This article considers what can be learned regarding the ethical acceptability of intrusive interventions intended to halt the spread of infectious disease (‘Infection Control’ measures) from existing ethical discussion of intrusive interventions used to prevent criminal conduct (‘Crime Control’ measures). The main body of the article identifies and briefly describes six objections that have been advanced against Crime Control, and considers how these might apply to Infection Control. The final section then draws out some more general lessons from the foregoing analysis for the ethical acceptability of different kinds of Infection Control.

/pdf/infection-control-for-third-party-benefit-lessons-from-52zaoqe5sb.pdf

Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons

Infection control for third-party benefit: lessons from criminal justice

In the District of Columbia, as in many state jurisdictions, psychiatrists are likely to encounter the issue of testifying in a court regarding their “predictions of future dangerousness” in two situations: (a) during the process of involuntary civil commitment or commitment after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal case and (b) upon petition for a conditional or unconditional release after commitment in a criminal case [1ߝ3] The criteria for civil commitment in the District of Columbia are mental illness and a finding that the mentally ill individual is likely to injure himself or others because of his mental illness [4] The standard is similar after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity [5, 6]

Alternatives in psychiatric testimony on dangerousness.

Incapacitation Studies: A Review and Commentary

/pdf/individual-prevention-in-criminal-procedure-5abp5vcgus.pdf

Individual prevention in criminal procedure

There is a popular saying: “If you do the crime, then you must do the time.” Here the word “time” refers to the time spent in prison as punishment for the crime in question. And so the saying means this: if you commit a crime of some sort, then you must suffer the associated punishment. It’s an interesting saying. I’m not sure just what is intended by it. Is it that, if you choose to commit a crime, then you ought to be prepared in advance to undergo the punishment? That you ought to accept that the punishment is justified? Or simply that you ought to undergo it, whether you are prepared for it or accept it? Well, no matter. I won’t try to settle this issue here, interesting as it is, because that’s not the topic of this paper. I mention it only because my title may have suggested it. The “time” in the title refers not to the time spent in prison, that is, to the duration of punishment, but rather to the time at which punishment is initiated. As a matter of at least practical necessity, this time is distinct from the time at which the crime at issue is committed. The question to be addressed here is this: what relevance, if any, does this discrepancy in times have to the moral justification of punishment?

Time and Punishment

/pdf/prediction-of-criminal-conduct-and-preventive-confinement-of-17zvvvwnno.pdf

Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons

Citations

Infection control for third-party benefit: lessons from criminal justice

Alternatives in psychiatric testimony on dangerousness.

Incapacitation Studies: A Review and Commentary

Individual prevention in criminal procedure

Time and Punishment

Related Papers (5)

The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness

Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom

The Future of Imprisonment

The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: Some Estimates

Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques