preventive detention is not commitment, and it is not quarantine. Those who are involuntarily committed must be both insane and dangerous; in general they are not culpable for their dangerous acts. Preventive detention is aimed precisely at those who are competent and whose future violent acts will be intentional and voluntary, and therefore culpable. Quarantine, or isolation of the contagiously ill, is detention designed to prevent the spread of diseases. Such diseases must be easy to communicate, and it must be difficult for the diseased person even with the greatest care to avoid spreading them. One way in which preventive detention is different from quarantine is this: the communication of the disease that quarantine aims at preventing will not be due to any culpable act of the diseased person. Indeed, if someone with a contagious disease were to intend maliciously to spread the disease, preventive detention would be more appropriate for him than quarantine. …

Punishment, quarantine, and preventive detention

We interviewed 203 juvenile inmates housed in a juvenile corrections facility in New Orleans, using a revised version of the Rand instrument developed by Chaiken and Chaiken. The purpose was to demonstrate how prediction scales, used in the past to identify high-rate offenders for selective incapacitation, actually may be more suitable for identifying low-rate offenders for selective release. Our results show that the prediction scale performed worse at identifying high-rate offenders but better at identifying low-rate offenders. We discuss the policy implications of our findings.

The idea of selective release

The recent amendment to Law 18.216 completes a silent process of insertion of actuarial technologies of risk prediction of recidivism among offenders. These technologies are closely linked to changes that Anglo-Saxon penal systems have experienced in the past 30 years. This paper aims to explain the origins of these technologies, their content and what are the main problems and challenges that their introduction poses to the penal system. This paper will contrast two types of explanatory speeches of risk paradigm that, while epistemologically different, allow us to have a more complete picture of the analyzed scenario.

/pdf/origen-del-paradigma-de-riesgo-4kqge5eliq.pdf

Origen del paradigma de riesgo

/pdf/prediction-of-criminal-conduct-and-preventive-confinement-of-17zvvvwnno.pdf

Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons

Citations

El Modelo de libertad condicional español

Perspectives on the medical research of violence

Punishment, quarantine, and preventive detention

The idea of selective release

Origen del paradigma de riesgo

Related Papers (5)

The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness

Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom

The Future of Imprisonment

The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: Some Estimates

Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques