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Journal Article

Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons

01 Jan 1972-Buffalo Law Review-Vol. 21, Iss: 3, pp 717
About: This article is published in Buffalo Law Review.The article was published on 1972-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 35 citations till now.

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The determinate sentencing proposals merely displace discretion to other areas of the criminal justice system where it is less visible and, hence, less subject to control as mentioned in this paper, which is undesirable.

4 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Corrado as mentioned in this paper argued that preventive detention is morally no more problematic than quarantining the contagious to protect public health, and he also discussed preventive detention, demolishing a defense of preventive detention relying on the analogy between quarantine and preventive detention.
Abstract: The subject of "Arresting the White Death"[1] was civil confinement for treatment of tuberculosis, a particularly burdensome form of quarantine; the paper's primary purpose was to understand how such quarantine could be morally justified. Because of the obvious analogy between quarantine and preventive detention, I also discussed preventive detention, demolishing a defense of preventive detention relying on that analogy. So, of course I was surprised to find Corrado criticizing my defense of preventive detention - more surprised when I realized I had a defense to criticize. How did I end up defending preventive detention? What does the answer to that question tell us about Corrado's argument and mine? In the course of trying to answer these questions, I shall argue: (a) that Corrado has misunderstood my defense of preventive detention; (b) that his misunderstanding makes most of his criticism beside the point; and (c) that my defense, though philosophically interesting, leaves most of the important questions open. Some Basic Distinctions Almost two decades ago, Ferdinand Schoeman published a paper arguing that detention of potential criminals to prevent crime is morally no more problematic than quarantining the contagious to protect public health. Though much reprinted since, the paper has received little criticism. No doubt the practical ignored it because Schoeman did not address their problems. His target was philosophical, the moral criticism that preventive detention violated a person's right to punishment. Schoeman's argument seemed to show that the right to punishment, if it existed at all, did not count for much. Since the right to punishment, then associated with Herbert Morris, underwrote much of the revival of retributivism, we would expect Schoeman's argument to have provoked philosophical retributivists. It did not. Why not? My guess is that they found it paradoxical enough to consign to that category of low-priority puzzle of which Anselm's Ontological Argument is the exemplar: hard to prove invalid for interesting, if technical, reasons, but certain to be proved invalid sooner or later. "The White Death" could not do the same because Schoeman's argument, insofar as it did not quiet doubts about the moral justification of preventive detention, raised doubts about the moral justification of quarantine. By "preventive detention," I mean holding a person (a rational agent) against his will to prevent him from committing a crime. Presupposing that the detainee is rational, preventive detention differs substantially from commitment for mental illness or incompetency (which presupposes that the committed is not fully rational). Preventive detention may be civil or criminal. Civil preventive detention uses procedures like those of an ordinary incompetency hearing. Criminal preventive detention uses the procedures of the criminal law. While the place of civil preventive detention may be different from that of criminal, it need not be. Even criminal preventive detention is (as such) not punishment. Like preventive detention, quarantine is an extensive interference with the liberty of some rational agents to protect others.[2] Quarantine differs from preventive detention in what it is supposed to protect others from. Preventive detention is supposed to protect others from the serious crimes that the detainee would otherwise commit; quarantine, to protect others from serious disease the quarantined would otherwise spread. Quarantine also differs from preventive detention in apparent moral status. While preventive detention has always seemed morally problematic, quarantine generally has not. What Schoeman argued was that because quarantine and preventive detention differ in no morally significant way (except apparent moral status), preventive detention is morally no more problematic than quarantine. The apparent difference in moral status is only that, an apparent difference. …

3 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
16 Aug 2005
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors give an idea of some of the most current obstacles that confront the undertaking of prediction of violence in general, and some additional thoughts follow, based on the author's earlier work on the subject.
Abstract: Discussions of dangerousness generally tend to be concentrated on the danger of violence in particular. The effective prediction of violent behaviour, if, indeed, it is the best guage of the objectivity of our knowledge of this phenomenon, is nonetheless an extremely difficult task. This article gives us an idea of some of the most current obstacles that confront the undertaking of prediction. Some additional thoughts follow, based on the author's earlier work on the subject.

3 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The relationship between changes in delinquency prevalence over time and prediction error is developed and discussed in this paper, where published data from a 21-year British longitudinal study are used to exemplify the formal relationships that are derived.
Abstract: The relationship between changes in delinquency prevalence over time and prediction error are developed and discussed. Published data from a 21-year British longitudinal study are used to exemplify the formal relationships that are derived. Statistically, as prevalence increases, there will be a relative increase in false negative errors and a decrease in false positive errors; the relationship is independent of prediction accuracy. Substantively, this means that as deliquency prevalence increases, imperfect prediction models will move toward "missing" more actual delinquents (increasing false negatives) and "mistaking" fewer actual nondelinquents (decreasing false positives). Some characterizations of differentially weighting the costs of false negative and false positive errors are presented in terms of intervention and nonintervention policies and decisions.

3 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Oct 1979

2 citations