Problem Gambling 'Fuelled on the Fly'.
14 Aug 2021-International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute)-Vol. 18, Iss: 16, pp 8607
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored problem gambling behavior and its psychological determinants and concluded that gamblers anchor on the most recent event, typically a small loss or rare win, which alters the psychological representations of substantial and accumulated loss in the past to a representation of negligible loss.
Abstract: Problem gambling is a gambling disorder often described as continued gambling in the face of increasing losses. In this article, we explored problem gambling behaviour and its psychological determinants. We considered the assumption of stability in risky preferences, anticipated by both normative and descriptive theories of decision making, as well as recent evidence that risk preferences are in fact 'constructed on the fly' during risk elicitation. Accordingly, we argue that problem gambling is a multifaceted disorder, which is 'fueled on the fly' by a wide range of contextual and non-contextual influences, including individual differences in personality traits, hormonal and emotional activations. We have proposed that the experience of gambling behaviour in itself is a dynamic experience of events in time series, where gamblers anchor on the most recent event-typically a small loss or rare win. This is a highly adaptive, but erroneous, decision-making mechanism, where anchoring on the most recent event alters the psychological representations of substantial and accumulated loss in the past to a representation of negligible loss. In other words, people feel better while they gamble. We conclude that problem gambling researchers and policy makers will need to employ multifaceted and holistic approaches to understand problem gambling.
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TL;DR: In this article , it is argued that the nudge theory overlooks the cognitive biases of political decision-makers, neglects the comparative perspective of the institutional environment in the face of such biases, and does not consider how construction of on-the-fly judgments works.
Abstract: Behavioral development economics promotes the nudge theory as a mechanism to incorporate people’s cognitive biases, steering their behavior in the desired direction through coercive state intervention. Cognitive biases become a reason to doubt the efficiency of decision-making psychology in the free market process. A fundamental assumption of this approach is that political decision-makers know the people’s means and ends in ways that protect them from cognitive biases. This article reviews and discusses the nudge theory, based on the boost theory developed by the Austrian School of Economics. The boost theory consists of a comparative institutional perspective to provide the empowerment people need to realize their errors and correct them “on the fly” to cultivate economic development. It is argued that the nudge theory overlooks the cognitive biases of political decision-makers, neglects the comparative perspective of the institutional environment in the face of such biases, and does not consider how construction of on-the-fly judgments works. After reviewing the principles of the nudge theory, its main criticisms from the boost theory are discussed, forming novel conclusions about and research avenues on behavioral development economics, according to the steering or empowering quality of the institutional environment.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors explore the lability of human risk preferences and argue that the most recent choices guide decision-making and provide a psychological tool that measures people's shift in preferences.
Abstract: Recent decision-making research provides empirical evidence that human risk preferences are constructed “on the fly” during risk elicitation, influenced by the decision-making context and the method of risk elicitation (Kusev et al., 2020). In this article, we explore the lability of human risk preferences and argue that the most recent choices guide decision-making. Accordingly, our novel proposal and experimental method provide a psychological tool that measures people's shift in preferences. Specifically, in our experiment (240 participants, registered UK users of an online survey panel), we developed and employed a two-stage risk elicitation experimental method. The results from the experiment revealed that providing participants with false feedback on their initial decisions (stage 1) changes their risk preferences at the feedback stage of the experiment in the direction of the false feedback. Moreover, participants' final decisions (stage 2) were influenced by the type of feedback (correct or false) and informed by their altered risk preferences at the feedback stage of the experiment. In conclusion, our work provides experimental evidence that human preferences are constructed “on the fly,” influenced by the decision-making context and recent decision-making experience (e.g., Kusev et al., 2020; Slovic, 1995).
3 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors used preference for precepts Implied in Moral Theories (PPIMT) as a measure of moral judgment, and examined if risk taking moderates the relationships between psychopathic tendencies and moral judgment.
Abstract: Research in empirical moral psychology has consistently found negative correlations between morality and both risk-taking, as well as psychopathic tendencies. However, prior research did not sufficiently explore intervening or moderating factors. Additionally, prior measures of moral preference (e.g., sacrificial dilemmas) have a pronounced lack of ecological validity. This study seeks to address these two gaps in the literature. First, this study used Preference for Precepts Implied in Moral Theories (PPIMT), which offers a novel, more nuanced and ecologically valid measure of moral judgment. Second, the current study examined if risk taking moderates the relationships between psychopathic tendencies and moral judgment. Results indicated that models which incorporated risk-taking as a moderator between psychopathic tendencies and moral judgment were a better fit to the data than those that incorporated psychopathic tendencies and risk-taking as exogenous variables, suggesting that the association between psychopathic tendencies and moral judgment is influenced by level of risk-taking. Therefore, future research investigating linkages between psychopathic tendencies and moral precepts may do well to incorporate risk-taking and risky behaviors to further strengthen the understanding of moral judgment in these individuals.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an umbrella review of the effectiveness of gambling preventive and harm reduction strategies, which can be implemented at a local level and targeted at adults, was conducted according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement.
