Processus d'apprentissage, savoirs complexes et traitement de l'information : un modèle théorique à l'usage des praticiens, entre sciences cognitives, didactique et philosophie des sciences.
11 Jun 2013-
TL;DR: Cherchant et al. as mentioned in this paper propose a modele allosterique, which is an interface between the sciences of education, the sciences cognitives, and the philosophy des sciences.
Abstract: Cherchant a etablir un pont theorique et pratique entre les sciences de l'education, les sciences cognitives et la philosophie des sciences, la these developpe un modele didactique a l'interface entre ces disciplines : le modele allosterique de l'apprendre initie et developpe par Giordan (1988) et al. (1992), qui s'inscrit dans le paradigme des theories du changement conceptuel. Nourri par les travaux recents des psychologues cognitifs sur les processus d'apprentissage tels que les theories du recyclage neuronal (Dehaene, 2007) ou de l'inhibition cerebrale (Houde & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003), ainsi que sur diverses theories relatives a l'elaboration de la pensee telles que l'economie comportementale (Tversky & Kahnernan, 1982) ou le modele-cadre SRK (Rasmussen, 1990), ce modele developpe et precise le concept d’allosterie a travers la description et la formalisation des processus de deconstruction-reconstruction des conceptions, qui ont lieu lors des apprentissages complexes. De la phase de theorisation du modele, effectuee par un recours aux formalismes de la reactivite chimique en accord avec la metaphore initiale de l'allosterie, il est possible de deduire divers environnements didactiques operatoires et feconds pour le praticien de l'enseignement et de la mediation scientifiques. Ces previsions theoriques sont alors mises a l'epreuve de l'experimentation didactique a travers une recherche de terrain centree sur la notion d'experience contre-intuitive (Eastes & Pellaud, 2004) menee aupres de differents types de publics.
Citations
More filters
272 citations
01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap, including performance errors, computational limitations, wrong norm being applied by the experimenter, and a different construal of the task by the subject.
Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experimenter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the model response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance errors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.
231 citations
Journal Article•
149 citations
79 citations
01 Dec 1997
TL;DR: In this article, positron emission tomography (PET) was used to examine the neural substrates of topographical memory retrieval in licensed London taxi drivers of many years experience while they recalled complex routes around the city.
Abstract: Functional imaging to date has examined the neural basis of knowledge of spatial layouts of large-scale environments typically in the context of episodic memory with specific spatiotemporal references. Much human behavior, however, takes place in very familiar environments in which knowledge of spatial layouts has entered the domain of general facts often referred to as semantic memory. In this study, positron emission tomography (PET) was used to examine the neural substrates of topographical memory retrieval in licensed London taxi drivers of many years experience while they recalled complex routes around the city. Compared with baseline and other nontopographical memory tasks, this resulted in activation of a network of brain regions, including the right hippocampus. Recall of famous landmarks for which subjects had no knowledge of their location within a spatial framework activated similar regions, except for the right hippocampus. This suggests that the hippocampus is involved in the processing of spatial layouts established over long time courses. The involvement of similar brain areas in routes and landmarks memory indicates that the topographical memory system may be primed to respond to any relevant topographical stimulation; however, the right hippocampus is recruited specifically for navigation in large-scale spatial environments. In contrast, nontopographical semantic memory retrieval involved the left inferior frontal gyrus, with no change in activity in medial temporal regions.
44 citations
References
More filters
[...]
74 citations
TL;DR: The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations.
Abstract: The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations. It is argued that these problems are all issues in philosophical logic, in the strong sense of requiring inputs from both logic and philosophy for their solution.
69 citations
01 Jan 2002
56 citations
Additional excerpts
...…cognitif particulier constitué de « cognitive artifacts, including anomalies, analogies, metaphors, epistemological beliefs, metaphysical beliefs, knowledge from other areas of inquiry, and knowledge from other areas of competing conceptions ». C’est également …...
[...]
TL;DR: It is shown here that for accuracy in numerical quantification, the adult brain still had to control the childlike cognition biases that are stored in a kind of developmental memory.
Abstract: Inhibition is a key executive function in adults and children for the acquisition and expression of cognitive abilities. Using event-related potentials in a priming adaptation of a Piaget-like numerical task taken from developmental psychology, we report a negative priming effect in adults measured just after the cognitive inhibition of a misleading strategy, the visuospatial length-equals-number bias. This effect was determined in the N200 information processing stage through increased N200 amplitude. We show here that for accuracy in numerical quantification, the adult brain still had to control the childlike cognition biases that are stored in a kind of “developmental memory.”
49 citations