Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics
TL;DR: The wedge strategies that are likely to have significant effects use selective accommodation (concessions, compensations, and other inducements) to detach and neutralize potential adversaries.
Abstract: States use wedge strategies to prevent hostile alliances from forming or to disperse those that have formed. These strategies can cause power alignments that are otherwise unlikely to occur, and thus have significant consequences for international politics. How do such strategies work and what conditions promote their success? The wedge strategies that are likely to have significant effects use selective accommodation—concessions, compensations, and other inducements—to detach and neutralize potential adversaries. These kinds of strategies play important roles in the statecraft of both defensive and offensive powers. Defenders use selective accommodation to balance against a primary threat by neutralizing lesser ones that might ally with it. Expansionists use selective accommodation to prevent or break up blocking coalitions, which isolates opposing states by inducing potential balancers to buck-pass, bandwagon, or hide. Two cases—Great Britain's defensive attempts to accommodate Italy in the late 1930s a...
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01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: The seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather, one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and deformation as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and de‹ciency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself the enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency. (Ibn al-Haytham)1
512 citations
302 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors call for a research program focused on the dynamics of global power politics, rather than linking realpolitik to structural-realist theoretical frameworks or the putatively anarchical character of world politics, they treat power politics as an object of analysis in its own right.
Abstract: We call for a research program focused on the dynamics of global power politics. Rather than link realpolitik to structural-realist theoretical frameworks or the putatively anarchical character of world politics, the program treats power politics as an object of analysis in its own right. It embraces debate over the nature of global power politics among scholars working with distinctive approaches. It sees the structural contexts of power politics as highly variable and often hierarchical in character. It attenuates ex ante commitments to the centrality of states in global politics. And it takes for granted that actors deploy multiple resources and modalities of power in their pursuit of influence. What binds this diverse research program together is its focus on realpolitik as the politics of collective mobilization in the context of the struggle for influence among political communities, broadly understood. Thus, the study of the dynamics of collective mobilization—the causal and constitutive pathways linking efforts at mobilization with enhanced power—brings together approaches to security studies in a shared study of power politics.
89 citations
TL;DR: The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the present by Christopher Layne as discussed by the authors is a collection of influential articles on the history of the United States' foreign policy.
Abstract: The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. By Christopher Layne. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006. 290p. $29.95. For over a decade, through a series of influential articles, Christopher Layne has been the leading advocate within the academy of an entirely new and much more detached foreign policy strategy for the United States, one based upon what he calls “offshore balancing.” In The Peace of Illusions, Layne puts his argument in book form, addressing conceptual as well as historical and policy issues.
87 citations
01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose an alliance compensation theory to explain why some states that receive a nuclear security guarantee move towards, and sometimes back away from, nuclear weapons, and argue that allies become more likely to engage in nuclear behavior when they doubt the reliability of the security guarantees they receive from their major power patrons.
Abstract: Why do some states that receive a nuclear security guarantee move towards, and sometimes back away from, nuclear weapons? To answer these questions, I propose alliance compensation theory. I argue that allies become more likely to engage in nuclear behavior when they doubt the reliability of the security guarantees they receive from their major power patrons (e.g., the United States and the Soviet Union). Specifically, I show that allies evaluate the strength of these guarantees by referring to their patron’s overseas conventional military deployments and foreign policy doctrines – in short, its strategic posture. When the nuclear-armed patron implements undesirable conventional military redeployments (e.g., unilateral troop withdrawals), the ally loses confidence in the patron’s earlier pledges to provide it with military support in a future nuclear crisis. These doubts encourage the ally to adopt policies that range from signaling an interest in an nuclear arsenal to activating a nuclear weapons program. Allies that covertly undertake nuclear activities are seeking to produce an independent deterrent. Allies that overtly engage in nuclear behavior are also bargaining over the terms of their patron’s security guarantees. I further argue that the interaction of two variables – the ally’s economic and security dependence on the patron – affect the major power’s ability to force the ally to credibly renounce nuclear weapons acquisition. To test this argument, I include three main cases on West Germany, Japan, and South Korea in addition to narrower cases on the United Kingdom, France, and Soviet allies. I also draw on statistical analysis to investigate the relationship between conventional military withdrawals and the likelihood of US allies to engage in nuclear behavior.