Abstract: Concerns about negative consequences of gambling diffusion are increasing. Prevention and harm reduction strategies play a crucial role in reducing gambling supply and harms. This study aims to conduct an umbrella review of the effectiveness of gambling preventive and harm reduction strategies, which can be implemented at a local level and targeted at adults. It was conducted according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement. Sixteen reviews were analyzed, and 20 strategies were selected and classified in 4 areas with different targets and aims. Reducing the supply of gambling is an effective strategy both for the general population and for risky or problematic gamblers. Demand reduction interventions have been found to have limited effects but most of them are mainly focused on knowledge about risks and odds ratios. Risk reduction strategies aim to reduce contextual risk factors of the area where gambling is provided, change the gambling locations’ features, and modify individual behaviors while gambling. Smoking and alcohol bans or restrictions are considered one of the most effective strategies. Finally, harm reduction strategies targeted at problematic gamblers are potentially effective. Some relevant implementation conditions are identified and the results show inconsistent effects across different targets.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors analyzed the clinical profile of treatment-seeking patients with the comorbid presence of schizophrenia (SCZ) and gambling disorder (GD), which warrants new research to assess the network structure of this complex mental condition.
Abstract: Abstract Few studies have analyzed the clinical profile of treatment-seeking patients with the comorbid presence of schizophrenia (SCZ) and gambling disorder (GD), which warrants new research to assess the network structure of this complex mental condition. The aim of this study was to explore the organization of the symptoms and other clinical correlates of SCZ with GD. Network analysis was applied to a sample of N = 179 SCZ patients (age range: 19–70 years, mean=39.5, SD=9.9) who met clinical criteria for gambling disorder-related problems. Variables included in the network were the core GD symptoms according to the DSM-5, psychotic and paranoid ideation levels, global psychological distress, GD severity measures (debts and illegal behavior related with gambling), substances (tobacco, alcohol, and illegal drugs), and personality profile. The nodes with the highest authority in the network (variables of highest relevance) were personality traits and psychological distress. Four empirical modules/clusters were identified, and linkage analysis identified the nodes with the highest closeness ( bridge nodes) to be novelty seeking and reward dependence (these traits facilitate the transition between the modules). Identification of the variables with the highest centrality/linkage can be particularly useful for developing precise management plans to prevent and treat SCZ with GD.
References
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develop an alternative model, called prospect theory, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights.
Abstract: This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low prob- abilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (24), and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior, e.g. (15, 4). Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory (47, 36), and that most people actually do, most of the time. The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account of choice under risk. 2. CRITIQUE
35,067 citations
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01 Jan 1974TL;DR: The authors described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, availability of instances or scenarios, and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available.
Abstract: This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
31,082 citations
27,773 citations
TL;DR: The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways.
Abstract: The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.
15,513 citations
TL;DR: Cumulative prospect theory as discussed by the authors applies to uncertain as well as to risky prospects with any number of outcomes, and it allows different weighting functions for gains and for losses, and two principles, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion, are invoked to explain the characteristic curvature of the value function and the weighting function.
Abstract: We develop a new version of prospect theory that employs cumulative rather than separable decision weights and extends the theory in several respects. This version, called cumulative prospect theory, applies to uncertain as well as to risky prospects with any number of outcomes, and it allows different weighting functions for gains and for losses. Two principles, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion, are invoked to explain the characteristic curvature of the value function and the weighting functions. A review of the experimental evidence and the results of a new experiment confirm a distinctive fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability; risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability. Expected utility theory reigned for several decades as the dominant normative and descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty, but it has come under serious question in recent years. There is now general agreement that the theory does not provide an adequate description of individual choice: a substantial body of evidence shows that decision makers systematically violate its basic tenets. Many alternative models have been proposed in response to this empirical challenge (for reviews, see Camerer, 1989; Fishburn, 1988; Machina, 1987). Some time ago we presented a model of choice, called prospect theory, which explained the major violations of expected utility theory in choices between risky prospects with a small number of outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). The key elements of this theory are 1) a value function that is concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains,
13,433 citations