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Journal ArticleDOI

Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics

Timothy W. Crawford
- 18 Mar 2011 - 
- Vol. 35, Iss: 4, pp 155-189
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TLDR
The wedge strategies that are likely to have significant effects use selective accommodation (concessions, compensations, and other inducements) to detach and neutralize potential adversaries.
Abstract
States use wedge strategies to prevent hostile alliances from forming or to disperse those that have formed. These strategies can cause power alignments that are otherwise unlikely to occur, and thus have significant consequences for international politics. How do such strategies work and what conditions promote their success? The wedge strategies that are likely to have significant effects use selective accommodation—concessions, compensations, and other inducements—to detach and neutralize potential adversaries. These kinds of strategies play important roles in the statecraft of both defensive and offensive powers. Defenders use selective accommodation to balance against a primary threat by neutralizing lesser ones that might ally with it. Expansionists use selective accommodation to prevent or break up blocking coalitions, which isolates opposing states by inducing potential balancers to buck-pass, bandwagon, or hide. Two cases—Great Britain's defensive attempts to accommodate Italy in the late 1930s a...

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Journal ArticleDOI

The Annexation of Crimea: A Realist Look from the Energy Resources Perspective

TL;DR: In this article, the role of energy resources in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian government is investigated, and it is shown that there were no major incentives for Russia to capture the Black Sea resources intrinsically, but these reserves were recognized as part of the main Ukrainian economic empowerment plan.
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Lessened allied dependence, policy tradeoffs, and undermining autonomy: focusing on the US-ROK and US-Philippines alliances

TL;DR: The authors sheds light on the structural causes of the complex and often seemingly contradictory aspects of junior allies' behavior in an era of global power rivalry, and shows that these relatively smaller US...

Reinforcing Wedging: Assessing China's Southeast Asia Policy in the Context of Indo-Pacific Strategy

Ruo-Fan Liu
TL;DR: In the context of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the primary goal of China's Southeast Asia policy is to reduce ASEAN countries' willingness and ability to rely on external powers to exert pressure on it, while strengthening the region's function as a bridge to the global industrial chain this paper .

The illusion of limited war: chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's calculated risk, July 1914

TL;DR: The responsibility for the outbreak of World War I weighed heavily upon Imperial Germany's fifth Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg as mentioned in this paper, who believed that "all nations are guilty; Germany, too, bears a large part of the blame." But he also admitted candidly: "Lord yes, in a certain sense it was a preventive war," motivated by "the constant threat of attack, the greater likelihood of its inevitability in the future, and by the mili? tary's claim: today war is still possible without defeat, but not in two
References
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Book

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