58 citations
References
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Book•
01 Jan 1978
TL;DR: In this paper, Howard traces the centuries-long struggle by liberals to understand the causes of war and prevent its occurrence, from the days of Erasmus to American protestors who hoped to bring an end to the Vietnam war.
Abstract: It is said that war is rooted in the vested interests of the ruling class, but haven't democracies proved to be just as bellicose as other states? It is believed that political disputes should be settled by civilized negotiations, but what if the adversary is not, by accepted standards, "civilized"?Should states steer clear of other states' internal conflicts, or should they help liberate oppressed peoples? Which is the better option: appeasement or launching a war to end another? These questions reflect the complex issues that lie at the heart of the liberal conscience.In his timely book, Michael Howard recounts the centuries-long struggle by liberals to understand the causes of war and prevent its occurrence. From the days of Erasmus to American protestors who hoped to bring an end to the Vietnam war, Howard tracks liberals' shifting attitudes toward war and their attempts to wrestle with its problematic consequences. In conclusion, Howard finds that peacemaking is "a task which has to be tackled afresh every day of our lives."
214 citations
TL;DR: The absence of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated a new phenomenon known as soft balancing, in which states seek to undermine and restrain U. S. power in ways that fall short of classic measures.
Abstract: Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted a rise in balancing against the United States. More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Indeed, some analysts claim that signs of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated a new phenomenon known as soft balancing, in which states seek to undermine and restrain U.S. power in ways that fall short of classic measures. There is little credible evidence, however, that major powers are engaging in either hard or soft balancing against the United States. The absence of hard balancing is explained by the lack of underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United States under current conditions. Soft balancing is much ado about nothing: the concept is difficult to define or operationalize; the behavior seems identical to traditio...
211 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1991
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed coercive persuasion as an alternative to war as a coercive diplomacy alternative to the use of force in the Middle East, and proposed a coercive persuasion strategy as a substitute for war.
Abstract: Forceful persuasion : coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war , Forceful persuasion : coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war , کتابخانه دیجیتال و فن آوری اطلاعات دانشگاه امام صادق(ع)
207 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors lay out three considerations in a decision to intervene in a war, including the tradeoff between arms and allies, burden sharing, alliance management and duration, nonsecurity benefits, and domestic politics.
Abstract: States formalize some relations into military alliances. A formal commitment could increase credibility by signaling an intention to come to the aid of another state or by creating commitment by altering the costs and benefits of such intervention. In this review, I lay out three considerations in a decision to intervene in a war. Signals require some costs to trasmit information, and I examine some possible costs in alliances. A state's willingness to intervene could be enhanced by audience costs for failure to honor a commitment. Neorealist arguments about alliances are flawed in asserting that security is a public good and in failing to realize that all states have both status quo and revisionist interests. This review surveys a number of smaller topics in alliances—the tradeoff between arms and allies, burden sharing, alliance management and duration, nonsecurity benefits, and domestic politics.
195 citations
16 Dec 2010
TL;DR: This book discusses Mao's rise and fall, Khrushchev's Fall, and the collapse of the Military Alliance in Vietnam between 1964-1966.
Abstract: Maps viii Acknowledgments xi Abbreviations and Terms xiii Transliteration and Diacritical Marks xix Introduction 1 Chapter One: Historical Background, 1921-1955 19 Chapter Two: The Collapse of Socialist Unity, 1956-1957 46 Chapter Three: Mao's Challenges, 1958 80 Chapter Four: Visible Cracks, 1959 114 Chapter Five: World Revolution and the Collapse of Economic Relations, 1960 157 Chapter Six: Ambiguous Truce, 1961-1962 194 Chapter Seven: Mao Resurgent, 1962-1963 219 Chapter Eight: The American Factor, 1962-1963 246 Chapter Nine: Khrushchev's Fall and the Collapse of Party Relations, 1963-1966 273 Chapter Ten: Vietnam and the Collapse of the Military Alliance, 1964-1966 302 Conclusion 340 Essay on the Sources 353 Index 361
193 citations